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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Executive summary 
 
This is the official report from master thesis work performed spring 2007 for 
AstraZeneca Sweden Operations in Södertälje, Sweden.  
 
The study addresses the problem of Information Systems security (IS security) in the 
computerized systems used for manufacturing of pharmaceuticals within Sweden 
Operations. The thesis work was performed at the Södertälje site and was 
supervised by the Sweden Operations Information Technology (OIT) department and 
the Department of Automatic Control, Lund University, Sweden. The work is closely 
connected to the ISA 99 and also the ISA 95 standard. 
 
The main thought behind the ISA 99 standard is that a high level of IS security in 
computerized manufacturing environments cannot be achieved through just one 
project but needs long-term dedication. Therefore the ISA 99 standard suggests the 
implementation of an IS security program as the best way to reduce IS security risks 
to process automation systems and to sustain risk reduction over time.  
 
The overall objective of the study was to suggest an IS security program suitable for 
the pharmaceutical manufacturing at the AstraZeneca manufacturing and supply site 
in Södertälje, Sweden. The suggested IS security program can briefly be described 
as a long-term strategy for how to perform IS security activities in the manufacturing 
at the Södertälje site. The security program defines both technical and organizational 
requirements and recommendations. 
 
All production of pharmaceuticals within Sweden Operations is performed through 
batch manufacturing. The manufacturing is dependent on a variety of different 
processes and equipment and can briefly be described to consist of two main steps. 
Manufacturing of API (Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients) and manufacturing of drug 
product pharmaceuticals such as tablets, capsules or Turbuhaler devices (inhalators 
for respiratory diseases). The API is the substance in the drug that is intended to 
actively cure the consumer. 
 
The manufacturing of API uses Distributed Control Systems (DCS) for control of the 
process equipment. The manufacturing of drug product pharmaceuticals mainly use 
process equipment with Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) systems. The DCS 
and PLC systems are monitored from Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems. A SCADA system is basically a PC that also collects production 
data such as sensor trend data, and alarms and events from the DCS and PLC 
systems. These systems are commonly known as process automation systems. 
 
Due to regulatory requirements and the increasing business demands for sharing 
both real-time and other information within Sweden Operations, the process 
automation systems are becoming more and more connected to the AstraZeneca 
corporate network. With the increased connectivity to corporate networks and the use 
of commercial operating systems on SCADA clients, like Microsoft Windows, the 
process automation system becomes as vulnerable to IS security threats as normal 
office computers.  
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Most of the process automation systems at the Södertälje site are today connected to 
the DELTA network. The DELTA network is an internal network that interconnects 
different production area networks with the AstraZeneca corporate campus network 
(here named GAMMA) at the site. The DELTA network utilizes an architecture that is 
built upon the use of a demilitarized zone together with physical and logical network 
segmentations of the different production area networks. The systems and networks 
in the production of pharmaceuticals at the Södertälje site are presented in more 
detail in chapter 4. 
 
The intention with the DELTA architecture is to provide process automation systems 
with a secure environment, while still connected indirectly to the corporate campus 
network. The DELTA architecture is segmented according to global AstraZeneca IS 
security standards. Other AstraZeneca sites that are building and operating site 
networks might therefore find this study as a contributing source in their IS security 
compliance work. 
  
The first conclusion of the study is that the DELTA architecture and implemented IS 
security measures comply with global AstraZeneca IS security standards and 
recommendations. DELTA and the implemented IS security level also complies with 
to this date available and relevant industrial IS security standards concerning network 
architecture and IS security in the context of process automation systems. There are 
possibilities for improvements on local process automation systems in the different 
production areas at the Gärtuna and Snäckviken sub-sites. 
 
The second conclusion of the study is that the most severe IS security risk that 
threatens the process automation systems at the Södertälje site are: 
 
- An unknown virus from the corporate network (GAMMA) or the Internet, that the 
anti-virus in EPSILON (the demilitarized zone in the DELTA network) can resist, with 
major impact on all the different networks and production areas within the DELTA 
network (known as a Day zero scenario). 
 
- An IBM error that have major effects on both the DELTA network and the 
production area networks. Sweden Operations have outsourced the operation of the 
DELTA network to IBM. 
 
- Non-validated updates or patching of infrastructure services or network equipment 
prevents friendly communications or network services in the DELTA network. 
 
- Major virus infection from system providers in a production area network with PLC 
based process automation systems. 
 
- Major virus infection from direct-dial up access in a production area network with 
PLC based process automation systems. 
 
- Major incident due to remote access through a direct-dial up connection in a 
production area network with PLC based process automation systems. 
 
- Major incident due to virus outbreak from a non-standard SCADA client in a 
production area network with PLC based process automation systems. 
 
The built in architecture and IS security safeguards address most of the identified 
threat scenarios, except for the Day zero scenario. The Day zero scenario potential is 
well known to the site Local IS security managers. This report provides suggestions 
for improvements for reducing the severity of these risks.  
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The third conclusion of the study is that the main IS security risks with the possible 
implementation of a MES/EBR system within Sweden Operations are: 
 
- The scenario where the MES system malfunctions or becomes infested with a virus 
 
- The scenario where EBR critical systems becomes unavailable or infested with a 
virus 
 
- Increased wireless network vulnerabilities in the DELTA network 
 
- Wiretapping of information in the DELTA network 
 
- Problems with software for automatic validation of batches 
 
- Problems with electronic storage of records and traceability of batches 
 
The two first risks might force the production to undesired halts. Due to these risks, a 
conservative suggestion is to operate the MES/EBR system from inside the DELTA 
network. The implementation of a MES/EBR system and connection of a wireless 
network to the DELTA network demands thorough IS security risk assessment. 
 
Finally the study presents an IS security program or strategy suitable for the IS 
security work in the DELTA network and the operation process automation systems 
used within the Södertälje site. The structure of the security program is based on the 
ISA 99 ‘Manufacturing and Control Systems Security’ standard. The ISA 99 standard 
is today one of the most referred IS security standards in the process automation 
systems area. The main thought behind the IS security program is to simplify 
communications and increase the sharing of knowledge in order to increase the 
effectiveness in the IS security work within the production of pharmaceuticals and 
operation of process automation systems at the Södertälje site. 
 
 
1.2 AstraZeneca 
 
AstraZeneca is one of the worlds leading pharmaceutical companies. The company 
is dedicated to the discovery, development, manufacturing and marketing of high 
quality, effective prescription medicines that bring benefit for patients and add value 
for shareholders and wider society.  
 
AstraZeneca is a British-Swedish company with a global presence and enterprises in 
over 100 countries. The companies has a turnover of $26 billion and 66 000 
employees. The main medical areas are cancer, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, 
infection, neuroscience and respiratory and inflammation. [1] 
 
AstraZeneca Sweden employs 12800 in research (R&D), production (Operations) 
and marketing (ISMO). There are sites in Lund, Mölndal, Södertälje and Umeå. The 
sites in Lund and Mölndal are R&D sites. The site in Södertälje is used for both R&D 
and manufacturing of pharmaceuticals. AstraZeneca global R&D headquarters is 
also located at the site in Södertälje. The site in Umeå is mainly used for packaging 
of already prepared pharmaceuticals. [22] 
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1.2.1 AstraZeneca Sweden Operations 
 
The division for production and manufacturing of pharmaceuticals within AstraZeneca 
is Operations. Operations is the link between R&D and ISMO within AstraZeneca.  
The mission for Operations is to effectively produce pharmaceuticals and to provide 
the healthcare in different countries with valuable pharmaceuticals. The main 
objectives are manufacturing of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), production 
and packaging of the end product and quality control. [1] 
 
The Swedish part of Operations is called AstraZeneca Sweden Operations. Sweden 
Operations employs about 5000 and operate the sites in Södertälje and Umeå. 6 out 
of 10 of AstraZeneca globally most sold product are produced by Sweden 
Operations. This includes well-known products like Nexium, Losec and Turbuhaler. 
[22] 
 
The Södertäje site is divided into two sub-sites, the Gärtuna site and the Snäckviken 
site. The Gärtuna site is mainly dedicated for tablet production. The site has the 
largest pharmaceutical tablet and capsule production plant in the world. The 
Snäckviken site is mainly used for manufacturing of API, liquid pharmaceuticals and 
Turbuhaler pharmaceuticals. [22] 
 
API is for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients. The API is the part of the 
pharmaceuticals that is intended to actively cure or counteract a disease or symptom. 
The API is the basis of all other pharmaceuticals. Liquid pharmaceuticals are 
products that are provided to patients in liquid and intravenous forms. Turbuhaler 
products are consumed through breathing in the pharmaceuticals through a special 
device. 
 
1.2.2 Sweden Operations Information Services (OI) 
 
Information Services is the department within Sweden Operations that provides 
support and services for information systems and information technology (IS/IT). OI 
has 80 employees at the Södertälje site. 
 
The mission for OI is to provide solutions for IS/IT in a way that creates value for 
Sweden Operations. The vision is to work proactively and to work together with the 
different departments within Sweden Operations in a way that ensure that IS/IT 
improvements and solutions are realized. The goal is to make sure that IS/IT is used 
in an optimal and effective way within Sweden Operations. [39] [43] 
 
OI is responsible for providing network services and assuring that a satisfying level of 
IS security is maintained within Sweden Operations and in the production of 
pharmaceuticals at the Södertälje site. 
 
 
1.3 Problem formulation 
 
Sweden Operations is continuously aiming to become a more effective and 
integrated organization. The need for sharing both real-time and other information 
within Sweden Operations and also with other AstraZeneca companies is an 
important success factor. Due to regulatory compliance requirements there is also a 
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need for efficient storage of electronic records from the production. Therefore the 
presence and integration of computerized systems on all levels in the production of 
pharmaceuticals is increasing continuously and more and more manufacturing 
systems are being connected to the AstraZeneca corporate network. [44] [39] 
 
These systems cover all areas within the manufacturing, from order handling and 
information collection, down to process control and automation systems (process 
automation systems). With the increased hierarchical integration, increased network 
connectivity and implementation of modern automation equipment comes both 
benefits and problems. Benefits include possibilities to monitor the production in real-
time and possibilities for cost reductions through more efficient logistics, more 
efficient production processes and increased product quality. One of the major 
problems is to maintain a high level of IS security on the process automations 
systems used within the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals. [7] [5] [13] 
 
Standard office computers are protected against IS security threats by firewalls, 
updates to the operating systems and the use of anti-virus software. Many process 
automation systems are today delivered with computers that use standard operating 
systems like Microsoft Windows. Some process automation systems vendors provide 
control systems that use custom made operating systems or old standard operating 
systems. These operating systems were built with the intention of being used for 
automation and control equipment and might focus on real-time control and process 
reliability or are not supported with security upgrades. They were not built for 
resisting computer viruses or attacks from computer hackers. Therefore they might 
lack proper protection against virus infections and hostile intrusion.  [8] [13] 
 
The manufacturing of pharmaceuticals is highly regulated and all equipment used in 
the production must be validated according to different regulations that are 
transformed into rules and policies within Sweden Operations. The validation assures 
that the products are manufactured in a way that does not jeopardize the health of 
the consumers. The validation also assures that all products are traceable so that 
defect products always can be removed from the market. This means that if software 
on a process automation system is changed, updated or patched in some way, the 
equipment and system has to be revalidated. Validation is a costly and time-
consuming process that also might halt the production. Changing parameters on a 
process automation system might also invalidate support and warranty agreements 
with the vendor of the process automation system. The result of this is that a high 
level of IS security on the process automation systems either cannot be maintained 
or is very costly to maintain. [21] [53] [54] [32] 
 
With the connection to the corporate network comes a connection to the Internet. On 
the Internet lurk a variety of different threat sources like computer viruses, hackers, 
activists, terrorists and dubious organizations and companies. The manufacturing of 
pharmaceutical is generating large revenues, involves a lot of business secrets and 
due to the use of animal testing is of some people considered as non-ethical. This 
makes the process automation systems used in pharmaceutical manufacturing a 
vulnerable and legitimate target for IS security threats. Modern operating system 
enables easy connection of portable computer equipment like USB memories and 
CD-ROM discs. This also makes both intentional and unintentional injection of virus 
on process automation system a very present and possible threat. [6] [24]  
 
Thus maintaining a high level of IS security in this environment without interfering 
with the production is an important challenge for both Sweden Operations and 
Sweden Operations Information Services. Due to historical, technical and risk 
assessment reasons the different process automation systems used at the Södertälje 
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site have different standards and rules for IS security. Therefore there is need for an 
overall strategy or program for IS security for these systems. Furthermore, the 
strategy must make it easy to install new systems, and should therefore follow 
industrial standards. One of the most referred and accepted IS security standards for 
IS security in process automation systems is today the ISA 99 standard. [14] 
 
 
1.4 Objectives 
 
The overall objective of the study is to suggest a recommended overall IS security 
program suitable for the systems used for pharmaceutical manufacturing at the 
Södertälje site. The program must comply with the ISA 99 standard. 
 
In order to provide a background for the IS security program the first step is to 
evaluate the implemented IS architecture, the present IS security level and 
implemented IS security measures. The second step is to identify the most severe IS 
security risks that are present to the process automation systems and connect this to 
financial aspects to provide a business case background to the IS security program. 
 
The goal is also to suggest important improvements for IS security measures on 
process automation systems and to connect the work to relevant business aspects. 
The work should be made in connection to relevant available guidelines and industry 
standards for IS security in manufacturing systems with focus on architecture and 
network aspects. 
 
The ongoing installation of MES/EBR (Manufacturing execution system/Electronic 
batch records) components should also be taken into consideration. Therefore the 
objective is also to investigate how the implementation of a new MES/EBR system 
have impact on the IS security level in the production at the Södertälje site. 
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Fig. 1.1 Problem formulation 
 
 
1.5 Production areas used in the study 
 
At the Södertälje site there are numerous production plants and areas. To limit the 
study two production areas were chosen to represent the IS security context within 
pharmaceutical manufacturing at the site. The production areas used in the study 
was chosen in order to be of strategic importance for Sweden Operations, in order to 
be suitable in an IS perspective, in order to be suitable in a technical perspective and 
finally for practical reasons.  
 
The product areas cover Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) production and 
tablet production and thus in principal includes all the general production steps and 
the different automation equipment (DCS and PLC systems) that is used in the 
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals at the Södertälje site. 
 
The production area used for manufacturing of API is the ALFA plant at the 
Snäckviken sub-site. [34] 
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The production area used for analysing IS security in manufacturing of tablets is the 
BETA plant at the Gärtuna sub-site. [42] 
 
 
1.6 Key assumptions and delimitations 
 
1.6.1 Limitations of studied natural threats and Lab aspects 
 
The risk analysis part of the study is limited to scenarios that are induced by the 
threats described in the theory chapter, Wiretapping and scanning of the network, 
malicious code, human errors and Interference of systems and communications. 
Therefore physical or natural threats in the form of cables being dug up, burglary and 
natural events including storms, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes are generally 
considered as outside the scope of the study. The physical threats and aspects of IS 
security are considered but not addressed and analyzed in the study. 
 
The lab systems in the production at the Södertälje site have not been studied in 
detail during the study. Early in the study it was concluded that the lab systems 
maintain a satisfying IS security level and have limited impact on the production in 
the scenario of IS security incidents. Therefore the focus has been on production 
area systems and networks. 
 
1.6.2 Practical limitations 
 
Due to the scope of the study and for practical reasons, all systems and networks 
used in the production of pharmaceuticals within Sweden Operations are not 
investigated and observed in detail. The scope of the study is more focused on the 
management and support level of IS security than on technical system and network 
issues. The large amount and great complexity of the systems and networks within 
Sweden Operations also makes it impossible to perform a detailed study of all the 
different production areas, networks and systems. 
 
1.6.3 Umeå site connection 
 
The DELTA network today connects to the Umeå site. This study assumes that this 
connection not exists. Due to upcoming downsizing within Sweden Operations the 
site might be closed in a near future. [26] 
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1.7 Definitions and information for the reader 
 
This section provides some useful definitions and information to increase the reading 
value of this report. For more definitions, please refer to the ISA 99 standard, Part 1 
‘Concepts, Terminology and Models’. [13] 
 
1.7.1 Process automation systems 
 
A system collection of hardware and software that can affect or influence the safe, 
secure and reliable operation of an industrial process. 
 
These systems include, but are not limited to; industrial control systems, including 
distributed control systems (DCS), programmable logic controllers (PLC), remote 
terminal units (RTU), intelligent electronic devices, supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA), networked electronic sensing and control, and monitoring and 
diagnostic systems. [13] 
 
Associated information systems such as advanced or multivariable control, online 
optimizers, dedicated equipment monitors, graphical interfaces, process historians, 
manufacturing information systems (MIS), manufacturing execution systems (MES), 
plant information management systems, associated internal, human, network, or 
machine interfaces used to provide control, safety, and manufacturing operations 
functionality to batch processes are also included in this definition. [13] 
 
Systems operated from the corporate network are outside of the scope of the study. 
 
1.7.2 Information systems (IS) security 
 
The ISA 99 standard refers to information systems security as cyber security. This 
study utilizes the term information systems security. The objective of IS security 
measures is to preclude; unauthorized use of, denial of service to, modifications to, 
disclosure of, loss of revenue from, or destruction of critical systems or informational 
assets in an effort to reduce the risk of causing personal injury or endangering public 
health, losing public or consumer confidence, disclosing sensitive assets, failing to 
protect business assets or failing to comply with regulations. [13] 
 
This includes the concepts of identification, authentication, accountability, 
authorization, availability, and privacy of information systems. These concepts are 
applied to any system in the production process and include both stand-alone and 
networked components. Communications between systems may be either through 
internal messaging or by any human or machine interfaces that authenticate, 
operate, control or exchange data with any of these control systems. [13] 
 
The terms IS security and security have in general the same meaning in this report. 
The term security has a somewhat broader meaning including more physical and 
natural aspects.  
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1.7.3 Demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
 
A demilitarized zone is a perimeter network segment that is logically between internal 
and external networks. The purpose of a demilitarized zone is to enforce the internal 
network’s policy for external information exchange and to provide external, 
untrustworthy sources with restricted access to releasable information while shielding 
the internal network from outside attacks. In the context of industrial automation and 
control systems, the term ‘internal network’ is typically applied to the network or 
segment that is the primary focus of protection. For example, a process automation 
systems network could be considered ‘internal’ when connected to an ‘external’ 
business network (here known as a corporate network). [13] 
 
A Day zero scenario occurs when the demilitarized zone is severely infected with a 
virus. If the demilitarized zone is infected the virus will easily spread to all connected 
‘internal’ networks since they maintain a lower level of IS security than the 
demilitarized zone. 
 
1.7.4 Hardening of computer systems 
 
Hardening of computer systems is the process of securing a system. This work is 
especially done to protect systems against potential attackers and intrusion. This 
includes removal of unnecessary usernames or logins and the disabling or removal 
of unnecessary services or applications. This may also involve, among other 
measures closing open USB, CD-ROM and floppy drive ports and network ports, 
setting up intrusion-detection and prevention systems, firewalls and a higher level of 
password IS security..  
 
In this study hardening also includes the process of patching operating systems and 
use of anti-virus software against malicious codes, and ensuring that the possibility 
for an operator or user of a process automation system, to intentionally or 
unintentionally abuse the system is minimized. [31] 
 
1.7.5 Outsourcing of IT infrastructure and services to IBM 
 
In 2001 AstraZeneca signed a global outsourcing agreement with IBM for providing 
IT infrastructure and service. For Sweden Operations this creates a complex 
management system for management of systems, computer equipment and 
networks. The person or organization within Sweden Operations that is responsible 
for a system or a 'service', 'owns' and define the requirements the system or service 
must meet. Based on the requirements, IBM delivers the operating software, 
applications and the hardware that is necessary for the system or service. The third 
part in this management system is the IT services department. IT services is an 
AstraZeneca function that basically is responsible for ensuring that IBM delivers what 
is agreed. IT services also provide expert knowledge and different support services 
to Operations, R&D and other AstraZeneca functions. 
 
There are of course a lot of deviations from this model. For example, for some 
systems used in the production, IBM only provides standard PC clients and network 
equipment and not the control equipment or the control software used in the process 
automation systems. Other systems and networks in the production are not provided 
by or maintained at all by IBM. These systems also have a system owner, a system 
manager and a system service provider but are not using IBM. This makes the 
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network and system architecture within Sweden Operations very complex to analyze 
and model. 
 
Common to all systems and networks are that they have a system owner, system 
manager and system providers. The system owner is responsible for the system and 
defines the properties of the system. The system manager is responsible for 
governing the system and the service provider enable or deliver the actual system. 
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1.8 Disposition 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction                             
The background and the objective of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 – Theory 
Provides the theoretical background that form the basis for the study including 
standards, IS security background and regulatory aspects. 
 
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
Describes the methodology that was used for performing the study and the tools for 
IS security risk analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 – A reference architecture for the DELTA context 
Systems and networks used in the production are presented together with a suitable 
reference architecture for the DELTA context. 
 
Chapter 5 – Evaluation of the DELTA architecture and IS security level 
compliance 
This chapter evaluate the DELTA architecture and the IS security safeguarding 
efforts that are present to the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals at the Södertälje 
site. The work is performed through connecting to current available IS security 
standards. 
 
Chapter 6 – Identification and analysis of IS security risks  
A complete IS security analysis of the reference architecture is conducted to provide 
suggested improvements and a background for an IS security program. 
 
Chapter 7 – DELTA ISA 99 security program  
A suggested IS security program for the DELTA context. The structure of the 
program is based on the ISA 99 standard. 
 
Chapter 8 – MES/EBR implementation and IS security 
This chapter briefly discuss how the implementation of a MES/EBR system affects 
the IS security level in the DELTA network. Some suggestions for the implementation 
are provided. 
 
Chapter 9 – Conclusions 
Presents the main conclusions in the study and some input for future work, 
investigations and research. 
 
Chapter 10 – References 
Information sources used in the study. 
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2 Theory 
 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
The theoretical background of the study is mainly based on ISA standards, 
AstraZeneca and various national standards, guidelines and policies. The standards 
and guidelines address IS security in relation to process automation systems. 
 
Criterions for evaluating IS security and the network architecture as well as possible 
IS security threats and agents are also presented in this chapter. The last part of the 
chapter provides a brief picture of the regulations that have impact on the process of 
manufacturing pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
2.2 Standards, guidelines and policies 
 
2.2.1 ISA 95 Enterprise-Control System Integration 
 
The ISA 95 Enterprise-Control System Integration standard is a technical standard 
that defines the interface between enterprise activities and control related activities in 
a company. The Standard addresses the functional hierarchy in a manufacturing 
company and the interconnection between the different functions. The goal is to 
improve the effectiveness in manufacturing by having enterprise systems and 
manufacturing systems that inter-operate and easily integrate. In this study ISA 95 is 
mainly used for providing a hierarchical model to increase the visibility of the different 
computer systems and networks that are involved in the study. [12] 
 
2.2.2 ISA 99 Security for industrial Automation and Control 
Systems 
 
The ISA 99 Security for industrial Automation and Control Systems standard address 
the rising problem of security in industrial automation and control systems. The 
standard focus on electronic security (also known as IS or cyber security) for these 
systems. The standard focuses on level 0 through 3 of the ISA 95 hierarchical model 
(section 2.3). Level 4 and above are not explicitly addressed but the integrity of data 
exchanged between level 3 and above are considered. The standard is still being 
developed and will consist of four parts. At present and unfortunately, only part one 
and two are close to being published. Part 1 address concepts, terminology and 
models related to cyber security (IS security). Part 2 address how to establish an 
industrial automation and control systems security program. In this study ISA 99 
provides a background and framework for modelling and analysing IS security in 
process automation systems. The standard is also used as framework for developing 
an IS security program. [13] [14] 
 
There are also two ISA 99 Technical reports available. These are used in the study to 
provide technical guidance, ideas and suggested improvements for IS security. [15] 
[16] 
 17
2.2.3 AstraZeneca documents 
 
The AstraZeneca policy document Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the 
Security of Process Automation Services is a global Operations policy document for 
how to implement security in the company’s process automation systems. The 
AstraZeneca guideline Secure Network Isolation of Process Automation Computer 
Systems form a deeper background to the document above and complement with 
guidelines for a recommended system architecture for process control networks and 
systems. Both documents are composed by the AstraZeneca Global Automation 
Strategy Team (GAST). The documents are described in more detail below. [31] [32] 
 
Except for the GAST documents, numerous AstraZeneca routines (RUT), standard 
operating procedures (SOP), Beskrivning av datoriserat system (BaDS) (English: 
Description of computerized system) and other AstraZeneca documents, are also 
used for various purposes within the study. Many AstraZeneca documents are 
confidential.  
 
2.2.4 NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for 
SCADA and Process Control Networks 
 
The NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process 
Control Networks is a document published by the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure in UK. NISCC is for the National infrastructure security co-
ordination centre (UK). The document discusses firewalls; common process 
automation networks segregation architectures and firewall implementations, 
configuration and management. The document is here mainly used for discussing 
process automation networks segregation architectures. Eight different approaches 
for segregation of process control and automation systems are presented and 
evaluated after three criteria’s; security, manageability and scalability. The document 
also discus some special or future technologies, that might be of interest for the 
research area. The document is widely referred to in research papers and documents 
that are of interest for the scope of this study. [17] 
 
2.2.5 NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) and industrial Control Systems Security 
 
The NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and industrial 
Control Systems Security is a document with recommendations from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA. The document provide an 
overview of industrial control systems and the IS security threats and vulnerabilities 
of such systems. It discusses IS security program development and deployment for 
such programs. It also discusses network architectures and IS security controls for 
industrial control systems. The document is in this study mainly used to provide ideas 
for suitable network segmentations. [18] 
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2.2.6 DHS Control Systems Cyber Security: Defence-in-depth 
strategies 
 
Control Systems Cyber Security: Defence-in-depth strategies is a document from the 
department of Homeland Security (DHS), USA. The document provides information 
about current IS security challenges for SCADA and control systems. The intention 
with the use in this study is to evaluate the defense-in-depth capability of the 
architecture and IS security measures that are implemented, example shown in 
figure 2.1. The defence-in-depth strategies are presented as the use of: [11] 
 
- Firewalls 
 
- Creation of demilitarized zones (DMZ) 
 
- Intrusion detection and prevention systems 
 
- Security policies 
 
- Security training 
 
- Incident response capacity 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.1 Example of defence-in-depth strategy architecture (copyright © DHS) 
 
 
2.2.7 AstraZeneca Secure Network Isolation of Process Automation 
Computer Systems 
 
The purpose of this AstraZeneca Operations document is to ensure the continuity of 
the process automation infrastructure in the event of a network-based security 
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incident, by describing an approach and set of principles to the networking of process 
automation systems. The intention is to provide a high degree of protection against 
incidents in a specific automation system as well as against incidents in the 
AstraZeneca network infrastructure. The document consists of both mandatory and 
guiding principles for the implementation of process automation systems and 
networks.  
 
The document uses a terminology that defines every kind of equipment that connects 
to, and communicates via, the local site network as a device. A device can be a 
server, workstation, and process automation or network equipment. The term 
segment is used for defining a set of devices that communicate with each other but 
connects to the rest of the network through a device that controls the communication 
in a desired way. 
 
The fundamental part of the guideline is to divide the whole AstraZeneca network 
and devices into different classes according to the level of protection. The size and 
complexity of the AstraZeneca network makes it impractical to implement the same 
level of protection and IS security in all parts of the network.  
 
The devices are therefore divided into GOLD, SILVER and BRONZE classes. GOLD 
network segments contain only GOLD devices. SILVER network segments only 
contain devises with at least SILVER protection. All other segments are designated 
BRONZE. 
 
Devices connected to GOLD have in-support software versions, implement all 
AstraZeneca standards and have full and up-to-date patching of operating systems 
and up-to-date anti-virus protection. New patches are applied to GOLD devices as 
the highest priority within hours of release and through automated processes if 
possible. Devices that are critical to the operation of the corporate and internal 
networks are maintained as GOLD devices.  
 
Devices connected to SILVER have in-support software versions, implement all 
AstraZeneca standards and have full and up-to-date patching and anti-virus 
protection. Application of new patches takes a longer time due to the number and 
diversity of devices involved. 
 
BRONZE connected devices do not fully apply to global AstraZeneca IS security 
standards. Patching and anti-virus is not possible or not fully within AstraZeneca 
control mainly because of the need for vendor intervention and due to regulatory 
compliance problems. 
 
Based on this definition the document presents recommendations and mandatory 
principles for architecture and hardening of process automation systems and 
networks. The guideline also presents a recommended IS architecture for the 
protection of process automation systems networks. [32] 
 
The principles can be summarized as: 
 
a.  
When possible, process automation systems should run on up-to-date operating 
systems and have installed and up-to-date anti-virus software. 
 
b.  
Process automation systems should be hardened as much as possible. 
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c. 
Effective control must be in place to prevent unauthorized electronic access, remote 
access and connection of portable computer equipment to process automation 
systems and networks.  
 
d.  
Risk assessment and understanding of network traffic flows to, from and within the 
process automation systems and networks must be performed. 
 
e.  
Mandatory network segmentation architecture for process automation systems 
network infrastructure.  
 
 
 
Fig 2.2 AstraZeneca mandatory network segmentation 
 
 
d.  
Ensuring that remote access to process automation systems meet AstraZeneca 
global network security standards. 
 
2.2.8 AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the 
Security of Process Automation Services 
 
This document defines an AstraZeneca Operations policy for the security and control 
of its process automation and associated laboratory-based systems. It is a document 
intended for AstraZeneca Operations globally. The document defines mandatory 
standards and good practice principles for protecting these systems from physical 
and electronic attacks.  
 
 
Corporate 
network 
Process segment 1 Process segment 2 Process segment 3 
Connection  
Services 
Segment 
Local Services 
Segment 
Network device 1 
Network device 2 
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Where possible process automation systems should be maintained and protected 
according to the rules and standards for corporate IT systems. As described in the 
introduction, process automation systems cannot always fulfil the IS security 
standards for corporate IT systems. Therefore the document defines the rules for 
protection based on how the different systems are connected to the corporate 
network. There are four different kinds of network connectivity for the different 
process automation devices: 
 
- Devices connected directly to the corporate network (network connectivity scenario 
a) 
 
- Devices within securely isolated networks with indirect connectivity to the corporate 
network as defined in [32]. (b) 
 
- Groups of locally networked devices with no connection to the corporate network. 
(c) 
 
- Devices with no network connection. (d) 
 
Devices within (a) must meet all mandatory standards in the document. Devices in 
(b) must have local site approval for exceptions from mandatory aspects. Devices 
within (c, d) should meet all mandatory standards defined in the document where 
possible.  
 
This is to be done through an implementation of a framework built on a background 
from industry process automation system and IS security. The framework focus on 
actions and aspects divided into seven themes: 
 
- Establish ongoing governance 
 
- Implement secure architecture and processes 
 
- Understand the residual business risks 
 
- Establish response capabilities 
 
- Improve awareness and skills 
 
- Manage third party risks 
 
- Engage projects 
 
The different themes describe what is mandatory and what is good practice for 
systems depending on their network connectivity. Thus the document presents 
something of a generic program for IS security in process automation systems within 
AstraZeneca Operations. Deviations from compliance of mandatory aspects demand 
either global IS Security approval for exceptions or approval for local IS security for 
exceptions, depending on the severity of the deviations from the document. [31] 
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2.3 ISA Hierarchical Reference Model 
 
2.3.1 ISA 95 functional and equipment hierarchy modeling 
 
The ISA 95 functional hierarchy model depends of defining the different activities 
within a manufacturing enterprise to certain specific levels. Activities on level 4 
typically include plant production scheduling and operational management and the 
business-related activities needed to manage a manufacturing organization. 
Functions include enterprise or regional financial systems and other enterprise 
infrastructure components. [12] 
 
Activities on level 3 include activities like detailed production scheduling, data 
collection and acquisition, quality management, process management and the 
functions involved in managing the work flows to produce the desired end products. 
[12] 
 
Activities on level 2 include supervisory control. Activities on level 1 and 0 include 
direct control and the process. Functions here include batch control, continuous 
control and discrete control depending on the manufacturing processes. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is mainly performed through batch production. [12] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 ISA 95 functional hierarchy 
 
 
The equipment hierarchy model defines the areas of responsibility for the different 
functions in the hierarchy model. [12] 
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Figure 2.4 ISA 95 equipment hierarchy 
 
 
An enterprise is a collection of one or more sites and may contain sites and areas. 
The enterprise is responsible for determining what products will be manufactured, at 
which sites they will be manufactured, and in general how they will be manufactured. 
 
A site is a physical, geographical or logical grouping determined by the enterprise. It 
may contain areas and process cells. The level 4 functions at a site are involved in 
local site management and optimization. Site planning and scheduling may involve 
process cells within the areas. 
 
An area is a physical, geographical or logical grouping determined by the site. It may 
contain process cells, production units and production lines. Most level 3 functions 
occur within the area. Areas generally have well-defined manufacturing capabilities 
and capacities that are made up of different process cells.  
 
As mentioned above pharmaceutical manufacturing is mainly performed through 
batch production. Therefore level 0, 1, 2 are here considered as a process cell. This 
includes the process, the basic control equipment (a PLC or DCS system) and 
monitoring equipment (SCADA system). The process cell is the lowest element 
scheduled by operations on level 3 and 4. [12] 
 
2.3.2 ISA hierarchical reference model 
 
The ISA 99 standard use a hierarchical reference model for systems from level 0 
(Process) to level 4 (Enterprise). The model is derived from the model in ISA 95. The 
reference model describes a generic view of an integrated manufacturing or 
production system, expressed as a series of logical levels. The model provides a 
map of for the various systems in the enterprise for increased understanding and 
visibility of the system activities and functions. [13]  
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Fig. 2.5 ISA hierarchical reference model 
 
 
Computer systems used on the enterprise level are business systems. This includes 
for example accounting, logistics and production planning and business-to-business 
activities. MIS systems are systems for collecting information from the production and 
MES systems are used for executing the production. The data from production and 
corporate functions is used for optimization and detailed production scheduling.  
 
SCADA systems typically consist of two PCs connected to the control equipment on 
level 1. The PCs are used for monitoring, collecting information and controlling the 
control equipment (PLC or DCS equipment and systems in this study). PLC and DCS 
are equipment that reads sensor values and if necessary executes control algorithms 
that change actuator and valve positions in the process (level 0). [13] 
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2.4 ISA 99 Zone and conduit model 
 
The ISA 99 standard suggest the use of a key model for IS security analysis and 
implementation of IS security programs, the Zone and conduit model. By dividing the 
whole structure of the company network and computer systems into different zones 
and conduits, the security analysis can be improved. The intention with the use of the 
zone and conduit model in this study is to provide a tool for IS security analysis of 
Sweden Operations process automation systems and networks and to support the 
development of an IS security program. 
 
The Zone and conduit model suggest a way to model the structure of the networks 
and systems in order to be able to identify assets and the risks connected to those 
assets. Therefore the first step in the model is an asset model that defines entities 
that are relevant to protect. Assets are systems and devices that are valuable and 
need protection against threats and disturbances. Assets can also be modelled in a 
hierarchical way where different assets contain sub-assets. [13] 
 
The entities modelled in the asset model build up a reference architecture of the 
systems and networks. A reference architecture is specific to each situation under 
review and will be specific for that analysis. Each organization creates one or more 
reference architectures depending on the business functions performed, as well as 
the functions under review. According to the standard it would be common for an 
organization to have a single reference architecture for the general enterprise that 
has been generalized to cover all operating facilities. Each facility or type of facility 
may also have a more detailed reference network architecture that is used for 
expanding the model of the general enterprise model. [13] 
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Figure 2.6 Hierarchical asset model example (Copyright 2006 © ISA) 
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Figure 2.7 Reference architecture example (Copyright 2006 © ISA) 
 
 
The reference architecture is then split up into defined security zones and conduits 
that interconnect the different zones. This model helps to assess common threats, 
vulnerabilities, and the corresponding countermeasures needed to attain the level of 
security required to protect the grouped assets. By grouping assets in this manner, a 
security policy can be defined for all assets that are members of a zone or a conduit. 
[13] 
 
The security zones can contain other zones, assets or a combination of both. For 
every zone some characteristics or attributes are defined. Zone attributes that are 
relevant for this study are:  
 
- Asset inventory 
 
- Zone security policy 
 
- Access requirement and controls 
 
- Threat scenarios and vulnerabilities 
 
Conduits are special security zones that apply to specific communication processes. 
That is, the conduit is the wiring, routers, switches, firewalls and other devices that 
are used for communication within and between different zones. The conduit can be 
seen as a pipe that connects the different zones and that are used for communication 
within zones. The conduit cannot be made up of other sub-conduits and has similar 
characteristics as the zones: [13] 
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- Asset inventory 
 
- Conduit security policy 
 
- Access requirement and controls 
 
- Threats scenarios and vulnerabilities 
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Figure 2.8 Zones and conduit example (Copyright 2006 © ISA) 
 
 
The zone security policy and access requirement and controls here includes the 
security measures associated with the zone, activities permitted within the zone and 
the types of communication allowed access to and through the zone. The asset 
inventory includes assets that are valuable and worth protecting against threats 
inside the scope of this study. Assets can be both physical and abstract entities like 
servers, humans, the reputation of a company and valuable information. Threats and 
vulnerabilities represent possible identified threat scenarios based on the threats 
identified in section 2.7, which might harm or interfere with the identified assets. [13] 
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2.5 Development of an ISA 99 Security program 
 
According to the ISA 99 Part 2: Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control 
Systems Security Program, the development of a cyber security program for process 
automation consists of at least 18 essential steps. The 18 steps provide 18 key 
elements of the IS security program. These elements are considered to be applicable 
on all different environments, conditions and situations for a manufacturing industry 
or site. The 18 key elements are: [14] 
 
- Importance of cyber security in business 
 
- Scope of the security program 
 
- Organizational security 
 
- Security policy 
 
- Personnel security 
 
- Physical and environmental security 
 
- Incident planning and response (DRP) 
 
- Access control 
 
- Information and Document management 
 
- System development and maintenance 
 
- Staff training and security awareness 
 
- Business continuity plan (BCP) 
 
- Maintaining and implementing improvements 
 
- Infrastructure-related operations and change management 
 
- Risk identification, classification and assessment 
 
- Risk management and implementation 
 
- Monitoring and reviewing of the security program 
 
- Compliance with policies and regulations 
 
For a more detailed picture of the 18 elements and the suggested process for 
developing an IS security program, please refer to the ISA 99 standard Part 2. [14] 
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2.6 Criterions for evaluation of the architecture and IS 
security compliance 
 
To evaluate the implemented network and system architecture for Sweden 
Operations it is important to connect the architecture to internal AstraZeneca 
standards and guidelines and to industrial standards and guidelines. IS security for 
industrial automation and control systems is an active research area. There are also 
a great variety of needs and threats for different industries. Therefore there is no 
universally adopted industry standard for recommended IS security safeguards 
implementation and suitable network architectures. The presented standards and 
guidelines represent international, national and industry references that are available 
today. This is considered to offer a good reference framework from both industry and 
AstraZeneca perspectives.  
 
The criterions used for evaluation of the architecture and implemented security and 
the costs for implementing the security measures, are presented below. The 
criterions are mainly based on the criteria’s used in the NISCC Good Practice Guide 
on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control Networks document and on 
ISA 99 course material. [17] [20] [31]  
 
2.6.1 Architecture security and IS security program implementation 
 
The security criterion is maybe the most important criteria. It indicates the overall 
likely effectiveness of the architecture and implemented IS security measures to 
prevent possible attacks.  
 
2.6.2 Architecture scalability and manageability 
 
The overall ability of the architecture to be effectively deployed in both large and 
small systems or in large numbers. This also implies ability to expand the 
architecture. The overall manageability of the architecture indicates the ability of the 
architecture to be easily and effectively managed.  
 
2.6.3 Architecture security versus cost 
 
The last criteria can be seen as a summary of the criterions above. The probable 
cost of a security breach moves toward zero as the security level of the architecture 
and implemented security increases. At the same time the cost of security 
countermeasures increases with the security level, such as modeled in figure 2.9. 
Focus in this study is on the architectural aspects of IS security. 
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Fig. 2.9 Cost versus security 
 
 
Thus there theoretically exists an optimal security level for minimal cost. In this 
criterion the architecture ability to use common hardware for applications must also 
be addressed. This means for example that applications used by different process 
automation systems might access the same database for process history collection. 
Therefore the possible use for sharing hardware for common applications also is 
weighted into the architecture and security versus cost criteria. [20] 
 
 
2.7 ISA 99 IS security threats 
 
To understand the possible IS security threats that endanger process automation 
systems it is important to understand the possible threat agents and the possible 
vulnerabilities to the systems. Common to all attackers or threat agents is the 
intentional or unintentional challenge to first gain access to the process automation 
networks and systems. Therefore it is important to understand the possible threat 
agents and second how they will gain access to process automation network and 
systems. [24] 
 
ISA 99 defines threats as possible harmful actions that can be taken against a 
process automation system. Threats may be either passive or active. A passive 
threat is a threat that does not interfere with the affected system. A passive threat 
might include actions performed by the intruder to gather information that might be 
valuable or being useful in later performing an active attack. [13] 
 
Active threats directly interfere with the affected system and come in various forms 
described in the standard. Active threats are here summarized as malicious code, 
human errors and interference of systems and communications. [13] 
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2.7.1 Threat agents 
 
The ISA 99 standard present five forms of threat agents: [13] 
 
Insiders  
An insider is a ‘trusted’ person, employee, contractor, or supplier who has information 
that is not generally known to the public. 
 
Outsiders 
An outsider is a person or group not ‘trusted’ with inside access, which may or may 
not be known to the targeted organization. Outsiders may or may not have been 
insiders at one time. 
 
Natural 
Natural events include storms, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes, and are generally 
considered a physical risk. Natural threats are considered as outside of the scope of 
the study. 
 
Accidental 
Someone unfamiliar with proper procedure and policy or an honest oversight causes 
an accidental risk. It is also likely that an organization does not know all the risks and 
may uncover them by accident as it operates complex industrial automation and 
control systems. 
 
Non-validated changes  
Updates, corrections, and other changes to operating systems, application programs, 
configurations, connectivity, and equipment can provide an unexpected security 
threat to the industrial automation and control systems. 
 
2.7.2 Wire-tapping and scanning of networks 
 
Wire-tapping and scanning of networks are passive threats. Wire-tapping means that 
the intruder gathers information that is transmitted on a network. The information can 
then be used for identifying business plans or valuable information. The intruder 
might also perform a scan of the network topology or scan for open ports in firewalls 
and systems. This information can later be used for performing an active attack 
against the system. [13] [20] 
 
2.7.3 Malicious codes (Computer virus) 
 
Malicious code is a program that might gather information about the system or 
process, destroy or falsify system data, halt the system with time-consuming 
operations or provide foothold for further intrusion in the system. Some viruses also 
replicate themselves and try to infect systems connected to the infested computer 
system.  
 
Examples of malicious codes are computer viruses, worms and Trojan horses. Virus 
can be spread through networks, direct-dial up modems, e-mail and direct installation 
from connected memory devices like an USB memory sticks or by connection of a 
laptop computer. All malicious codes are manmade. [13] 
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2.7.4 Human errors 
 
In this study, human errors represent mistakes, negligence or intentions to harm the 
system from a system operator or people with connection to process automation 
systems and networks. This also includes manipulation of operating systems and 
software connected to the control and monitoring program that is connected to the 
PLC or DCS equipment.  
 
This also includes the threat of social engineering and insider attacks. Social 
engineering is performed through conning an individual to reveal secure information 
about architecture, networks and systems or even injecting hostile programs into a 
computer. The individual might be forced or tricked to reveal the information or to 
perform the hostile actions. Information can also later be used for conducting a more 
active IS attack against the process automation systems or sold to a hostile 
competitor or an organized criminal syndicate. Social engineering is a threat that has 
to be addressed seriously since it might provide an external attacker with valuable 
information or foothold for a more serious attack. [13] 
 
An insider attack is an attack initiated by an entity inside the security perimeter (an 
‘insider’). That is an entity that is authorized to access system resources but uses 
them in a way not approved by those who granted the authorization. [13] 
2.7.5 Interference of systems and communications 
 
One way of interfering with process automation systems is to perform a ‘denial of 
service attack’. The denial of service attack affects the availability of a network, 
operating system or application. An attack typically consists of the attacker sending 
multiple data packages to the attacked computer making it halt or become 
unavailable. Distributed denial of service attacks use multiple computers to send data 
packages towards the victim computer. [13] 
 
The intruder might also try to connect directly to a specific system through a direct-
dial up or a remote access connection. The direct-dial up connection is performed 
through a modem connection and the remote access connection through access 
from the Internet or through connection to a wireless network. System vendors of 
automation equipment often use modems for remote access to systems. In order to 
save money on travel and people the vendor can recode and modify parameters in 
the control equipment without being connected directly on site to the process. [13] 
 
If to access the process automation network by a remote access connection the 
intruder faces the challenge of first locating the process automation systems 
networks. If successful the intruder must also succeed in gaining access to the 
process automation systems or networks. When connected, the intruder can then 
perform more serious activities on the infested system and against the computer 
devices that are connected to the network. This threat also includes man in-the 
middle attacks, database attacks, peer utility attacks and VPN hacking. [13] [25] 
 
 34
2.7.6 Summary 
 
Possible IS security threats for different threat agents. 
 
 
Agent/Threat Insider Outsider Accidental Non-validated changes 
Wiretapping 
and network 
scanning 
 X   
Malicious code X X X  
Human errors X X (social engineering) X X 
Interference of 
systems and 
communications 
X X   
 
Table 2.1 IS security threats and threat agents 
 
 
2.8 Good Manufacturing Practice guide (GMP) 
 
The GMP is a regulatory framework that provides guidance and rules for the 
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals. Most countries and the European Union today 
have their own GMP regulations. The American GMP is administrated by the Federal 
drug and food administration (FDA). The American GMP regulations are very 
important to the company due to that a large part of the AstraZeneca revenue comes 
from the American market. However the majority of the different GMP regulations 
follow the same principles. [21] 
 
The GMP regulations are built on nine chapters: 
 
- Quality management 
 
- Personnel and education 
 
- Facilities and equipment 
 
- Documentation 
 
- Manufacturing and packaging 
 
- Quality control 
 
- Production and analysis within outsourcing ventures  
 
- Reclamations and withdrawal of products 
 
- Internal inspections 
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If AstraZeneca violates the GMP regulations, the company face the risk of loosing its 
permission to manufacture and for marketing pharmaceuticals. This makes the GMP 
regulations very important to the company. 
 
In this study, the most important part of the GMP regulations is the manufacturing, 
packaging and quality control directives. These directives demands that all 
production must be: 
 
- Repeatable. All produced pharmaceuticals must be exactly the same (within a 
certain allowed deviation interval) irrespective of that they are manufactured in 
different batches. 
 
- Traceable. There must be a possibility to trace all produced pharmaceuticals 
through the complete production process. This includes raw material, production 
processes and quality controls. All steps and deviations in the production process 
must be documented. 
 
Thus virus infections or changes to operating systems and the software on process 
automation and lab systems would jeopardize the compliance of the GMP 
regulations. This implies that all software on process automation systems and 
computerized quality control equipment (lab equipment) must always be approved 
and carefully maintained and supervised. This is known as the process automation 
system being in a validated state. Only process automation systems that are in a 
validated state can be used for manufacturing and quality assurance work. 
 
Within Sweden Operations there exist procedures for assuring that systems behave 
as intended after they have been updated or patched. These procedures are time 
consuming and costly since the production has to halt. Operating systems updates or 
changes to other software cannot be applied without assuring that the system works 
as intended. Therefore the computer systems within the manufacturing of 
pharmaceuticals must be protected in different ways than ordinary office computers. 
[2] [21] [53] [54] 
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3 Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
This chapter describes the methodology that was used for performing the study and 
the risk analysis method that was used for identifying and analyzing the most severe 
IS security risks. The chapter also provides some criticism and possible applicability 
of the study. 
 
 
3.2 Performing the study 
 
The work was continuously supported by the AstraZeneca supervisor through ideas, 
suggestions for personnel to contact for information and through sharing of 
knowledge. The work for performing the study can be divided into five major 
somewhat subsequent parts. All work was performed at the Södertälje site. 
 
3.2.1 Understanding the production, systems and networks 
 
To be able to perform the study the first step was to understand the context within 
Sweden Operations and the production at the Södertälje site. This work was mainly 
used for developing the reference architecture and to understand the IS security 
vulnerabilities and threats that are present to the process automation systems at the 
Södertälje site. 
 
The work was performed through studying various AstraZeneca documents, 
performing observations and interviews with personnel in the production, lab, and 
system owners and managers and with OI personnel. Due to the size of the 
organization, complexity and structure of the networks and systems and the 
outsourcing agreement with IBM within Sweden Operations, this was a time 
consuming process. 
 
In depth observations have been performed in the ALFA and BETA plant. The 
process for choosing ALFA and BETA production areas as reference was performed 
through evaluating different production areas as described in the introduction. 
Production areas at the Gärtuna and Snäckviken sub-sites were investigated during 
the process. 
 
3.2.2 Evaluating the architecture and IS security compliance 
 
The major effort was here spent on searching for current available IS security 
standards with a focus suitable for the study. The main focus was on finding IS 
security standards with suggestions for network segregations of manufacturing 
systems and networks. There are numerous IS security standards available for 
different environments and networks, but very few concerning process automation 
systems security. The topic is an active research area. 
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The industrial and national standards that are used in the study represent all relevant 
standards that are available today. Unfortunately the IEC 62443 standard is still 
being developed and therefore not available. The IEC 62443 ‘Security for industrial 
process measurement and control - Network and system security’ standards might 
have been useful for evaluation of the architecture and implemented security. The 
IEC 62443 work is connected to the work on the ISA 99 standards. The ISA 99 
standard is considered to cover the relevant parts in the ISO/IEC 17779 and ISO/IEC 
27001 standards. [13] [14] [27] 
 
The available standards and AstraZeneca guidelines then formed a framework for 
evaluating the architecture and implemented IS security measures. The criterions 
used in the evaluation were chosen in cooperation with AstraZeneca supervisor. The 
NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall for SCADA and Process Control Networks 
document Deployment mainly inspired the criterions together with ISA course 
material. [17] [20] 
 
The evaluation of the fulfillment of the AstraZeneca guidelines was mainly performed 
through interviews with responsible personnel and by review of relevant AstraZeneca 
documentation. Observations in the reference production areas in the study were 
also performed. 
 
3.2.3 IS security risk identification and assessment 
 
The IS security analysis work began with finding a suitable method for IS security risk 
analysis. The objective for the methodology in identifying and assessing the present 
IS security risks, was chosen to follow the Primatech Scenario-based approach for 
industrial cyber security analysis method (described below) and connect this to the 
ISA 99 Zone and conduit model. The ISA 99 Zone and conduit model is used for the 
work in the first step in the Primatech method. 
 
Following the Primatech method, the first step was to define zones and conduits from 
the reference architecture (presented in chapter 4). After this, the work was focused 
on identifying all possible IS security threats and vulnerabilities within the zones and 
conduits. These scenarios were investigated in order to identify the assets that are 
threatened and to define the expected worst possible consequences. This also 
included work to identify which production areas that are connected to and affected 
by the operation of the DELTA conduit and the EPSILON and ZETA zones. The 
DELTA conduit (network) and the EPSILON and ZETA zones (networks) are 
described in chapter 4 and 6. 
 
A lot of work was also spent on collecting information about implemented IS security 
measures through studying documentation, observations and interviews with 
responsible personnel. A test for hacker possibilities and virus infection from 
connected laptops in production was also performed. This test was performed 
through connection of an ‘external’ laptop to a BRONZE network (a production area 
or lab VLAN) (Appendix D). 
 
The consequences were then connected to financial aspects defined by the delay in 
production that the worst-case scenario consequences would cause. The financial 
aspects of the consequences were transformed into a monetary loss with the help of 
the Sweden Operations Finance department (OF). 
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Finally the scenarios and their consequences were ranked in likelihood and impact. 
The likelihood rating is based on incident history, the threatening picture and the 
existing IS security measures. The likelihood and impacts was then summarized to 
provide the severity for the scenarios.  
 
Based on the most severe risks, possible technical and administrative suggestions 
for security improvements were then suggested. These suggestions were inspired by 
the ISA 99 standard, AstraZeneca guidelines and the standards presented in the 
theory chapter. Input was also provided from the ISA 99 technical reports and 
personnel at the OIT department. [15] [16] 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.1 Performing the study 
 
 
3.2.4 Development of an IS security program for the DELTA context 
 
The first step in development of the security program was to define which of the 18 
key elements presented in the ISA 99 Part 2, which was going to be included in the 
security program. Addition of a ‘Defence-in-depth strategy’ section was made. 
Sections were also added to expand the Production area and Lab environment IS 
security policy. This includes ‘System hardening and anti-virus protection’, ‘System 
monitoring’, ‘Connection of portable computer equipment’ and ‘Reduction of third part 
risks’.  
 
The remaining elements of the security program were then developed. The work is 
mainly based on the ISA 99 Part 2 but also includes input from the standards and 
guidelines in the theory chapter. The ISA 99 technical reports also provided input for 
technical suggestions. [14] [15] [16] 
 
Finally a list of personnel and organizations responsible for the implementation of the 
italic paragraphs in the security program was developed (Appendix E). 
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3.2.5 Investigation of IS security risks in MES/EBR system 
implementation  
 
This chapter evaluates the future implementation of a manufacturing execution 
system/electronic batch record system. Therefore the work was first spent on 
studying the possible structure of the system and interviewing personnel involved in 
the project. These interviews provided knowledge about the system and possible IS 
security risks that the system could create. Possible ways to implement the 
MES/EBR system in the reference architecture was then developed together with 
AstraZeneca supervisor. These models and their impact on the IS security level in 
the production were then briefly evaluated in a perspective of increased wireless 
network vulnerabilities, MES system availability and MES critical systems availability. 
Unfortunately there are no standards available concerning MES and IS security. 
 
 
3.3 IS risk analysis methodology 
 
To perform a successful IS risk analysis it is important to have a clear strategy in the 
process of identification, assessment and analysis of the risks that is inside the scope 
of the study. There are numerous methodologies available for IS risk analysis 
procedures. The methodologies are either asset or threat/scenario based. The final 
conclusion of both methods is the same but either starts by identifying assets worth 
protecting from threats/scenarios or threats/scenarios harmful to assets worth 
protecting. [14] 
 
ISA 99 Part 2 present a suggested asset based method based on identification of 
assets worth protection and connecting them to possible threats and impacts. The 
method is applicable to process automation systems. The method is also applicable 
to the zone and conduit model. [14] 
 
The intention with this study is to analyze the IS security on both a detailed level and 
with an overall perspective of the DELTA architecture. The awareness of IS security 
issues is also already present at AstraZeneca Sweden Operations. This combination 
makes a threat/scenario based analysis methodology more suitable than an asset 
based model like the one presented in ISA 99 Part 2. AstraZeneca supervisor also 
supported this decision. 
 
In order to find suitable method for IS security analysis for a context in manufacturing 
of pharmaceuticals the CIDX document; Report on Cyber Security Vulnerability 
Assessment Methodologies, offers a good guideline for evaluating different risk 
analysis methods. With the help of attachment 2 (Technical criteria) the Primatech 
Scenario-based approach for industrial cyber security analysis, was chosen. [10] [19] 
 
Primatech is an Ohio based consulting firm specialized in process safety, security 
and risk management. Primatech offers consulting, training and software for 
identifying and reducing consequences of risks. The company is also involved in the 
development of the ISA 99 standards. 
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3.3.1 Primatech Scenario-based approach for industrial cyber 
security analysis method 
 
The Primatech ‘A Scenario-Based Approach for Industrial Cyber Security 
Vulnerability Analysis’ presents an IS security vulnerability analysis method that can 
be used to conduct IS security vulnerability analysis against present and future 
threats. The method can also be used on different levels of a reference architecture. 
The method is scenario based and is therefore suitable for the scope and context of 
this study. 
 
The first step in the method is to divide the systems, processes, facilities and 
networks into different systems or subsystems. In this study this is done in 
accordance with the ISA 99 Zone and conduit model. The next step is to consider all 
credible threats within each zone or conduit. 
 
Step three is to identify the vulnerabilities within each zone or conduit. Step four is to 
list worst possible consequences for the threat scenarios. Step five is to list existing 
security measures and measures within each zone and conduit. Step six is to risk 
rank all the different scenarios. The rating is in this study built upon a likelihood rating 
and a financial impact rating. The criterions for the rating are presented in appendix 
A.  
 
The existing security measures decrease both the probability of a threat scenario and 
the consequences. The final seventh step is to identify possible recommendations for 
suggested security improvements based on the analysis in the first six steps. 
 
To connect the different steps to the Zone and conduit model this provides the zone 
and conduit attributes; Asset inventory, Zone security policy, Access requirement and 
controls and Threat scenarios and vulnerabilities. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 Primatech Scenario-based approach for industrial cyber security analysis method 
combined with the ISA 99 Zone and conduit model 
 
 
3.3.2 Quantitative risk rating 
 
Likelihood and impact consequences for different risks and assets can be rated in 
both qualitative and quantitative ways depending on the informational available.  
 
Risks, likelihood or probabilities are usually treated as numbers and a value from 
zero to one respectively. In practice that kind of precise information is seldom 
available without extensive data collection. Hence a qualitative measure or 
quantitative scale is preferable.  
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The ISA 99 procedure above transforms qualitative ratings into quantitative measure 
scales. This is also the case with AstraZeneca guideline for risk analysis (also known 
as the AstraZeneca Integrated risk management tool (IRM)) and is also suggested in 
the Primatech method. Therefore the likelihood of a scenario is quantified as a 
number from one to five, corresponding to Very low, Low, Medium, High and Very 
high likelihood. [14] [19] [35] 
 
An asset with quantitative valuation has a precise monetary loss associated with it. 
An asset with a qualitative valuation expresses a more abstract loss. In the case of 
loss of information and loss of time for production it is very hard to calculate exact 
values. Therefore the AstraZeneca quantification scale for impacts is used as 
measure for financial impacts. This provides a scale form one to five corresponding 
to the delay in production that a security incident causes. 
 
Thus only the delay in time for production is transformed to a monetary value. The 
value of batches that have to be scrapped is also presented as a monetary loss. 
 
The criterions are presented in appendix A. [29]  
 
 
3.4 Criticism and applicability 
 
3.4.1 Applicability 
 
The result and conclusions of this study are only applicable at the AstraZeneca 
Sweden Operations context at the Södertälje site. The study might provide useful 
information for similar studies and IS security analysis at large manufacturing sites. 
Especially pharmaceutical and chemical substances manufacturing sites and 
companies might find the study useful. The study is less applicable on small 
manufacturing sites with process automation system that are less vulnerable to IS 
security threats. 
 
The study also presents a good source for references of the current available and 
under development IS security standards for IS security in the process automation 
systems environments. 
 
3.4.2 Criticism of the methodology 
 
The methodology in the study has a strong touch of a management view of IS 
security and less technical foundation. More in depth study of the hardware and 
systems that are involved might have provided a deeper insight and a more accurate 
likelihood and impact rating in the IS security risk analysis. 
 
There is also a possibility that the two production areas used in the study not 
represent the actual IS security context and conditions at the Södertälje site. They 
might have both a higher and a lower level of implemented IS security measures than 
the average production area at the site. Studying more production areas might 
therefore have been useful. 
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3.4.3 Criticism the information sources  
 
Many of the IS security standards used in the study are closely related. Since the 
area is an active research topic there is no universally accepted standard for IS 
security in manufacturing and process automation systems. The ISA 99 standard is 
the standard that is most referred to today. Many standards are also intended for a 
variety of industry environments. There is also a possibility that there exist suitable 
standards within the IT industry. 
 
The AstraZeneca documents used in the study are not publicly available and some 
information that is presented is also confidential. The AstraZeneca IS security 
standards are intended for the AstraZeneca environment and are therefore less 
applicable than industrial standards like IEC, ISA and ISO standards.  
 
A possibility to review the BCPs, DRPs for DELTA and other confidential material has 
not been granted due to the outsourcing agreement with IBM or AstraZeneca 
restrictions. This information is therefore based on information from AstraZeneca 
supervisors. 
 
A large part of the empirical material in the study is collected through interviews. 
There is a risk that the interviewed personnel at AstraZeneca have responded in a 
way that not is perfectly correct. The information might intend to emphasize the 
respondent in a good way. Some responses might also be incorrect due to guessing 
and assumptions from the respondents. Since the absence of a properly maintained 
IS security level probably will require more work for a system owner, there is a risk 
that they have tried to embellish the actual conditions. 
 43
4 A reference architecture for the DELTA context 
 
 
4.1 Overview  
 
To connect with the Zone and Conduit model from the ISA 99 standard this chapter 
provides a reference architecture that can be used in the subsequent chapters. The 
chapter describes the general process used for manufacturing of API and tablet 
pharmaceuticals (drug product pharmaceuticals), the systems used in the process 
and the overall architecture of the systems and the network that interconnects these 
systems – the DELTA context.  
 
 
4.2 Manufacturing of pharmaceuticals 
 
To provide a brief understanding of pharmaceutical manufacturing this section 
explains how tablets and active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) are manufactured. 
The basis of all pharmaceuticals is the API. The API is in general manufactured in a 
different production process than in the manufacturing process for the final product. 
The API is then used in different kinds of pharmaceuticals like tablets, capsules and 
Turbuhaler products. In this study, tablets are used as an example for the 
manufacturing process of the final product (or drug products pharmaceuticals). All 
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals at AstraZeneca in Södertälje is performed through 
batch manufacturing. 
 
4.2.1 Manufacturing of API  
 
The production in the ALFA plant is performed according to a gravimetric method. 
This means that the different equipment is placed on different floor plans. The raw 
materials are added at the top and the dried end product is delivered at the bottom 
floor. The Beta plant has three similar segments (Swedish: ‘skepp’) or production 
processes. The segments are called A, B and C. 
 
The process for manufacturing of API in Beta consists of six steps. The first four 
steps use the same process equipment (reactor tanks) while the centrifugation and 
drying steps use separate process equipment. All equipment is controlled by DCS 
systems, which are operated by the operators in the factory. The production 
equipment and DCS systems used in the manufacturing process in segment A in 
Beta is pictured in appendix B and section 4.4.4. [58] 
 
 
Mixing of 
liquids and dry 
raw material
Chemical 
reactions Purification Crystallization Centrifugation Drying
 
Fig 4.1 API manufacturing 
 
 
The production process begins with mixing raw materials into chemical reactor tanks. 
Raw material is often dry material, liquid substances and different solvers. Solvers 
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are added from the tank station (Swedish: ‘tankbar’) and liquid raw materials from the 
intake station (Swedish: ‘insugningsstation’).  
 
Depending on produced substance, different reactions and adding of more 
substances produce the desired API in the reactor tanks. The API is now part of a 
solution that needs to be purified from liquid solvers and unwanted substances. The 
unwanted substances and solvers are fed into the receiving tanks. After some 
purification, the API substance is crystallized in the solution. This might be performed 
through cooling of the reactor tank or by adding other substances to the solution.   
 
When the API substance has crystallized it is fed into the centrifugation equipment 
under the reactors and the receiving tanks. The centrifugation removes remaining 
solvers. 
 
The last step in the manufacturing process is drying of the API substance. The final 
product consists of a dry powder of API granules. 
 
4.2.2 Manufacturing of tablets 
 
The manufacturing of tablets products consists of several production steps involving 
different processes and production equipment and the batch is physically moved 
between the different production equipments used in the different processes steps.  
 
The process steps and the different process automation systems with operating 
systems used on SCADA systems for manufacturing of tablets in BETA are 
described in appendix B. Some equipment does not have SCADA systems and are 
controlled by manual control devices. The SCADA systems use PLC equipment for 
the control and monitoring of the process. 
 
 
API 
preparation Granulation
Tablet 
compression Tablet coating Sorting
 
 
Fig 4.2 Tablet formulation 
 
 
The first step in the production process of tablets is to prepare the API. The API is 
prepared into a mixture before the granulation starts. The granulation process 
involves building up several spherical layers starting with the API granules. The 
different layers are needed in order to make sure that the API is released at the right 
place in the human body. Different products have different layers depending on 
product group or tablet formulation.  
 
After the granulation, the pharmaceuticals now consist of small granules. In the tablet 
compression phase, the granules are mixed with a material that binds together the 
granules, for example with cellulose. The cellulose granule mixture is then 
compressed into tablets in a tablet compression machine. 
 
The next step is to provide the tablets with a proper coating. The coating is sprayed 
onto the tablets in a machine that resembles a tumble dryer. The coating is often 
dependent on the demands of the customers or on how the tablet needs to be 
protected. This might include providing the tablets with flavour, colour or lubrication. 
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The last step in the production process is to sort out defect tablets. This is done by 
machines that weights or sort the produced tablets and scrap tablets with a wrong 
weighing or defect form. A wrong weighing indicates that the number of granules not 
correspond to the intended potency of the produced pharmaceutical. 
 
After the tablets are sorted they are sent to a packing area for packaging and 
distribution.  
 
 
4.3 Systems in the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals at the 
Södertälje site 
 
4.3.1 SCADA, PLC and DCS systems 
 
The systems in production consist of process automation systems connected to one 
or more steps in the manufacturing of the pharmaceuticals. In this study a process 
automation system consists of a PLC or a DCS system connected to the process 
(level 1 and 0 in the hierarchical reference model) and PC clients.  
 
PLC based production is mainly used for manufacturing of the final product (drug 
product pharmaceuticals) like tablets, Turbuhaler and capsule pharmaceuticals. The 
PLC (level 1) is connected to a SCADA (Supervisory control and data acquisition) 
system that consists of one or two PC clients (level 2) One PC is placed in a control 
room and the other PC is placed close to the process (level 0). The SCADA system 
is used for monitoring of the control equipment and for collecting data from the 
process. 
 
DCS based production is mainly used for the manufacturing of API. The DCS (level 
1) is connected to clients (level 2) and the manufacturing processes (level 0). One 
DCS can be used for monitoring of many different dispersed processes steps. The 
clients are used for monitoring the DCS and for collecting data from the processes. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.3 SCADA + PLC and DCS 
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4.3.2 Scheduling of production  
 
The scheduling and planning of production is made with the help of a KANBAN 
system. KANBAN is a production-planning tool developed by Toyota that utilizes 
cards to keep track of items in manufacturing organizations. The KANBAN system is 
used for decreasing lead times in the production and to keep track of raw material 
and produced materials inventory. The system is partly computerized. All production 
planning and scheduling computer systems are operated from the corporate network 
(described below). Therefore they are not addressed in this study. [3] 
 
4.3.3 Quality systems 
 
All production is made in compliance with the GMP regulations that are described in 
the theory chapter. 
 
Recipes and Master recipes 
The DCS and PLC equipment uses predefined recipes in the manufacturing process. 
The recipe contains the procedure (program sequence), the formula (parameters), 
and the equipment requirements. The procedure defines the different steps the 
control equipment is supposed to perform, the formula defines the parameters to be 
used e.g., actuator values and equipment instructions. The equipment requirement 
specifies the equipment to be used.  As a simple example, one step in the procedure 
might be filling, the equipment requirement specifies the name of the reactor to be 
used and the formula gives the amount of liquid the reactor should be filled with.  
When the recipe executes it is referred to as a control recipe. During execution, the 
control recipe collects relevant information such as the temperature of the liquid and 
the time for starting and ending of the filling step 
 
A master recipe is the specification of how to produce a specific pharmaceutical, 
whereas the control recipe is the record of how a given quantity of a pharmaceutical 
was produced. 
 
Quality control and assurance – Lab systems 
Parallel to the production, special laboratory personnel run tests and analyze 
samples of both non-finished products and prepared products to assure the quality of 
the pharmaceuticals and that the production complies with the GMP regulations.  
 
The lab personnel use special lab equipment systems like chromatographs and 
radiation analysis instruments. Most lab equipment is connected to PC clients and 
has separate JOTA (VLANs). Some lab systems are of client-server type and use 
server applications in the ZETA network segment (described below) for storing 
measurement data (here referred to as Eta systems). 
 
The results from lab analyses are printed and used for quality assurance of 
manufactured batches (as described below) and for quality control. The systems 
used for this are called FI and OMEGA. These systems are operated from the 
corporate network and are therefore not addressed in this study. 
 
Batch protocols and quality control protocols 
The batch protocols are documents used by operators of the process equipment and 
lab personnel to provide reports from the production. For every process step there is 
a written protocol that connects to the recipe. For the step example above, this might 
include when the filling started and stopped, temperature of the liquid and if there 
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where any deviations from the defined recipe. When a step is completed the operator 
notes the required values and then signs the protocol to affirm that the step has been 
accomplished and performed in accurate ways that comply with the GMP regulations. 
 
The lab personnel use similar quality control protocols for performing and reporting 
test results that assures the quality of produced batches. 
 
Batch reports 
The batch reports are information and data from the manufacturing processes of a 
batch. This might include audit trails and trend data with timestamps or other data 
and information collected from the process automation systems involved in the 
production of the batch. 
 
Batch files 
When the batch is manufactured, the batch protocols and quality control protocols 
from the batch are assembled together with the batch reports to a batch file. The 
batch files provide traceability for the manufactured batch. The batch files are critical 
for Sweden Operations in order to comply with the GMP requirements. 
 
Batch quality assurance 
Before the batch is approved and shipped it must undergo quality assurance before 
being released from manufacturing. This is performed by special quality personnel. 
The quality control process uses the batch file and confirms that the production has 
been made according to the master recipe and in compliance with the GMP 
regulations. This insures that the final product is suitable for the intended patients 
and not harmful to consume. [21] 
 
Validation of computer systems used in pharmaceutical manufacturing 
All equipment that have impact on the production processes of pharmaceuticals or 
impact on GMP requirements must be validated prior to being used in the production. 
The validation assures that the equipment behaves as intended and the production 
comply with the GMP regulations. The framework for this is called the Good 
automated manufacturing guide (GAMP). [2] 
 
Since most equipment is computerized all changes of software or hardware or 
configurations on process automation systems must be revalidated. Thus applying 
updates to software or installing new software on process automation systems 
demands a new validation. The validation is performed through predefined SOPs and 
RUTs. [54] 
 
4.3.4 Collecting and reporting of data from production – the THETA 
system 
 
The Manufacturing information system (MIS) used within Sweden Operations for 
collecting and reporting of data from production is called THETA (Process 
Information System). All production areas on the Södertälje production site do not yet 
use the system. 
 
The THETA system is based on central information collection of production data from 
the process automation systems used in the production and consists of three main 
parts: The central databases that the system uses, applications placed both centrally 
and locally on production clients and finally the services that the system provides. 
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Fig 4.4 THETA 
 
 
The central databases, applications and services use hardware that belongs to of the 
ZETA segment (described further down). There are two different databases:  
 
The trend database is used for storing trend data. The trend database is a real-time 
process data historian as well as a special information platform with direct record 
access via a search tree technology. All process data from sensors on process 
automation systems in the production are stored along with a timestamp.  
 
The relational database used for storing batch data, events from production and 
applications like recipe handling. Events include for example start time for starting 
manufacturing a batch, time for specific commands from operators and sensor 
alarms from the processes.  
 
The central applications are used for providing batch data, batch reports, audit trails, 
trend history applications and recipe handling. The audit trail can be used to review 
who has been involved in manufacturing of a batch. The recipe handling application 
manages all manufacturing recipes (computer instruction recipes) for the connected 
process automation systems. When a recipe is updated it is downloaded to the 
specific process automation client and PLC or DCS system. This provides central 
storage and management of recipes. The history application is a graphical user 
interface that provides statistical tools for analysing trend data from production. 
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The central services provided are a production portal, KPI (key performance 
indicators) application and performance monitoring. The production portal is used to 
provide material to batch reports and provide information from the production to 
users in the corporate network and on the DELTA network (described below). The 
KPI application is used for optimization of the production and for finding bottlenecks 
in the supply chain. The performance-monitoring tool is used for reducing equipment 
and quality failures. With this tool the scrap and equipment breakdown costs in 
production are reduced. The services are presented to users on the corporate 
network through the DELTA application portal (described below) but can also be 
viewed from any web client inside DELTA. 
 
THETA is an important and efficient tool for the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals at 
the Södertälje production site. [44] [64] 
 
 
4.4 General model for systems involved in manufacturing of 
pharmaceuticals within Sweden Operations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.5 General model for systems involved in manufacturing of pharmaceuticals within 
Sweden Operations 
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4.5 The DELTA architecture 
 
The network structure or network solution that is used to connect the production with 
the corporate network within Sweden Operations is called the DELTA network 
service or the DELTA architecture.  
 
DELTA was designed to provide both a high level of IS security and connectivity for 
the process automation system at the Södertälje site. The intention with DELTA is 
also to offer advantages of scale in forms of management and shared computer 
services. [44] 
 
The architecture defines six major network or types of network segments:  
 
- The corporate network  
 
- The EPSILON segment 
 
- The ZETA segment 
 
- Production area networks 
 
- Networks for the lab systems in production.  
 
- The AstraZeneca corporate network is called GAMMA and is here modeled as a 
single entity. [44] 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6 The DELTA architecture 
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Most of the production areas at the Södertälje site are today connected to the DELTA 
network. The production areas are geographically grouped at the Gärtuna and 
Snäckviken sub-sites into different factory buildings and have VLANs that are 
structured after the different factory buildings. [73] 
 
No hardware is shared between the DELTA network and the corporate network. With 
this segmentation the production can be completely isolated from the corporate 
network. This segmentation also decreases the vulnerability to disturbances of 
communications and possible virus outbreaks in the corporate network.  
 
The DELTA network service consists of the EPSILON and ZETA VLANs and the 
VLANs in the production areas and lab departments, a physical network that 
connects EPSILON and ZETA with the production areas and lab departments, and a 
physical firewall-protected connection between the corporate network and the central 
router. All communication with the corporate network is logically defined to be 
performed from EPSILON. The EPSILON segment is the DMZ in DELTA and also 
provides central infrastructure services. ZETA provides a network for different 
services and applications that are used by more than one of the production or lab 
VLANs. [44] 
 
Included in the services provided by the DELTA network service are also client PC 
platforms (computer and operating system) for production (SESO-PRD client) and 
laboratory systems in production (SESO-LAB client). The intention with standard 
clients is to decrease cost for process automation and lab systems. The clients are 
provided with Microsoft Windows 2000 and anti-virus software. [44] 
 
Process automation systems that use non-standardized computers have clients that 
might run on different operating systems software or is a special client that is needed 
by some specific automation equipment. 
 
The DELTA administration is responsible for the DELTA network, the network, 
servers and systems in EPSILON and for maintaining the ZETA segment network. 
The DELTA administration is also responsible for the hardware and operating 
systems on the systems that operate from the ZETA segment. The information stored 
or used in the services and software applications provided from EPSILON and ZETA 
is owned by the consumer of the service. The DELTA administration is also 
responsible for maintaining the networks in the DELTA connected production and lab 
buildings, and finally for the hardware and operating systems on the standard clients. 
[44] 
 
For example, the information and systems in THETA belongs to the system owner of 
the THETA system. At same time, the THETA system has servers in the ZETA 
segment, which falls under DELTA administration supervision. Therefore the DELTA 
administration is responsible for the hardware and operating systems on the servers 
that THETA uses but not for the special THETA software applications. For EPSILON 
the DELTA administration is responsible for network, hardware, and operating 
systems and for providing the service but not for the data stored and used by the 
service. This belongs to the consumer of the service. [44] 
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4.5.1 The DELTA network, servers and databases 
 
The DELTA network consists of a physically separated network with access points in 
the connected production and lab buildings, the EPSILON and ZETA segments and a 
firewall-protected connection to GAMMA. The primary function of the network is to 
deliver a communication service (the DELTA network service). Hardware in DELTA 
also consists of servers and databases in EPSILON and ZETA, that offer different 
applications and services (EPSILON central infrastructure services and ZETA 
applications) for users in production and lab. Thus the hardware that DELTA consists 
of is a physical network, network equipment and servers and databases. [44] 
 
Systems in the different production areas and JOTA VLANs are only allowed to 
communicate with applications and services in ZETA and EPSILON. No 
communication is permitted between different production area VLANs and JOTA 
VLANs. Applications in ZETA are only allowed to communicate with the different 
production areas, JOTA VLANs and with EPSILON. The corporate network is only 
allowed to communicate with EPSILON through the firewall. All this is physically and 
logically defined in the network. [44] 
 
4.5.2 The EPSILON segment 
 
EPSILON is a separate VLAN and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) of the DELTA 
architecture. A DMZ is network zone that provides an extra protective layer between 
two other zones. In the DELTA context EPSILON works as a DMZ between the 
corporate network and ZETA, the production area VLANs or the JOTA VLANs. 
 
The servers that EPSILON uses are stored in protected server rooms on the site. 
The servers are used for managing the network and to provide the central 
infrastructure services. [44] 
 
Central infrastructure services included in EPSILON are: 
 
Fileservers 
This service provides data storage for different applications and systems in 
production and lab. 
 
Databases 
This service provides different databases for different systems and systems in 
production and lab. 
 
DELTA application portal 
This service provides a secure access for applications and users in the corporate 
network to systems and applications inside DELTA (systems in ZETA, production 
and lab). The service provides indirect access to the systems inside DELTA. 
 
Print service 
Central print management and printers for users in production and lab. 
 
Time synchronization 
A central service for synchronization of correct time configurations on the systems 
and applications used in ZETA, EPSILON, production and lab. 
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Active directory 
This service provides access to AstraZeneca login accounts. This is more efficient 
and secure than to provide special login and account management for authentication 
and login on clients in the different production areas and on the lab systems. 
 
Antivirus 
This service is used to provide antivirus updates to systems inside DELTA and in the 
production area networks. The service uses the global AstraZeneca antivirus 
infrastructure.  
 
Backup for central services 
This service offers backups to the systems used for the EPSILON central services 
described above. 
 
Inventory and configuration database 
A system that keeps track of and stores information about installed hardware and 
software on clients in production and lab. 
 
Backup for local systems 
A backup service for clients and systems in production and lab. Provides a possibility 
to make ‘disc-images’ or hard drive copies. The service is not intended to be used for 
backup of data from production and lab but to be used as way for quick reinstallation 
of operating systems and other software on process automation systems. The 
service is mainly intended for the clients in production and lab. 
 
The IS security level in EPSILON is maintained as AstraZeneca GOLD standard or 
as ‘other critical devices’. [32] [50] 
 
4.5.3 The ZETA segment 
 
The ZETA is a separate VLAN for applications that are used for collecting, 
assembling and reporting information from processes and equipment in the different 
production areas and lab systems. The intention with ZETA is to provide advantages 
of scale and increase the IS security level by placing all systems in ZETA that are 
used by more than one production or JOTA network. The use of a ZETA segment 
also enables IBM support for hardware and operating systems of the systems that 
have servers in ZETA. 
 
The most important part of ZETA is the THETA system. The information stored in 
THETA is used for batch reports and for optimization and tuning of processes and 
equipment used in the production (described above). There are also Eta systems in 
ZETA. These systems are used for storing data from lab equipment in production. 
[44] 
 
The DELTA administration is responsible for the network and the hardware and the 
operating systems on servers in ZETA. The servers are stored in protected server 
rooms on the site. IS security on Servers are maintained as AstraZeneca SILVER 
standard. 
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4.5.4 Production area VLAN 
 
In this study there is considered to exist two main different variants of production 
area networks or VLANs. PLC based production or DCS based production area 
VLANs. 
 
In BETA almost all of the PLC + SCADA system are connected to the production 
area VLAN. Some SCADA systems are operated by one client but the majority use 
two clients. The execution of commands to the control equipment is performed from 
the clients. The clients communicate with THETA in ZETA and the DELTA 
infrastructure through scanning node servers. The scanning node servers assure that 
all communication is transformed into communication protocols that are suitable for 
the systems in THETA. [68] 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.7 General model for PLC based production area VLAN (BETA) 
 
 
DCS based production is mainly used in the manufacturing of API. In the ALFA plant, 
the DCS equipment is stored in a separate room under an operator control room. 
Clients are placed in the operator room and in direct connection to the centrifugation 
and drying equipment. Every segment in the ALFA plant has two clients assigned in 
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the operator room. This assignment is only for practical reasons and the different 
segments and DCS systems can be operated from any client on the network in the 
building. [45] [58] 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.8 General model for DCS based production area VLAN (ALFA) 
 
 
The scanning node server is used to translate information from production equipment 
prior to sending it to the THETA system. The local server is used for storing process 
history and recipes (program instructions) for the DCS system. 
 
The DELTA administration is responsible for the network and the hardware and 
operating systems on the standard clients. Local system owners and managers are 
responsible for the control system applications and other software on the clients. 
 
Today mostly non-standard clients are used in ALFA and BETA. Responsible for 
hardware, operating systems and applications on non-standard clients are local 
system owners and managers. [58] [57] [62] [81] 
 
The IS Security level in production area VLANs is maintained as BRONZE or 
‘Securely isolated devices’. [32] [50] 
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4.5.5 Jota VLAN 
 
The Jota VLANs are networks used for connection of the lab systems (that are used 
in manufacturing) to the DELTA network. The Jota VLAN basically provides a 
network service for the lab clients and the connected lab equipment and systems. As 
described above, the lab personnel perform lab tests and measurements with 
support of the lab equipment and systems. The results of these tests are printed and 
then manually typed into the FI and OMEGA systems. These systems are operated 
from the corporate network and are therefore not addressed in this study. [59] 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.9 General model for a Jota VLAN 
 
 
Some lab systems are of client-server type as described above. These systems have 
clients in the JOTA VLANs and servers in the Eta systems in ZETA.  
 
The DELTA administration is responsible for the network and the hardware and 
operating systems of the clients. Local system owners and managers are responsible 
for the applications on the clients. 
 
The IS Security level in JOTA VLANs is maintained as AstraZeneca BRONZE 
standard or ‘Securely isolated devices’. [32] [50]. 
 
4.5.6 The corporate network (GAMMA) 
 
The corporate network (a WAN) is not deeply analyzed in this study. The corporate 
network is called GAMMA and is divided into local campus networks for the different 
AstraZeneca sites. It consists of network equipment, PCs and servers. Systems 
involved here are concerned with activities on level 3 and 4 in the ISA hierarchical 
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model and other activities like research and marketing. The campus network is 
connected to DELTA, the Internet and other campus networks.  
 
The IS Security level is maintained as AstraZeneca SILVER standard in the 
corporate network. [32] 
 
 
4.6 A reference architecture for the DELTA context 
 
To connect with the ISA 99 standard, this section summarizes this chapter into a 
reference architecture for the systems and networks within the DELTA context. The 
reference architecture is suitable for the scope of this study and for a management 
view of the IS security work in the production networks within Sweden Operations.  
 
This reference architecture is used for evaluation of the DELTA architecture and 
implemented IS security (chapter 5), identification and analysis of IS security risks 
(chapter 6) and for developing an ISA 99 IS security program for DELTA (chapter 7). 
The reference architecture also provides a background for analysis of IS security 
issues due to the implementation of an MES/EBR system (chapter 8). 
 
 
Network Maintained AstraZeneca IS security standard level 
GAMMA SILVER 
EPSILON GOLD 
ZETA Servers are maintained as SILVER 
Production area VLAN BRONZE 
JOTA VLAN BRONZE 
 
Table 4.1 AstraZeneca IS security levels 
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Fig 4.10 A reference architecture for systems and networks within the DELTA context 
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5 Evaluation of the architecture and IS security level 
compliance 
 
 
5.1 Overview 
 
This chapter analyse the implemented DELTA architecture and IS security measures 
through the three criterions specified in the theory section; Architecture security and 
IS security program implementation, Architecture scalability and manageability and 
Architecture security versus cost.  
 
The analysis is made through connection of current available IS security standards 
concerning network architecture in connection to production systems (presented in 
the theory chapter). It is strongly recommended that the reader of this chapter study 
the theory chapter and preferably also the involved standards, prior to reading this 
chapter.  
 
Standards used in the Architecture security and IS security program implementation 
criteria are: 
 
- AstraZeneca Secure network Isolation of process automation computer systems. 
 
- AstraZeneca Mandatory standards and good practice for the security of process 
automation systems. 
  
- NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process 
Control Networks. 
 
- NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and industrial 
Control Systems Security. 
 
- Department of Homeland Security Control Systems Cyber Security: Defence-in-
depth strategies.  
 
- ISA 99 part 2. 
 
Standards used in the Architecture scalability and manageability criteria are: 
 
- NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process 
Control Network. 
 
- NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and industrial 
Control Systems Security. 
 
Standards used in the Architecture security versus cost criteria are mainly the NISCC 
Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control 
Networks. 
 
The architecture and all systems in process automation networks are not empirically 
investigated due to the limitations of the study. The empirical foundation of the study 
is built on AstraZeneca policies, AstraZeneca SOP, RUT, BaDS and system 
documentations and observations and interviews.  
 60
 
The analysis is conducted with a perspective that emphasizes an architecture that 
will offer a cost effective and secure environment for process automation systems. 
Where effective or necessary it also demands cooperation from process automation 
system operators, system owners and managers as well as senior management. The 
architecture is not the solution for all security problems. According to ISA 99, IS 
security is an organizational challenge that affects all levels of the ISA hierarchical 
reference model. [14] 
 
 
5.2 Architecture security and IS security program 
implementation 
 
5.2.1 AstraZeneca Secure network isolation of process automation 
computer systems 
 
 
Compliance of the overall principles for IS security protection of process automation 
systems.  
 
a.  
Overall security policy available for IS security levels, operating systems and the use 
of anti-virus on process automation systems. [31] [32] [81] 
 
b. 
Security policy and initiatives exist for hardening of process automation system. The 
implementations of the policies differ within the different production areas. Standard 
client platforms are considered to be more secure than non-standard clients. [31] [32] 
[78] [81] 
 
c. 
There are routines and SOPs available for control of local unauthorized access and 
connection of portable computer equipment. 
 
The DELTA architecture prevents unauthorized remote access to process 
automation systems and networks from the Internet. However, vendors of automation 
process equipment might install modems that are left behind and can be used for 
direct dial-up access or war-dialing attacks on process automation equipment.  
 
There exists a security policy for remote access control from trusted computers within 
the AstraZeneca networks. All computer equipment must be checked for virus and 
approved before being connected to a production area or JOTA VLAN. [49] [52] [73] 
 
d. 
Not fully fulfilled. All traffic flows to, from and within process automation networks and 
all dependencies on external systems are identified. A risk assessment on the impact 
of loss or disruption of the traffic flows to the dependent systems is not performed. 
The suggestion is that the result of this study might be important input for a future risk 
assessment analysis. [44] 
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e. 
The DELTA reference architecture presented in chapter 4 is considered to comply 
with the requirements in the document.  
 
According to the document the firewall between GAMMA and DELTA should be 
maintained as fully open during normal operations. The firewall is today configured to 
during normal operations only allow communication between predefined systems in 
GAMMA and within DELTA. Thus the document is not fully implemented in order to 
increase the IS security level in the DELTA network and process automation 
systems. [32] [50] [73] 
 
f. 
A global policy for remote access to the process automation systems exists.  How 
well this is communicated through the organization is unknown. Remote access from 
outside AstraZeneca to process automation systems at the Södertälje site must 
always be approved by LISSM. [38] [73] 
 
5.2.2 AstraZeneca Mandatory standards and good practice for the 
security of process automation systems 
 
 
Compliance of the mandatory standards and good practices for IS security protection 
of process automation systems. 
 
Establish ongoing governance 
There exists AstraZeneca policies, SOP and RUT for roles and responsibilities for IS 
security in process automation systems. Those documents cover most areas of IS 
security but are intended for system owners and users. The impression is that the 
DELTA IS security level would benefit from having a clear program for IS security 
and also a policy towards senior management. The policy for senior management 
should explain the benefits and costs with the implemented architecture and IS 
security protection measures. 
 
Implement secure architecture and processes 
This document provides a clear policy for how to implement a secure architecture 
and IS security environment for process automation systems.  
 
The DELTA architecture is considered to comply with the secure isolation aspects 
(except for the firewall configuration). There are process automation systems that 
require approval of exceptions from AstraZeneca Global IS Security and many 
exceptions that will require approval from site LISSM. 
 
Knowledge about exceptions is collected by the site LISSM through the AstraZeneca 
‘Traffic light’ compliance process. [44] [65] [81] 
 
Understand the residual business risk 
This is in principally fulfilled. No document for IRM (Integrated Risk Management. 
AstraZeneca procedure for risk assessment) document for DELTA exists. This study 
can be seen as input for a future IRM process for the DELTA context. [56] 
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Establish response capabilities 
There exist documents for responsibilities for DELTA, the systems in production and 
the systems in the ZETA segment. Documents and responsibilities for incident 
management exist for the campus network on the Södertälje site. This includes the 
DELTA network. IBM is responsible for maintaining this. [73] 
 
Improve awareness and skills 
Currently there are no major efforts for increasing awareness and skills about IS 
security in the production. There exist training frameworks for computer users in 
general. This includes a computer user’s code of conduct and a small course, before 
access to the Internet is granted. A suggestion is to provide operators and personnel 
that work with process automation systems with training or information in order to 
raise the skills and awareness about IS security threats. 
 
There is currently no clear document available for senior management to explain the 
usefulness, benefits and risks with the DELTA architecture. This might be included in 
a business case for a DELTA security program 
 
Manage third party risks 
AstraZeneca Engineering and local production and lab project managers and system 
managers handles the risks from vendors and support organizations of process 
automation systems. The IS security risk is only one of many risks involved in the 
projects for purchasing and implementation of process automation systems. 
Depending on various factors, all requirements in projects are sometimes not 
possible to meet. IS security risks are in general addressed, but not always. This 
means that hardening of process automation systems, patching of operating systems 
or the use of anti-virus software not always is possible. [61] 
 
All connection of computerized equipment (that belongs to external support 
personnel or vendors of process automation systems) in production areas is 
controlled through local SOPs. There exist routines for virus scanning of third part 
computer equipment prior to being connected to the DELTA network. If needed, 
AstraZeneca will provide data from Internet but not through directly connecting the 
process automation systems to the Internet. [52] [66] 
 
Engage projects 
When AstraZeneca Engineering manages projects for purchasing of automation 
equipment there is no clear document or routine for including IS security in the 
project specifications. The common practice is to work in cooperation with the system 
vendor and future system owners to implement IS security measures. 
 
Projects for increasing IS security within the DELTA context are initiated 
continuously. Examples are ongoing hardening of process automation systems and 
use of modern and more secure operating systems on clients for process automation 
systems. Currently this document is being implemented in the production within 
Sweden Operations. [61] [73] 
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5.2.3 NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for 
SCADA and Process Control Networks  
 
Architecture security 
The DELTA architecture match the firewall deployment design (nr 8 Firewall and 
VLAN-based Process Network Combination) presented last in the document. This 
design is rated as 4.5 of 5 in the security aspect. According to the document this 
design is very secure provided that a demilitarized zone (DMZ) is used. Since this is 
the case for the DELTA architecture it can be concluded as a good solution in the 
security perspective. The drawback with the design is the scenario where the DMZ 
security is compromised. This will lead to possible infections and security problems in 
a majority of the control systems networks. Thus the applications and hardware in the 
DMZ must be hardened as much as possible. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Design nr 8, Firewall and VLAN-based Process Network Combination 
(copyright NISCC) 
 
 
The only solution presented in the document that provides a more secure design is 
the Paired Firewalls between Process Control network and Enterprise network 
(design nr 7, 5 out of 5 in the security aspect).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Design nr 7, Paired Firewalls between Process Control network and Enterprise 
network (copyright NISCC) 
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5.2.4 NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) and industrial Control Systems Security  
 
Architecture security 
This document recommends an architecture or network segregation that at least 
implements three different zones, where one is a demilitarized zone. The DELTA 
architecture matches something between network segregation model 4 and 5 that 
are presented in the document (Firewall with DMZ between Corporate Network and 
Control Network or Paired Firewalls between Corporate Network and Control 
network). Both models are concluded as a secure way of segregating the production 
network from the corporate network. Model 5 provides more in-depth protection but 
increases complexity and cost. The services and applications provided from 
EPSILON and ZETA match recommendations for services and applications that are 
to be placed in a DMZ.  
 
Thus DELTA can be concluded to comply with security recommendations in the 
document. The document also concludes that the primary security risk is that if 
systems in the DMZ are compromised or infected. Then systems in the DMZ can be 
used for attacks on control networks through permitted communications. Thus the 
applications and hardware in the DMZ must be hardened as much as possible. The 
document also recommends the use of different antivirus software for DMZ than used 
in the corporate network to decrease the likelihood of this scenario. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.3 Firewall with DMZ between Corporate Network and Control Network 
(copyright NIST) 
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5.2.5 Department of Homeland Security Control Systems Cyber 
Security: Defence in depth strategies 
 
Architecture security and defence-in-depth strategy implementation 
The Department of Homeland Security Control Systems Cyber Security: Defence-in-
depth Strategies, recommends the deployment of firewalls in combination with DMZs 
in order to protect the control systems LAN. Thus the DELTA architecture provides a 
good solution in aspects of security. 
 
Intrusion detection systems are used in GAMMA and there exists overall security 
policies. The security might benefit from more detailed policies and a more clear 
communication of the security policies towards process automation system owners 
and production management. There exist no special IS security training initiatives for 
operators of process automation systems. There exist BCPs and DCPs for incident 
responses. Thus the IS security level and implemented architecture provides a depth 
in defence protection (except for the training initiatives) for the process automation 
systems at the site.  
 
5.2.6 ISA 99  
 
Security program implementation 
There exists no clear security program for the networks and systems used in the 
production at the Södertälje site. There exists a variety of global and local policies, 
documents, SOPs and RUTs for security in production. Some documents are 
intended for specific systems or networks. Some documents are very generic and 
address systems on a variety of the different levels in the hierarchical reference 
model. 
 
According to ISA 99 a common error in addressing cyber security (IS security) is to 
break down the problem to specific systems and networks. Cyber security is a much 
larger challenge that must be addressed in a holistic manner. Cyber security can also 
be seen as more of a cultural and organizational task that must be addressed in 
multiple ways. ISA 99 therefore recommends the implementation of a cyber security 
management system (here referred to as an IS security program) in order to reduce 
IS security risks and to sustain risk reduction over time. [14] 
 
The conclusion here is that the DELTA architecture and the IS security measures at 
the site lack a clear IS security program. Thus the implemented IS security measures 
within the DELTA network does not comply fully with the ISA 99 standard. 
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5.2.7 Compliance conclusions 
 
 
Standard IS Security compliance Comments 
AstraZeneca Secure 
network Isolation of 
process automation 
computer systems 
Mainly compliant 
The DELTA architecture and 
implemented security in general 
fulfils the document. Risk 
assessment and configuration of 
the firewall deviates from the 
document. 
AstraZeneca Mandatory 
standards and good 
practice for the security of 
process automation 
systems 
Mainly compliant 
The DELTA architecture and 
implemented security in general 
fulfils the document. There is also 
no clear policy for control of how 
the document is implemented in 
the operations. Many process 
automation systems must be 
further hardened and protected 
with anti-virus or require global or 
local exceptions. 
NISCC Good Practice 
Guide on Firewall 
Deployment for SCADA 
and Process Control 
Networks 
Yes 
DELTA corresponds to design 8. 
Security 4.5 out of 5. DMZ must 
be hardened as much as possible.
NIST Guide to Supervisory 
Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and 
industrial Control Systems 
Security 
Yes 
DELTA corresponds to model 4 
and 5. DMZ must be hardened as 
much as possible. Should use 
different antivirus software in DMZ 
than on corporate network. 
Department of Homeland 
Security Control Systems 
Cyber Security: Defence-
in-depth strategies 
Yes 
With the connection to GAMMA 
the architecture and IS security 
measures provides a defence-in-
depth strategy. There should be 
some sort of training initiatives for 
operators of process automation 
systems. 
ISA 99 No clear IS security program. 
Clear view on IS security as 
important. No clear security 
program. 
 
Table 4.1 IS security standards compliance 
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5.3 Architecture scalability and manageability 
 
5.3.1 NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for 
SCADA and Process Control Networks 
 
According to the NISCC document, the design model (nr 8) that DELTA can be 
compared with, offers excellent scalability (5 out of 5). Several production area 
networks and VLANs can be added without significant problems. Thus extra 
production areas can easily be added to a site.  
 
The drawback of design model nr 8 is the added management complexity and cost 
(manageability 3 out of 5). However for a large manufacturing site there is a lot of 
complexity in computer systems and networks incorporated anyway. Thus the 
drawback of manageability more applies to smaller manufacturing sites. 
 
The outsourcing agreement with IBM also implies that the possible manageability 
problems with the architecture will be addressed by IBM and therefore not should be 
a major problem for AstraZeneca and Sweden Operations. It is very important that 
IBM fulfils its part of the agreement, considering especially incident management and 
availability and accessibility of the DELTA network, 
 
5.3.2 NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) and industrial Control Systems Security  
 
The most scalable control network and corporate network segregation architecture is 
the implementation of at least 3 zones where one is DMZ, according to the NIST 
document. Therefore it is concluded that the DELTA architecture offers a good 
solution in terms of scalability. Placing patch management, antivirus servers and 
other security services in EPSILON and ZETA offers advantages of scale and more 
controlled updates of software on process automation systems. 
 
The DMZ architecture adds cost in terms of manageability and complexity according 
to the document.  
 
 
5.4 Architecture security versus cost 
 
The DELTA architecture offers a solution that according to the standards and 
guidelines provides a secure environment in terms of IS security. Comparing with a 
higher level of security (replacing the router with firewalls between the DMZ and the 
different production areas or increased segmentation) this will add some extra 
security but also most likely a lot of problems in terms of manageability. Comparing 
with a lower level of security (no DMZ) this will create an architecture that permits 
direct connectivity between the corporate network and process control networks. 
Considering the high vulnerability in process automation systems used for 
pharmaceutical manufacturing this is not a satisfying level of IS security. This will 
also violate global AstraZeneca IS security standards. [17] [31] 
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The main drawbacks with the architecture are the complexity and potential problems 
with manageability that is created. Big manufacturing sites with lots of different 
systems and production processes involve a lot of complexity in implementation and 
manageability of computer systems and networks. Since DELTA is intended to be 
applied on a large site involved in pharmaceutical manufacturing the manageability 
issue is not seen as a big problem if compared to the security and scalability level 
that the architecture adds. If the architecture is to be implemented on a smaller site 
there might be more inexpensive solutions for the same security and scalability level. 
Due to the outsourcing of the infrastructure service, this problem will also have to be 
addressed by IBM. 
 
Advantages with the architecture are the security level, ability to use large-scale 
advantages and the ability to expand the architecture. Large-scale advantages 
include placing applications for security and production (that are used by more than 
one production area or system in the production) in ZETA and EPSILON segments. 
 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
According to current available standards the DELTA architecture is suitable for a 
large manufacturing site within Sweden Operations. It is considered as almost a best 
practice solution for a large manufacturing site with highly vulnerable process 
automation systems that demands a high level of IS security protection. It is less 
suitable for a small manufacturing site. 
 
The architecture and implemented IS security safeguards in general comply with 
global AstraZeneca IS security standards. The security level and the effectiveness of 
the DELTA architecture would benefit from a clear security policy or security 
program. There exist policies, documents and SOPs for how to secure process 
automation systems and networks. Theses AstraZeneca policies aim for systems and 
networks on different levels or are in general intended for a specific system or a 
special kind of systems.  
 
DELTA provides a suitable architecture for a large manufacturing site within Sweden 
Operations, but would benefit from a clear and complementing IS security program.  
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6 Identification and analysis of IS security risks  
 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
This chapter presents an IS security risk analysis of the systems and networks within 
the DELTA context. The objective is to identify the main risks and assess these risks 
in order to provide a background and a business case for the DELTA IS security 
program (chapter 7), find possible areas of improvements for IS security for the 
DELTA network and context. 
 
The risk analysis uses the ISA 99 Zone and conduit model and is performed 
according to the Primatech Scenario-based approach for cyber security vulnerability 
analysis method. 
 
 
6.2 Zone and conduit model definition 
 
To connect with the ISA 99 standard, the first step in the risk analysis is to define 
zones and conduits from the reference architecture presented in section 4.5. 
 
The idea here is to view the DELTA network as a conduit, the DELTA conduit. The 
different production area networks are divided into two different security zones based 
on if they use PLC or DCS automation systems.  
 
ZETA and EPSILON are defined as separate security zones. The corporate network 
(GAMMA) is mapped as a separate security zone. The corporate network is here 
only viewed as a protection layer and a way for threats to enter. Therefore the 
GAMMA zone does only have attributes in the form of a security policy. Finally the 
JOTA VLANs are also defined as a separate security zone. 
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Fig 6.1 Zone and conduit model 
 
 
6.3 Asset inventory 
 
This section describes the assets that are considered being valuable for Sweden 
Operations within the DELTA context. The costs for loss of assets are estimated as 
loss of manufactured batches or the time that the production in the different 
production areas is forced to stop due to IS security incidents. The cost of loss 
reflects the worst possible consequences of the threat scenarios presented in 
appendix C. Only the lost production capacity or time is transformed into the financial 
impact rating criteria as described in chapter 3 and appendix A. 
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Costs for production areas being out of order are based on the refinement value 
(Swedish: Förädlingsvärdet) per day. This includes both direct and indirect costs. The 
refinement value is based on the assumptions that production is performed 46 weeks 
per year, five days a week, in three shifts per day and includes overheads and 
depreciations.  
 
It is also assumed that if a production area is infected, then the packaging area that 
belongs to the production area is also affected by the stop. It is also assumable that 
work for restoring the process automation systems from an IS security incident, will 
be performed on both weekends and regular working days. This means that the cost 
for impacts only affect regular working days. [67] [72]  
 
Information assets that is used and transmitted within the DELTA context is classified 
as confidential or internal depending on the estimated value for a competitor to 
AstraZeneca. The information is described in section 4.3.3. Confidential information 
is in general assumed to be of value for a competitor to AstraZeneca. The different 
information that is communicated, used or stored within the zones or the DELTA 
conduit is presented in table 6.2. [63] [70] [71]  
 
6.3.1 DELTA CONDUIT 
 
The DELTA conduit provides the communication between the different zones, thus 
the network and communication is viewed as an asset. The infrastructure services 
provided by DELTA (like login, data storage, backup services) are needed for the 
operation of the other zones. A loss of the DELTA conduit will cause the 
communication between connected production areas and the ZETA zone to halt. 
 
The production areas connected to the DELTA conduit are: 
 
- Gärtuna sub-site: Kappa, Lambda, BETA, My, Ny  
 
- Snäckviken sub-site: ALFA, Xi, Pi, San, Koppa, Rho, Sigma, Tau  
 
It is very difficult to estimate exact monetary numbers for the loss of production in all 
production areas. Therefore the total cost for the DELTA conduit being out of order 
for one day is estimated to the same as for Sweden Operations production ‘being out 
of order’ for one day. Today almost all production areas are connected to the DELTA 
network. Thus this figure is a slight over exaggeration of the present costs. [67] [73]  
 
Information sent over the DELTA conduit is also considered as an asset. Information 
transmitted on the DELTA conduit is considered confidential or internal within 
Sweden Operations. The information is considered confidential to external 
organizations. The loss of information is considered to be costly for AstraZeneca but 
very hard to estimate in a monetary value. A lot of the information is also available in 
paper format (batch protocols and quality control protocols) in the production and lab 
environments. [60] [70] [71] [81] 
 
Knowledge of the network architecture is assumed not to be of significant value since 
the network is built according to AstraZeneca standards and is protected by the 
GAMMA zone from direct attacks. The relevant standards are not confidential. [31] 
[32] 
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6.3.2 EPSILON ZONE 
 
Assets in EPSILON are the servers that are used for the services that EPSILON 
provides. Examples of this include login services, web portals and communication 
services. This means that production area zones connected to the DELTA conduit 
are in general dependent on that EPSILON is working as intended. Thus the cost for 
EPSILON being out of order is the same as for the DELTA conduit. [44] 
 
The information stored, used or communicated in the EPSILON zone is the same as 
for the DELTA conduit. 
 
6.3.3 ZETA ZONE 
 
Assets in ZETA are mainly the applications used by THETA and the Eta systems and 
the servers for these applications. 
 
THETA has connected production areas at the Gärtuna sub-site and at the 
Snäckviken sub-site. [64]  
 
Information stored in THETA is considered confidential. Assets here also include 
information from production for optimization and information for performing 
production. The loss of information is considered to be costly for AstraZeneca but 
very hard to estimate in a monetary value. [60] [70] [71] 
 
6.3.4 Production area VLAN ZONE 
 
Assets in the production area zone are: 
 
- The processes and production equipment 
 
- Clients (both standard and non-standard clients) 
 
- PLC or DCS equipment 
 
- Control systems software on clients and PLC or DCS equipment 
 
- Information about pharmaceutical recipes or product formulation processes that are 
considered providing AstraZeneca with a competitive advantage. Electronic recipes 
and batch protocols. 
 
- Quality of produced pharmaceuticals or batches. Batches manufactured in ALFA 
and BETA are valuable. [76] [77]  
 
Under the assumptions described in section 6.3, the cost for BETA and ALFA being 
out of order one day is estimated to a significant cost. [67] [72] 
[74] 
 
Loss of information used in the production (i.e. electronic work instructions or product 
recipes) is considered not being confidential within Sweden Operations. The loss of 
information is considered to be costly for AstraZeneca but very hard to estimate in a 
monetary value. The information is also available in paper format (batch protocols 
 73
and quality control protocols) in the production and lab environments. These are 
considered confidential. 
 
Knowledge of the network architecture is assumed not to be of significant value since 
it is considered as standard network architecture.  
 
6.3.5 JOTA VLAN ZONE 
 
Assets in the JOTA VLAN zone are the clients, lab equipment and lab equipment 
software. There is no significant risk that manufactured batches that have to be 
scrapped because of malfunctions in lab clients.  
 
Quality control protocols are available in paper format. These are confidential. 
 
6.3.6 Summary of assets 
 
Assets are the networks, process automation systems, servers, confidential and 
internal information and process automation systems and lab equipment. The cost 
per day for lost production and cost for loss of batches are presented in table 6.1. 
This only includes costs for loss of production capacity and scrapped batches as 
described above.  
 
 
 Cost per day for lost production Cost for loss of batches 
DELTA conduit   
EPSILON zone   
ZETA zone   
PLC based zone (BETA)   
DCS based zone (ALFA)   
JOTA VLAN zone   
 
Table 6.1 Cost for lost production and batches 
 
 
Information Confidential Internal 
Stored, used or 
communicated 
within 
Master batch recipe 
material   - 
Batch and quality 
control protocols   
Production and 
Laboratory 
environments (in 
paper format) 
Batch recipes 
(electronic work 
instructions) 
  
ZETA, production 
area VLAN and 
the DELTA conduit
Batch report material   ZETA and the DELTA conduit 
 
Table 6.2 Classification of information 
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6.4 Zone and conduit security policies 
 
6.4.1 DELTA CONDUIT 
 
The traffic control of communication on the DELTA conduit is performed through the 
internal firewall, the use of anti-virus and predefined rules for allowed communication.  
The anti-virus is updated according to the rules of the EPSILON zone.  
 
Traffic is not permitted between different production areas, between production areas 
and the corporate network and between ZETA and the corporate network (GAMMA). 
Traffic is allowed between ZETA and production areas and between EPSILON and 
all other zones. Traffic is permitted between JOTA VLANs and EPSILON and ZETA. 
No communication is permitted between different JOTA VLANs or between JOTA 
VLAN and production area VLAN. [44] 
 
Communication between the zones inside DELTA and users in GAMMA is permitted 
through the DELTA Application Portal service. Thus users in GAMMA can indirectly 
communicate with the different production areas and ZETA. [44] 
 
In the event of a ‘Day zero attack’ (GAMMA, DELTA, EPSILON and production 
severely infected by a virus that the anti-virus software not have been updated 
against) the firewall can be used for completely closing the communication to the 
corporate network. This can also be done as a preventive action. [73] 
 
This paragraph presents the estimated recovery time for the DELTA conduit for 
different IS security incidents. [73]  
 
6.4.2 EPSILON ZONE 
 
Communication with the corporate network through the firewall is permitted. The 
firewall can be closed in the scenario of a virus threat. Communications with ZETA, 
production area VLAN zones and JOTA VLAN are allowed. [44] 
 
IS security is maintained as AstraZeneca GOLD standard in EPSILON. All servers 
must run up-to-date antivirus software according to AstraZeneca corporate 
standards. [32] 
 
Since EPSILON consists of servers there is no large demand for the use of e-mail. 
Thus no e-mail is used within EPSILON. The reason for this is also to reduce the IS 
security risks. [73] 
 
Servers and computer equipment are protected in locked server rooms on the site. 
 
This paragraph presents the estimated recovery time for the EPSILON zone for 
different IS security incidents. [73]  
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6.4.3 ZETA ZONE 
  
Communication with EPSILON, production area VLAN zones and JOTA VLAN is 
permitted. [44] 
 
Security is maintained as AstraZeneca SILVER standard on servers. All systems 
must run up-to-date antivirus software according to AstraZeneca standards. [32] 
 
No e-mail is used on ZETA applications. 
 
This paragraph explains the impact on THETA connected production areas if the 
THETA system is being disabled due to an IS security incident. [64] 
 
The lab systems in the JOTA VLAN are not dependent on incidents in the ZETA 
segment. [59] 
 
This section describes the estimated recovery time for the THETA system due to a 
severe IS security incident in the ZETA zone. A manufactured batch that is validated 
and approved is not affected by IS security incidents in the THETA zone. This means 
that AstraZeneca do not face the risk of having to recall distributed batches due to 
THETA zone malfunctions. There exist recovery plans in case of an infection or 
breakdown. [48] [60] [69]  
 
6.4.4 Production area VLAN ZONE 
 
Rules for communication permit traffic between production area zones and ZETA or 
EPSILON. No communication between different production area VLAN zones and 
with JOTA VLAN zones is permitted. [44] 
 
IS Security in production area zones is maintained according to AstraZeneca 
BRONZE standard. Updates of operating systems and software on the clients in the 
production are made irregularly. Every time operating systems are patched the 
process automation systems have to be validated before the production of 
pharmaceuticals is allowed to continue.  
 
Mostly non-standard clients are used today in BETA and ALFA. [83] 
 
If standard clients are used they are provided with anti-virus software. Updates of 
antivirus software are performed regularly and patches to operating systems are 
applied on a non-regular time scale. [44] [50]  
 
If non-standard clients are used there is no guarantee that the system is provided 
with anti-virus or protection against malicious codes or unauthorized access. There is 
also no guarantee that the clients are updated and patched. There exists a routine for 
this but it is not fully implemented or used. The different production areas maintain 
the security on the non-standard clients and the local servers in production. Thus 
there is no guarantee that non-standard clients are provided with anti-virus software 
or hardened against unauthorized operator manipulations. [58] [78] [44] 
 
E-mail use and Internet access is prohibited on the clients in the production area 
zones. [73] 
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AstraZeneca security policies demands that all use of modems for vendor installation 
and support of process automation systems through remote access must be 
approved by the site Local Infrastructure Security managers (LISSM). 
 
This section describes the current situation in the production areas (BETA and ALFA) 
used as references in the study. This includes estimated recovery time from IS 
security incidents and the IS security measures that are implemented to prevent 
incidents. [46] [52] [57] [58] [62] [66] 
 
6.4.5 JOTA VLAN ZONE 
 
Communication is permitted between the JOTA VLAN zone to the ZETA and 
EPSILON zones. Communication between different JOTA VLANs is prohibited. 
 
IS Security in JOTA VLANs is maintained according to AstraZeneca BRONZE 
standard. The lab clients have anti-virus software. Patches to operating systems are 
applied on a non-regular time scale. Due to that the lab equipment not have to run 
continuously it is easier to apply patches and updates on lab clients than on 
production connected clients. Operating systems and anti-virus software updates are 
applied regularly. [32] [59] 
 
E-mail use and Internet access is prohibited on the clients in the JOTA VLAN zones. 
[73] 
 
This paragraph describes the possible impacts of IS security incidents and IS 
security measures that are present on the lab systems. [47] 
 
6.4.6 GAMMA 
 
GAMMA and connects to the Internet and internal AstraZeneca networks (including 
DELTA). Since GAMMA includes a great variety of systems that not are relevant for 
this study, only the connection to Internet and DELTA will is described here. This 
section also describes how virus and hackers possible will reach the DELTA conduit. 
 
Antivirus updating and operating systems patching is performed regularly. GAMMA 
firewalls and infrastructure are considered to provide protection to DELTA against 
Denial-of-service attacks. [50] [32] [73] 
 
To summarize; GAMMA provides both protection and a threat with the connection to 
the Internet and corporate office computers. 
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6.5 Access requirements and controls 
 
6.5.1 DELTA CONDUIT 
 
To be able to access systems in ZETA and production via the DELTA application 
portal, AstraZeneca personnel must apply for and be granted permission. The 
DELTA manager approves administrator access. The manager that is responsible for 
the personnel grants other access. [73] 
 
IBM is responsible for the network and the services that are provided and thus also 
for the access requirements and controls. 
 
DELTA services comply with current corporate standards for passwords. [36] 
 
6.5.2 EPSILON ZONE 
 
Servers used in EPSILON are stored in locked server rooms. The different services 
do not share hardware (different servers for different services). [73] 
 
Access to systems in EPSILON is controlled by the DELTA manager and managed 
by IBM. Users with administration status authority are strictly controlled. Normal 
users are less controlled. [73] 
 
6.5.3 ZETA ZONE 
 
ZETA servers are stored in locked server rooms on the site. [81] 
 
To be able to access THETA applications in ZETA through the DELTA application 
portal, AstraZeneca personnel must apply for and be granted permission. Access is 
approved by OITP and managed by IBM. Personnel that are granted access have in 
general very limited access rights. The access is regularly revised. [54] [64] 
 
External personnel (for example consultants) use the same procedure and routines 
for applying for access to THETA systems. Duration of the access is always limited. 
System providers and support are also controlled by various business contracts. [54] 
[64] 
 
6.5.4 Production area VLAN ZONE 
 
To access the process automation systems, AstraZeneca personnel must first have 
access to the plant building. Access to the process automation system clients is 
protected by login and passwords. Operators and personnel that operate the clients 
are assigned different authority levels depending on the level of responsibility and 
education. This authority applies for the process-control computer system. [55] [81] 
 
AstraZeneca policy demands that unnecessary ports (like USB or CD-ROM) on 
clients are closed and that operating systems are hardened to prevent manipulation.  
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This does not guarantee that all ports are closed and the systems are properly 
hardened. [31] 
 
For standard clients there exist implementations for hardening and access constrains 
in the operating systems. Sometimes this is also included in the control system 
software. [78[ 
 
For non-standard clients there are only operating systems hardening if it is included 
in the control system software or installed by the local CTS department. Thus the 
standard clients in general have a higher level of security. [78] [81] 
 
The networks in production area zones permit connections of portable computer 
devices like laptops. AstraZeneca laptops cannot be assigned IP-addresses via 
DHCP and are therefore not considered to posses a major virus infection threat. For 
‘external’ laptops it is possible to assign an IP address. Telnet, FTP and http 
communication protocols are enabled after defining an IP address. All 
communication protocols require login for access to ZETA applications or EPSILON 
devices. [82] 
 
6.5.5 JOTA VLAN ZONE 
 
To access the lab clients, lab personnel must have physical access to the clients and 
proper login rights. Since the lab client is a standard client there exists work 
implemented for hardening and constrains for access in the operating system to 
prevent undesired manipulation.  
 
There exist no special initiatives for hardening of USB, floppy drive and CD-ROM 
ports on lab clients. 
 
The JOTA VLANs permits connections of portable computer devices like laptops. 
AstraZeneca laptops cannot assigned IP-addresses and are therefore not considered 
to posses a major virus infection threat. For ‘external’ laptops it is possible to assign 
an IP address. Telnet, FTP and http communication protocols are enabled after 
defining an IP address. All communication protocols require login for access to ZETA 
applications or EPSILON devices. [82] 
 
 
6.6 Analysis of threatening picture for the DELTA context 
 
This section describes the current threatening picture that is present to the DELTA 
context. The threatening picture is based on theoretical likelihood for possibility 
incidents due to malicious code, human errors and hostile intrusion threats and IS 
security incident history. This section also analyse the hacker possibilities for 
intrusion into the DELTA conduit. [4] [14] [26] [33] [66] [73] 
 
 
6.7 Identified threat scenarios and vulnerabilities 
 
Please refer to appendix C for the identified credible IS security scenarios that 
threatens the DELTA conduit and the different zones. The threats are assembled 
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through observations, interviews, and system and network descriptions and based on 
the threats that are presented in the theory chapter. 
 
The consequences represent the consequences of worst-case scenarios. The costs 
of the consequences are transformed into the financial impact scale (appendix A). 
Costs of halted production less than one day, cost for destroyed equipment, cost for 
lost batched or costs by loss of potentially important information are not transformed.  
 
The likelihood of the different scenarios is derived in cooperation with AstraZeneca 
Local IS security managers and the Local IT infrastructure manager at the Södertälje 
site. The likelihoods are based on incident history, IS security threatening picture and 
the existing security measures that is presented in the Zone and conduit Security 
policy and Access requirement and control sections. The existing security measures 
affect the likelihood. [73] [79] 
 
As a function of the likelihood and financial impact, the severity rating associated with 
each threat is summarized.  
 
The conclusion is that the main IS security risks are: 
 
- An unknown virus from GAMMA and the Internet, with major impact on all the 
different zones and the DELTA conduit (a Day zero scenario). 
 
- IBM error that have major effects on both the DELTA conduit and the production 
area VLAN zones. 
 
- Non-validated update or patching of the DELTA conduit and infrastructure prevent 
communications or network services. 
 
- Major virus infection from a system provider in a PLC based production area zone. 
 
- Major virus infection from direct-dial up access in a PLC based production area 
zone. 
 
- Major incident due to remote access through a direct-dial up connection in a PLC 
based production area zone. 
 
- Major incident due to virus outbreak from a non-standard client in a PLC based 
production area zone. 
 
 
6.8 Evaluation of the DELTA architecture and implemented IS 
security measures from a risk perspective 
 
An infection with a virus that is unknown to the DMZ (a Day zero attack) is the 
greatest threat to this network architecture. The network architecture provides good 
protection against external virus attacks where the antivirus software in the DMZ is 
updated. When connected to the Internet through the corporate network, the 
architecture also provides excellent protection against undesired remote access and 
denial of service attacks.  
 
The network would be more vulnerable if connected directly to the Internet since 
GAMMA provides protection against denial service attacks and hostile intrusion 
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(hacking). The firewall is a good way to almost eliminate possible intrusion from the 
Internet and GAMMA into the DELTA network. The firewall also provides virus 
protection. 
 
The present internal security measures and policies including rules for no 
communication between different production area zones, hardening of clients and 
security policies for remote access, provides a fairly secure environment for local 
process automation and lab systems in the DELTA connected production areas and 
lab departments. 
 
The DCS based production zone, the ZETA zone and the JOTA VLAN are the most 
secure zones.  
  
 
6.9 Suggested improvements  
 
This section present suggested improvements for increasing the IS security level in 
the DELTA context. Suggestions are mainly inspired by the ISA 99 Technical reports 
and possibilities for hacking derived in section 6.6. [4] [15] 
 
 
6.10 Summary 
 
According to the risk analysis there are threat scenarios with consequences and 
impacts that might be very costly for Sweden Operations. A Day zero scenario (Major 
virus outbreak in the production due to that the anti-virus in the DELTA network not is 
updated in time) might cost Sweden Operations as much as -  . The built in 
architecture and IS security measures address all identified threat scenarios, except 
for the Day zero scenario. The Day zero scenario potential is well known to the site 
Local IS security managers.  
 
The most severe IS risk that endangers DELTA and the production of 
pharmaceuticals at the Södertälje site is: 
 
- A virus that is unknown to the antivirus used in the demilitarized zone of DELTA, 
with origin from GAMMA and the Internet (A Day zero scenario) and with major 
outbreak in the DELTA connected production area networks. 
 
- A major error executed by IBM that affects critical infrastructure equipment and 
systems within DELTA.  
 
- Applying of a non-validated patching on critical infrastructure equipment or systems 
within DELTA that cause a major malfunction in the DELTA network. 
 
- Major virus infection from a process automation systems vendor or support 
organization in a PLC based production area network. 
 
- Major virus infection from an unauthorized direct-dial up access in a PLC based 
production area network. 
 
- Unauthorized remote access through direct-dial up into a PLC based production 
area network. 
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- Major incident due to virus outbreak from a non-standard client in a PLC based 
production area network. 
 
This section also summarize the most important and cost effective IS security 
improvements that could be realized in order to increase the IS security level in the 
DELTA context. 
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7 DELTA ISA 99 security program 
 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
This chapter presents a suggested IS security program for the DELTA network and 
the systems that are connected to the network. The IS security program is based on 
the suggested 18 key elements (section 2.5) of a cyber security management system 
presented in the ISA 99 Part 2 standard, ‘Establishing an Industrial Automation and 
Control Systems Security Program’. According to the standard this represents the 
essential parts of a security program for all different conditions and organizations. 
The documents used in the chapter for evaluating the architecture and IS security 
compliance (chapter 5) together with the ISA 99 technical reports provides further 
input to the program. The AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for 
the Security of Process Automation Services document provides compliance through 
mandatory IS security aspects for process automation systems. [14] [15] [16] [32] 
 
The security program uses a network segmentation of the DELTA architecture into 
two defined IS security zones. The intention with the network segmentation is to 
increase the visibility and the efficiency of the security policies and the risk 
management within the program. The defined zones are a DELTA network zone, 
including the DELTA network, ZETA and EPSILON, and a zone for production area 
and JOTA VLANs. The two zones have separate security policies (Section 7.6 and 
7.7).  
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.1 DELTA zone and production area and lab VLAN zones 
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Text in italics presents important information and suggestions or mandatory 
aspects. 
 
Paragraphs in bold text represent mandatory AstraZeneca Operations aspects 
that must be implemented or demand global or local IS security approval for 
exceptions. Both global and local exceptions are to be documented and 
reported for approval. [31] 
 
Text sections that begin with a star (*) represent sections that provide 
improvements that are implemented today and need to be confirmed or 
evaluated to assure that an effective level of IS security is implemented. 
 
Text sections that begin with two stars (**) represent sections that provide 
improvements that will increase the IS security level and should be considered 
in a longer timetable. 
 
Text sections that begin with three stars (***) represent sections that provide 
high priority improvements that is needed in order to increase the IS security 
level and can be realized in a near future to a cost that is assumed to be 
justified by the increased IS security level. 
 
 
7.2 Business case for a DELTA ISA 99 security program 
 
Objective: Make sure that Sweden Operations understands the importance of IS 
security in the context of process automation systems. Develop a business case for 
the IS security program that includes analysis of the loss of integrity, availability or 
confidentiality of process automation systems due to an IS security incident. 
 
A majority of the production areas at the Södertälje site are today connected to the 
DELTA network. Due to regulatory requirements, technical possibilities and business 
aspects, most of the process automation systems used in the manufacturing of 
pharmaceuticals cannot maintain a satisfying level of Information systems (IS) 
security, in order to be connected directly to the corporate network (GAMMA). There 
is also no great need for the use of Internet access and e-mail on process 
automation systems that would justify such direct connection to GAMMA.  
 
The main idea with the DELTA network architecture is therefore to provide a secure 
IS security environment for process automation systems and at the same time 
provide a communication link between the operations and FREIA. Thus DELTA is a 
critical part in the ongoing work for increased integration and effectiveness within 
Sweden Operations. 
 
The impact of the loss of availability and integrity of the process automation systems 
used at the Södertälje site could be very costly for Sweden Operations. Risk analysis 
performed on the networks and production systems connected to DELTA indicates 
that a major virus incident (A day zero scenario) might halt almost all production in 
Södertälje.  
 
This worst-case scenario is estimated to cost Sweden Operations - for loss of 
production capacity. This might possibly also affect the delivery capacity for 
AstraZeneca globally and in the long run the company’s global reputation.  
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A severe virus infection of the THETA system would halt the tablet production within 
Sweden Operations. This worst-case scenario is estimated to cost Sweden 
Operations - for loss of production capacity.  
 
A major virus infection in a production area network in a plant used for tablet 
manufacturing (BETA here used as an example) might possibly stop the production. 
This is estimated to cost – for loss of production capacity plus the cost for batches 
that have to be scrapped. 
 
Inside the DELTA network there is also stored and communicated a lot of information 
that is considered to provide AstraZeneca with a competitive advantage. The loss of 
confidentiality of such information due to wiretapping of the DELTA network might 
reduce demand and profit for Sweden Operations.  
 
For a more detailed picture of possible IS security incident scenarios, please refer to 
the risk analysis chapter (chapter six). 
 
At present, various AstraZeneca standards, policies and SOPs defines the rules for 
how to protect process automation systems and connected networks from IS security 
threats. These documents are often very generic or intended for a special kind of 
system. The different production areas at the Södertälje site today also have different 
standards and rules for IS security on process automation systems. Therefore there 
is need for an overall strategy or program for the IS security activities in the 
manufacturing. 
 
According to the ISA 99 standard, a common error when addressing IS security is to 
deal with one system at a time. According to the standard, IS security is a much 
larger challenge that must be addressed in a holistic manner on a company–wide 
basis. IS security can be viewed as more of a cultural and organizational issue that 
must be addressed in multiple ways. A satisfying level of IS security cannot be 
achieved through one project. IS security work is an evolutionary process that 
demands both long term planning and continuous efforts and measures. Therefore 
the ISA 99 standard suggests the implementation of an IS security program as the 
best way to reduce IS security risks to process automation systems and to sustain 
risk reduction over time.  
 
An IS security program that is integrated in management, implementation and 
ongoing operations and maintenance of process automation systems will in the long 
run be more cost effective than selective measures to prevent IS security incidents. 
The intention with the program is also to reduce the bureaucracy in the IS security 
work and to simplify the communication and cooperation among departments like 
OIT, CTS, the operations, IT Services and IBM. Many of these departments today 
have different views on possible IS security threats and risks that threatens process 
automation systems. 
 
Comparing costs for planning and implementation of an DELTA ISA 99 security 
program with the worst-case scenario costs described above, this gives an indication 
of that an IS security program is an efficient way to maintain and increase the IS 
security level within DELTA and the connected process automation systems.  
 
The benefits of the DELTA ISA 99 security program will also increase as more and 
more local networks are being connected to DELTA. The costs for maintaining the 
DELTA ISA 99 security program will decrease, as it becomes an integral part in the 
operation of DELTA and process automation systems at the Södertälje site.  
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The ISA 99 standard represents a broad international industrial framework for IS 
security within automation and control systems. The DELTA ISA 99 security program 
is intended to comply with and supplement GAMP regulations and global 
AstraZeneca IS security standards for process automation systems. [2] [31] [32] 
 
 
7.3 Scope of the DELTA ISA 99 security program 
 
Objective: Establish a framework to initiate and control the implementation and 
ongoing operations of IS security within the DELTA context. The scope is 
recommended to include all IS security aspects for process automation systems 
within the DELTA network and production and laboratory environments in the 
production areas. 
 
The reader of this document should be aware of that it is intended for the DELTA 
network and not intended for the GAMMA corporate campus network. Thus the 
suggested recommendations only apply for DELTA and connected internal networks 
and systems. This is referred to as the DELTA context in this document.  
 
7.3.1 Responsibilities 
 
A suggested scope of management responsibility for the IS security within DELTA 
and the connected production areas at the Södertälje site is: 
 
- Responsible for overall IS security in the DELTA context and for defining and 
maintaining the DELTA ISA 99 security program is the DELTA security group (DSG, 
section 7.4.1).  
 
- Responsible for the implementation of all mandatory and suggested security 
measures presented in this document, in the DELTA network and the EPSILON 
segment are the DELTA governing group (Swedish: ‘DELTA styrgrupp’). This also 
includes ensuring the availability and integrity of the ZETA segment.  
 
- Responsible for the implementation of all mandatory and suggested security 
measures presented in this document, are the system owners for the different 
process automation and lab systems. This also includes the THETA system and the 
Eta systems. 
  
- IT Services are operationally responsible for hardware and operating systems for 
standard clients. Operationally responsible for process automation and lab systems 
applications and all non-standard clients are the system owners of these applications 
and clients.  
 
- Responsible for the training and education of operators and lab personnel and the 
operation of process automation and lab systems are managers of the concerned 
production areas and connected lab departments. 
 
- Responsible for the implementation of IS security in process automation purchasing 
and implementation projects are suggested to be the AstraZeneca Engineering 
department. Where appropriate this responsibility is shared with CTS project 
managers and Lab systems project managers. 
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This makes it possible to use the current responsibility hierarchy. IT Services are 
operationally responsible for networks, systems and hardware on central 
infrastructure services in EPSILON and the DELTA network. IT Services are 
responsible for hardware and operating systems for applications and services in 
ZETA and on standard clients. System owners of THETA and the Eta systems and 
application software on standard clients are responsible for these applications. Local 
system owners are responsible for all software and hardware on non-standard 
clients. [44] 
 
Please refer to Appendix E for full picture of implementation responsibilities of 
sections in italics. 
 
Please refer to the DELTA- BaDS for a full picture of responsibilities 
concerning DELTA. [44] 
 
 
7.4 Organizational security 
 
Objective: Establish an organization or network of people with responsibility for 
overall security within the DELTA network and context and for managing the DELTA 
ISA 99 security program, recognizing that there are operational and IS as well as 
organizational components that should be addressed.  
 
7.4.1 Establishment of a DELTA Security Group (DSG) 
 
Establish a special DELTA security group (DSG) responsible for providing clear 
direction and oversight of the overall IS security in the DELTA network and context. A 
suggestion is that the group is formed of the site Local IS security managers (LISSM) 
(OITI) and the site Local IT infrastructure manager/DELTA manager (OITI) together 
with representatives from: 
 
- DELTA governing group (DELTA styrgrupp) 
 
- The OITP department (Production information systems, responsible for THETA) 
 
- Process automation system operators and system owners (both PLC and DCS 
based production) 
 
- Lab personnel and lab system owners 
 
- The CTS department (process automation system managers) 
 
- Lab system managers 
 
- Process technicians and production support 
 
- AZ Engineering (automation projects group) and project managers from CTS and 
Lab systems 
 
- The IT Services department 
 
- IBM Security 
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By involving personnel from outside OITI, the chance for understanding and 
integration of IS security in DELTA and the operations will increase. Cooperation will 
increase and communication and sharing of knowledge will be simplified between the 
different organizations  
 
The DSG will be responsible for reviewing and maintaining the DELTA ISA 99 
security program and to communicate it towards the representative’s respective 
department. A suggestion is also that one of the site LISSM or the Local IT 
infrastructure manager/DELTA manager is appointed as chairman of DSG. This 
person should also, as a suggestion based on the importance of the work being 
performed by DSG, report to Sweden Operations OIT Director (SWEOPS IS IT 
Director). 
 
DSG must in cooperation and with the support of Sweden Operations senior 
management ensure that the DELTA IS security program is implemented into the 
responsible organizations within the Södertälje site. The implementation should be 
made in consideration with the needs of the operational departments to minimize 
economic loss due to IS security measures interference with the operations. The goal 
is to implement an IS security level that in the long run is optimal in terms of both IS 
security and business perspectives. 
 
A suggestion is that the DSG group meets on a monthly basis. The frequency of the 
meetings could also be adapted to the needs in terms of reviewing the program and 
responding to IS security incidents. 
 
Use balanced scorecards to provide members of DSG with incitements to strive for 
increased cooperation and efforts in the work for reducing the likelihood for IS 
security incidents. 
 
DSG must actively invite new member representatives from new networks and 
systems that are connected to the DELTA network. DSG should also suggest that 
systems and networks that would benefit from being connected to DELTA, becomes 
connected to the DELTA network. 
 
 
7.5 Defence-in-depth strategy for the DELTA context 
 
Objective: Create a defence-in-depth strategy that adds several layers of IS security 
protection within the DELTA network and production and lab environments.  
 
According to the AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the 
Security of Process Automation Services and the DHS Control Systems Cyber 
Security: Defence in depth strategies, it is important to endorse a defence-in-depth 
strategy to provide a high level IS security level to the DELTA context. A defence-in-
depth strategy can be summarized as adding several layers of protection or 
measures against IS security threats. A suggested defence-in-depth strategy for IS 
security in the DELTA context at the Södertälje site is: [11] [32] 
 
- * (1) Firewalls and wireless networks. There should be a firewall between the 
corporate network and the DELTA network. If a wireless access point is added 
to the DELTA network, there should be a firewall between the DELTA network 
and the access point. Firewalls should be properly patched and maintained. 
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Efficient firewalls will make it very difficult for an intruder on the Internet or a 
wireless network to access systems within the DELTA network. The wireless 
networks must also be configured and secured in a way that maintain the level 
of security and comply with AstraZeneca global IS security standards. [37] 
 
- * (2) Secure architecture and demilitarized zones. Maintain a high level of 
security in EPSILON. Use EPSILON as a DMZ between a wireless network 
access point and ZETA and production and JOTA VLANs (if possible). Take 
advantage of the security level in the DELTA architecture and actively suggest 
that added systems are constructed and operated in a way that increase the 
security level in the DELTA network. Safeguard that the implementation of new 
systems and networks on a minimum maintains the current level of IS security.  
 
- * (3) Intrusion detection and prevention systems.  
 
- Change control. Implement a centralized change control software system for all 
connected systems (where possible) in ZETA, production and lab.  
 
- IP address control. Implement a network configuration that couple IP addresses 
with MAC addresses. This will decrease the likelihood of unauthorized connection of 
portable equipment to production networks. 
 
- * (4) E-mail and Internet access. No e-mail should be used on process 
automation systems or systems within the DELTA network. No Internet access 
should be possible in ZETA, EPSILON and on process automation and lab 
systems. 
 
- ** (5) Standard clients and systems. Cooperate with AstraZeneca Engineering and 
other appropriate AstraZeneca departments to decrease the number of systems that 
use non-standard clients. IS security is easier to maintain on standard clients. Since 
many process automation systems have a long lifetime, standard clients with 
standard operating systems increase the chance of being supported by operating 
and security systems vendors (Please refer to section 7.7.5 - 7.7.7 for more 
information). Ensure that the standard clients meet the requirements from production 
and lab. 
 
- *** (6) Hardening of process automation and lab systems as described in section 
7.7.6. 
 
- ** (7) Security organization. Install a DSG group as described in section 7.4. 
 
- ** (8) Security policies. Implement clear security policies. This document provides a 
framework for a security policy for the DELTA network and a security policy for the 
production area and JOTA environments (Section 7.6 and 7.7). Communicate the 
policies towards the departments or personnel defined in section 7.3. 
 
- ** (9) Security training. Provide users in production and lab with a ‘Production and 
lab computer user code of conduct’ for IS security expectations and responsibilities 
(as suggested in section 7.7.2). Involve IS security training in courses for operation of 
process automation and lab systems. Evaluate how personnel from contractors and 
consultant firms and third part organizations maintain security. 
 
- * (10) Incident response capacity. Actively work with system and network owners to 
ensure that they have updated and tested BCPs and DRPs (Section 7.6 and 7.7).  
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 - * (11) Remote access. Avoid remote access to networks and systems within 
the DELTA network. Assure the implementation of this. If remote access is 
used it must be carefully supervised of the site LISSM and comply with 
AstraZeneca global IS security standards. Only temporary and strictly 
controlled modem connections are to be used. Evaluate the suggestions in 
section 7.7.11. 
 
 
7.6 IS security policy for DELTA network, services and 
applications  
 
Objective: Identify how Sweden Operations defines and operates IS security within 
the DELTA network context. 
 
This section presents a suggested IS Security policy for the DELTA network, services 
and applications. 
 
Most of the management of networks, systems, services and applications within the 
DELTA network and the ZETA and EPSILON zones, is performed by IT Services, 
IBM and Omikron (Consulting firm that provides the applications and services in 
THETA). This means that most suggested requirements under this section must be 
controlled through reviews and updates of the business agreements with IT Services, 
IBM and Omikron. Clear responsibilities for security incidents for external companies 
should be stated in order to increase the awareness of those companies so that they 
deliver their services with the agreed level of IS security. 
 
Together with the AstraZeneca document Mandatory Standards and Good Practice 
for the Security of Process Automation Services, the security policy should be 
communicated towards the departments and personnel as defined in section 7.3 and 
appendix E. [31] 
 
7.6.1 Physical and environmental IS security 
 
Objective: Create a secure environment for protecting critical DELTA network and 
server equipment from damage, loss, unauthorized access and misuse.  
 
The security perimeter at the Gärtuna and Snäckviken sub-sites and security 
perimeters to production area facilities, functions as the main security barrier against 
unauthorized access to networks, equipment and systems.  
 
* (12) There is need for extra control of physical access to and protection of server 
rooms with critical servers and network equipment for both AstraZeneca personnel 
and external personnel. There should be a clear policy that defines who authorized 
AstraZeneca and authorized external personnel are.  
 
These facilities must also be protected against environmental damage such as fire, 
water, smoke, dust, radiation and impact. Ensure that all external connections (power 
and communications) are adequately protected and maintained. This must be 
properly agreed with and communicated towards internal and external contractors. 
 
* (13) Ensure that external and AstraZeneca personnel are following the physical 
security procedures that have been established. Ensure that procedures are 
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established for monitoring and alarming when physical or environmental security of 
the DELTA network, hardware, services and applications are compromised. 
 
* (14) Ensure that all new process automation systems equipment (including the 
THETA and Eta data systems) and central infrastructure devices are checked for 
computer virus and malicious code prior to being connected to a network within 
DELTA. Ensure that all software, which might be of potential value for a competitor or 
dubious organization outside AstraZeneca, is erased prior to removing and disposing 
process automation systems and servers used within DELTA. Ensure that all 
possible negative impacts on ongoing production due to disconnection of process 
automation system equipment, network equipment and other critical computer 
equipment are eliminated prior to removal. 
 
7.6.2 Personnel IS security 
 
Objective: Evaluate new and current external and AstraZeneca personnel to 
determine if they will maintain the defined IS security level within the DELTA context. 
 
 ** (15) Ensure that there is a security policy established for responsible personnel 
from IBM, ZETA system application providers and other appropriate organizations 
that install, operate, support or maintain networks and systems within DELTA. The 
policy should clearly state the expectations and responsibilities in terms of IS 
security. A suggestion is that this policy includes: 
 
- Agreements with contractor to ensure appropriate communication of the policy 
towards personnel that performs consulting services within DELTA. 
 
- Agreements with contractor to ensure reviewing of external personnel prior to 
sensitive work assignments within DELTA and the production area and JOTA 
VLANs. 
 
- Insurance that no external personnel have total control over all networks and 
systems in the DELTA network, ZETA and EPSILON. 
 
- Clear responsibility for IS security incidents for the responsible company if external 
personnel fails to fulfill business agreements and this leads to a security incident. 
 
- A clear process for shutting off misbehaving or suspicious external personnel. 
 
- A statement that insures that the policy apply on external personnel for a 
reasonable time after their employment and/or work for AstraZeneca ceases. 
 
All stated above must also apply for all AstraZeneca personnel that perform tasks 
similar to those of the external personnel. 
 
7.6.3 Access control 
 
Objective: Address the administrative process of account administration, 
authentication and authorization of users in the corporate network to specific 
resources within the DELTA network. 
 
This section applies to both AstraZeneca personnel and external personnel. 
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Account administration 
* (16) There must be clear rules for authority and access to systems inside the 
DELTA network. All users must be individually identifiable with separate 
accounts. Access should be granted, changed or terminated by the user’s 
respective manager.  
 
Administrator authority should be granted from the DELTA manager. There 
should be a clear record on authorized user access accounts including, 
individual attributes, their permissions, extension of access authority and the 
authorizing manager. The record should regularly be updated and reviewed in 
order to remove accounts no longer needed and to ensure that the users only 
have the minimum required permissions.  
 
No default passwords should be used. Ensure that a password protected 
screen saver is activated when leaving a system. Ensure that all passwords 
meet global AstraZeneca corporate standards. [36] 
 
Authentication 
** (17) The standard AstraZeneca accounts are suggested to be used as 
authentication. 
 
There should be a SOP for managers that is granting authority, to support the 
manager in the evaluation of that the person is considered to not pose an IS security 
threat. There should also be a SOP for the DELTA manager to be followed prior to 
granting administrator authority to support evaluation of that the person is considered 
to not pose an IS security threat. 
 
All systems should provide an audit trail or a log that stores information about 
all access to systems on the DELTA network and failed log-on attempts. 
 
There must be a function that disables the users account for a certain amount 
of time after some number of failed login attempts. There should also be a 
function that ensures that the user has to login again after some length of 
inactive time. 
 
Authorization 
** (18) All authenticated personnel should be provided with a security policy 
that clearly states the rules that the granted authority expects. User accounts 
should be role based to manage access to appropriate information and 
systems. 
 
7.6.4 Staff IS security training and awareness 
 
Objective: Provide personnel with necessary information to identify and address IS 
security vulnerabilities and to ensure their work practices are using effective risk 
mitigation solutions. 
 
There are already SOPs (that must be read and confirmed before access is granted) 
available for both AstraZeneca and external personnel that is approved access to 
THETA and other systems inside DELTA. To expand this initiative, in accordance 
with the ISA 99 standard, there should be a small test prior to granting access for 
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evaluating that the person has acknowledged the SOP information. This test and the 
SOPs concerned should be reviewed in an appropriate time interval.  
 
** (19) Personnel with connection to critical systems like THETA and EPSILON 
central infrastructure services should be educated in the threat of social engineering 
to reduce the likelihood and impact of insider induced IS security incidents and loss 
of confidential information. 
 
7.6.5 System development and maintenance 
 
Objective: Build IS security into the THETA system and where possible other 
applications in the EPSILON and ZETA zones. 
 
* (20) All software on devices in EPSILON and ZETA must be maintained at 
release levels supported by the vendor of the software. This also includes the 
operating systems on standard clients. All systems should have a documented 
life cycle plan for software and hardware components. 
 
Where possible, demand that systems and applications within ZETA and EPSILON 
(mainly THETA) include features that ensures a proper built-in level of IS security. 
For THETA this could include a THETA system architecture that enables the use of 
an automatic recovery system, backup of all involved data and possibility for quick 
execution of BCP and DRP. 
 
Ensure that all systems and applications that have impact on the production of 
pharmaceuticals have a clear established routine for patching and updating of 
operating systems and software applications, which insures minimal negative 
influence on the production. This is to reduce the likelihood of a scenario where an 
upgrade to systems causes the production to halt. The SOP 016054 defines when 
systems in ZETA and EPSILON must be patched. [50] 
 
** (21) IS Security requirements must be considered and addressed during all 
maintenance and support of production critical systems in EPSILON and ZETA. 
 
** (22) Work actively in cooperation with project managers that are responsible for 
implementation of new systems inside DELTA. Examples are possibilities for quick 
execution of BCP and DRP, high level of built-in system security and use of secure 
operating systems that are easy to maintain. Examples include the upcoming 
MES/EBR system implementation. 
 
7.6.6 Incident planning and response (DRP) 
 
Objective: Deter and detect IS security incidents and respond promptly if an incident 
occurs in the DELTA network and in EPSILON or ZETA applications. 
 
Due to the outsourcing contract with IBM, most of the content in this section must be 
agreed (and ensured that it is implemented) with IBM. For THETA, there is room for 
initiatives from OITP in cooperation with Omikron and IT Services to develop 
satisfying incident planning and response. 
 
*** (23) Review the DRP for DELTA. 
 
 93
It is important that there exists a clear DRP for servers in ZETA and for THETA and 
the Eta systems. There should be some sort of regular testing and drills of the DRPs 
for DELTA, EPSILON and ZETA to ensure that if an incident is identified there is a 
proper response. Review that all of this is implemented in a satisfying way. 
 
* (24) Ensure and review periodically (suggestion on a yearly basis) with IT Services, 
IBM, Omikron and OITP that proper DRPs exists for DELTA networks and systems in 
EPSILON and ZETA. This includes responses to possible worst-case scenarios and 
review of the time that the responses are assumed to require. 
 
** (25) There should be an established routine for IBM for reporting of incidents and 
unusual events and experiences within the DELTA network and the applications used 
in the EPSILON and ZETA zones and production and JOTA VLANs. The incidents 
and experiences should be documented to record the incident, the response, the 
lessons learned and the course of action to prevent it from occurring again. 
Preferably this could be manifested as a SOP for the DSG group. This document 
should then be communicated to the appropriate departments and personnel as 
defined in section 7.3 and appendix E. 
 
7.6.7 Business continuity plan (BCP) 
 
Objective: Identify procedures for sustaining essential business operations while 
recovering from a significant disruption in DELTA or THETA.  
 
*** (26) Review the BCP for DELTA. 
 
OITP should in cooperation with IT Services, Omikron and IBM develop a satisfying 
BCP for THETA. Make sure that all of this is implemented in a satisfying way. This 
includes how to restore locally (SCADA and DCS systems) saved data to the system 
(if the THETA system becomes unavailable and the SCADA and DCS systems have 
to store data locally) and loss of infrastructure services. The plans should be tested 
and updated regularly. 
 
According to the ISA 99 standard, the first step in the procedure for developing a 
BCP is to specify the recovery objectives for the involved systems based on the 
business needs. Based on these objectives, there should be development of a BCP 
that ensures that the production can be restored in a timely fashion. A major source 
for contribution to this area is the impact analysis of IS security incidents to specific 
systems and networks performed in the IRM process (section 7.9).  
 
** (27) A formal business continuity team should be formed including IT Services, 
IBM, Omikron and system managers of the THETA and Eta systems. This team 
should in the event of a significant disruption determine the priority of critical systems 
to reestablish normal operations. The BCP should also define and communicate the 
specific roles and responsibilities for each part of the plan.  
 
The ISA 99 standard also states that the organization must make and protect system 
backups to support the BCP. Today there is a backup for all involved systems in 
EPSILON and ZETA. A suggestion is therefore to evaluate the existence and 
functionally of automatic recovery system for THETA and Eta systems and to ensure 
that the procedure for restoring all systems from automatic recovery is established in 
detail in the BCPs for DELTA, THETA and Eta systems. 
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A suggestion is to review and update the agreements with IBM concerning the 
implementation and preparedness of the BCP for DELTA (based on input from an 
IRM process and impact analysis of different IS security incidents). It is also 
suggested to review and update the BCP for THETA in cooperation with OITP, 
Omikron, IT Services and IBM. Finally there should be some sort of regular testing 
and drills of the BCPs for DELTA and ZETA applications. 
 
7.6.8 Information and document management 
 
Objective: Safeguard information and make appropriately available the information 
associated with operating the DELTA network and the ZETA and EPSILON zones. 
 
OITP should in cooperation with IT Services, IBM and Omikron ensure that THETA 
complies with the objectives of this section. This mainly includes ensuring long-term 
storing of data and possible retrieving of long-term stored data. This must also be 
implemented on a satisfying level for the Eta systems. 
 
* (28) Disposal of servers from EPSILON and ZETA requires removal of data that 
might be of value to a competitor to AstraZeneca. 
 
There should also be a policy defining which documents that are considered to be 
confidential for the operation of the DELTA network. Thus all information about the 
DELTA network should be classified as either ‘confidential’ or ‘internal’ information. 
This is to reduce the information for a possible external or internal attacker. 
 
* (29) Most information that is communicated in the DELTA network is 
considered confidential to organizations outside Sweden Operations. 
Therefore it must be assured that no part of the network admits possibilities 
for wiretapping. This includes all wireless networks. [63] [71] [72]  
 
 
7.7 IS security policy for Production area and Lab 
environments 
 
Objective: Identify how Sweden Operations defines and operates IS security within 
the process automation and lab systems environment.  
 
This section presents a suggested IS security policy for the production area and lab 
environments. Together with the Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the 
Security of Process Automation Services document, the security policy should be 
communicated towards the departments and personnel as defined in section 7.3 and 
appendix E. [31] 
 
7.7.1 Physical and environmental IS security 
 
Objective: Create a secure environment for protecting critical process automation 
and lab system from damage, loss, unauthorized access and misuse. 
 
For all production areas there should be a security policy and procedure for physical 
protection of process automation. Current security perimeters at the Snäckviken and 
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Gärtuna sub-sites comply with the requirements in the ISA 99 standard. The process 
automation and lab systems must also be protected against environmental threats 
such as fire, water, smoke, dust, radiation and impact. 
 
7.7.2 Personnel IS security 
 
Objective: Evaluate new and current external and AstraZeneca personnel to 
determine if they will maintain the defined IS security level within the process 
automation and lab environments. 
 
** (30) There should be a clear policy for all personnel that operate process 
automation and lab systems. The policy should state the IS security responsibilities 
of personnel.  
 
A suggestion is therefore that there should be a document or a ’Production and lab 
computer users code of conduct’ or equivalent for IS security expectations and 
responsibilities of the personnel defined above. This document should be regularly 
communicated and include IS security expectations, responsibilities and disciplinary 
actions that might be the result for personnel that violate the regulations. The 
document should also state the reason why the rules are necessary with focus on the 
GMP regulations and not with focus on the potential business effects IS security 
incidents might cause (please refer to chapter 6 for a more detailed view about IS 
security incident impacts). The document is intended to complement the standard 
AstraZeneca global ‘Computer Users Code of Conduct’. [30] 
 
Thus the document could include rules and information about: 
 
- A GMP background to the rules. 
 
- That the process automation or lab system only is to be used for the purpose 
intended. 
 
- No connection of computer equipment or media is allowed, including USB and CD-
ROM. 
 
- Installation of programs on clients is not permitted. 
 
- E-mail or Internet use is never permitted. 
 
- The user must also follow the corporate Computer Users Code of Conduct when 
operating process automation and lab systems. 
 
- What the user is expected to do if other personnel violates the document. 
 
- The disciplinary consequences that might be the result of violation of the rules. This 
could range from warnings to dismissals 
 
The disciplinary consequences must match with AstraZeneca employee terms and 
conditions. The responsibilities should also extend for a reasonable time after 
employment ceases. 
 
** (31) It must also be agreed with third part and contract employees (consultants 
and contractors (Swedish: ‘bemanningspersonal’ ) to follow the document prior to 
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performing process automation systems related work in production and lab 
environments. 
 
7.7.3 Access control 
 
Objective: Address the administrative process of account administration, 
authentication and authorization of users on process automation and lab systems. 
 
* (32) Ensure that passwords and accounts comply with AstraZeneca corporate 
standards. Use standard AstraZeneca accounts for login on process 
automation and lab systems to provide central account administration. Access 
should be granted, changed or terminated by the authority of the manager for 
the production area, lab or appropriate. A SOP could be created for this task, to 
support the manager in the evaluation of the employee. All access accounts 
should be recorded with information about the individual, their permissions 
and the authorizing manager. Access accounts shall be removed as soon as 
they are no longer needed. Users shall have minimum required permissions. 
[36] 
 
No group accounts or default passwords should be used. Ensure that a password 
protected screen saver is activated when leaving the system. 
 
All access should be logged. Access accounts should be disabled for a certain 
amount of time after some number of failed login attempts. Access accounts 
should be role based to ensure that a required minimum of resources is 
granted.  
 
7.7.4 Staff training and IS security awareness 
 
Objective: Provide personnel with necessary information to identify and address IS 
security vulnerabilities and to ensure their work practices are using effective risk 
mitigation solutions. 
 
** (33) Newly employed operators are educated in the operation of process 
automation systems. This education should also include IS security training, 
implementation of section 7.7.2 and information about the social engineering threat. 
This should regularly be tested and updated. 
 
*** (34) CTS and other technical automation support organizations must be carefully 
informed that modem connection of and to process automation systems never is 
permitted without a clear permission from LISSM. 
 
7.7.5 System development, maintenance and disposal 
 
Objective: Build IS security into the process automation and lab systems. 
 
** (35) Perform work for developing a standard client that meet the demands and 
requirements in terms of both IS security and production usability. Update the client 
continuously. 
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** (36) Cooperate with AstraZeneca Engineering and other relevant AstraZeneca 
departments to decrease the number of systems that use non-standard clients. IS 
security is easier to maintain on standard clients. Since many process automation 
systems have a long lifetime, standard clients with standard operating systems 
increase the chance of being supported by operating, control and security systems 
vendors. There is a clear business case for the use of standard clients. 
 
(37) All software on process automation and lab systems must be maintained 
at release levels supported by the vendor as defined in the Mandatory 
Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services 
document. All systems should have a documented life cycle plan for software 
and hardware components. [31] 
 
*** (38) All remote access to process automation and lab systems must meet 
Global corporate IS security standards and be reported to LISSM, OIT. No 
modems or modem connections is to be used by process automation and lab 
systems during installation, operations or maintenance, without a clear and 
documented permission from LISSM. [31] 
 
* (39) There must be proper procedures established and audited with respect to 
the addition, removal and disposal of process automation and lab systems. All 
data that might be considered as confidential or of value to a competitor to 
AstraZeneca must be erased prior to disposal of all process automation 
systems. Establish a SOP for the process for adding and connecting of 
process for process automation and lab systems. Include virus scanning in the 
SOP. Investigate the suggestions for use of EPSILON central services as 
described in section 7.7.11. 
 
7.7.6 System hardening and anti-virus protection 
 
Objective: Provide process automation and lab systems with proper protection to 
combat misuse and virus infections. 
 
*** (40) All (including also process automation systems without any network 
connection) clients should be provided with locked cabinet or alternatively 
equivalent software to prevent physical intrusion and connection of memory 
devices. This includes disabling USB, floppy drives and CD-ROM ports and 
equivalent ports and vulnerabilities. Safeguard keys to cabinet lock. 
 
Provide all clients (including unconnected process automation systems) with 
software that disables all vulnerabilities in the operating system. This includes 
disabling command prompt and Microsoft Windows Explorer and equivalent 
vulnerabilities. A suggestion is that administrator access enables this.  
 
Always undertake further hardening of process automation systems where 
defined by the automation vendor. 
 
It is desired to provide all process automation and lab systems with standard 
clients. Include the software and hardening as described in section 7.7.6 on 
standard clients. Make sure that the standard clients meet the requirements 
that the production and lab departments demand. 
 
A suggestion is that the site LISSM should approve all use of non-standard clients. 
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*** (41) All process automation and lab systems should be equipped with 
antivirus software. Updates should preferably be made with the help of the 
DELTA antivirus service. Updates should be made regularly. 
 
** (42) Operating system should be updated or patched when administratively 
and technically possible, without interfering with the production or laboratory 
tests performed. Minimum requirement is that updates shall be made once a 
year. 
  
** (43) Ensure that all servers and control systems equipment (like scanning 
node and local servers and PLC and DCS hardware or equivalent) are properly 
hardened according to the AstraZeneca document Mandatory Standards and 
Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services. This includes 
use of anti-virus software, physical protection (locked cabinets) against 
unauthorized connection and abuse and proper patching of operating systems. 
This section also applies where appropriate to lab equipment and systems. 
Safeguard the keys to cabinet locks. [31] 
 
Implement change control software as described in section 7.5. 
 
Where patching of operating systems and the use of antivirus software not is 
possible on process automation systems, evaluation and assessment of the use of 
other equivalent security measures should be performed. A suggested alternative 
solution is the combination of: 
 
- Physical protection of clients and other computerized equipment belonging to the 
process automation system. The protection must prevent connection of any computer 
or memory device to the system. 
 
- Let the whole process automation system connect to the production area network 
through a system-included firewall. Firewall should be dedicated (not host-based) 
and only allow communication to predefined addresses and on a minimal number of 
predefined protocols. The firewall might include packet filtering, stateful inspection 
and application proxy filtering, depending on security and manageability issues. 
Some firewalls also have inbuilt antivirus. [15] 
 
- No email or Internet access on the process automation system. 
 
- No modem or remote access to the process automation system. 
 
Include this as a new ‘process automation system firewall’ service in the services 
offered by DELTA (see section 4.5). 
 
For production areas that use DCS process automation systems that cannot be 
patched or use of antivirus, there should be analysis for which firewall solution is the 
most suitable depending on the DCS network connectivity to the production area 
network. 
 
This suggestion does not apply for servers in production. 
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7.7.7 System monitoring  
 
Objective: Ensure traceability of all systems with impact on the production and 
identify threat agents. 
 
(44) Install and operate monitoring software on all systems that have impact on 
the production. Ensure that logs are recorded from logon attempts, external 
attempts to access or modify data, use of user accounts on the system and all 
changes to the system and platform parameters (As defined in the Mandatory 
Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services 
document). [31] 
 
All systems should generate an audit trail. Investigate if there is possibility for 
a central service in EPSILON to support this task. 
 
7.7.8 Incident planning and response (DRP) 
 
Objective: Deter and detect IS security incidents and respond promptly if an incident 
occurs in a process automation or lab VLAN 
 
** (45) There shall be a DRP for every production area unit or lab department. The 
DRP should state responsible personnel and define the actions to be performed to 
restore systems. The plan should be tested, drilled and updated regularly. Plans 
should also include responses to loss of infrastructure services or contact with critical 
systems like THETA. 
 
All incidents should be documented and reported to the DSG. Which personnel that 
are responsible for this should also be stated in the DRP.  
 
Responsible for development of the DRP document should be the affected system 
owners in cooperation with management in the production area unit or lab 
department. 
 
A suggestion is that the DRP should have supplementary CD-ROM or USB memory 
devices that contains software for restoring different systems in the scenario of an IS 
security incident. This would decrease the recovery time. 
 
A suggestion is also that the DSG is responsible for approving DRPs.  
 
Ensure that DRP also contains plans for local servers in production. 
 
7.7.9 Business continuity plan (BCP) 
 
Objective: Identify procedures for sustaining essential business operations while 
recovering from a significant disruption in process automation and lab systems. 
 
** (46) Develop a BCP for every production area unit and lab department. The BCP 
shall state recovery objectives based on business needs and define the specific roles 
and responsibilities for each part of the plan. The plans need to be tested and 
updated regularly. Plans should also include responses to loss of infrastructure 
services or contact with critical systems like THETA. 
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DSG shall determine the impact and consequences that is associated with loss of 
systems to provide input for recovery priorities in the scenario of a major incident. 
 
** (47) Form a special Sweden Operations DRP and BCP team of responsible 
system managers, IT Services, IBM, CTS personnel, OITP personnel and managers 
for Sweden Operations production area units and lab departments. The group is 
responsible for restoring systems and operations with the help of local DRP and 
BCP. This might be more effective in terms of both costs and recovery time. In the 
scenario of a major incident in several process automation and lab VLANs the group 
should determine the priority order for restoring critical systems. 
 
Ensure that BCPs also contains plans for local servers in production. 
  
7.7.10 Information and document management 
 
Objective: Safeguard and make appropriately available the information associated 
with operating the process automation and lab systems. 
 
* (48) Provide a policy for CTS and system owners of process automation systems 
that demand that all information on systems must be erased prior to disposal of 
equipment and systems. 
 
7.7.11 Connection of portable computer equipment 
 
Objective: Combat unauthorized connection of portable computer equipment in 
production and lab environments and prevent possible virus injection.  
 
(49) Avoid connection of portable computers to process automation and lab 
VLAN. If portable computer equipment has to be used and connected, it must 
be cleaned from malicious codes prior to connection according to applicable 
SOP that is in place. [52] [46] 
 
Investigate the possibility to develop a special central service in EPSILON for easy 
cleaning of virus on portable computer equipment or portable media devices.  
 
This service could consist of a physically isolated server that is updated with the 
latest antivirus software. By connecting to the server, the connected computer or 
media device is scanned and cleaned.  
 
Alternatively an individual SILVER standard VLAN could be created for this task. This 
VLAN should have a network connection in all DELTA connected buildings. The 
VLAN should be able to communicate with BRONZE networks but with EPSILON as 
DMZ. Alternatively a wireless router could be connected to the new VLAN and 
increase the mobility for the owner of the portable computer equipment in the 
production areas. This VLAN could also be used if a wireless access point is added 
to DELTA. This VLAN is then used for connection of the portable computer 
equipment. 
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7.7.12 Reduction of third party risks 
 
Objective: Reduce IS security risks from third part organization to an acceptable 
level. 
 
Manage risks from vendors 
** (50) Ensure that AstraZeneca Engineering actively take notice to the Mandatory 
Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services 
document (mainly section 8.3.2) when choosing vendors and purchasing new 
process automation and lab systems. To ensure this establish a SOP for 
AstraZeneca Engineering personnel which states that all purchase projects must 
consider this and preferably state that process automation systems must be able to 
use standard clients. The SOP shall (as a suggestion) include mandatory reporting to 
DSG of all cases that deviates from this to increase the incentive for AstraZeneca 
Engineering to contribute to the IS security work. [31] 
 
There should also be one specialized SOPs for project managers from all different 
production areas (CTS) and LAB. 
 
Manage risks from support organizations 
** (51) Develop a SOP according to section 8.3.3 in the Mandatory Standards 
and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services document, 
which is to be followed by all support organizations of process automation and 
lab systems. Include anti-virus scanning in the SOP. [31] 
 
 
7.8 Infrastructure operations and change management 
 
Objective: Address the procedure requirements for changes and updates of systems 
to IS security. 
 
This area is addressed in the SOP 016054 and the AstraZeneca Mandatory 
Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services and 
the AstraZeneca guideline Secure Network Isolation of Process Automation 
Computer Systems. There also exist policies for validation of systems due to all sorts 
of changes of process automation systems, [31] [32] [50] [54] 
 
7.8.1 Update and patch management strategy 
 
Deployment of operating systems software patches is regulated in the SOP 016054. 
This means that the patch deployment for the DELTA network and the EPSILON and 
ZETA applications already has a working and mandatory procedure. [50] 
 
For process automation systems in production area networks (BRONZE) there is 
room for deployment of patches on a local decision based non-regular time interval. 
Based on this it is suggested that there should be a well documented procedure that 
includes: 
 
- Maximal time length that is allowed to pass without applying security patches to 
systems in BRONZE class networks. 
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- Forming of a special process automation systems patching group. This group 
should work continuously throughout the year with patching of process automation 
systems (where there is greatest need for patching, based on IRM work and 
upcoming threats). This work should be conducted in cooperation with appropriate 
CTS departments and system owners. The intention with this suggestion is to provide 
a way for patch deployment that provide security patches and at the same time 
minimal interference with the production. For example all systems could be patched 
during the summer brake and the group responsible for all other security patching 
throughout the rest of the year. The group could be formed of IBM, IT Services and 
CTS personnel and directed by the DSG. 
 
7.8.2 Backup management 
 
A procedure for backing up and restoring computer systems within DELTA should be 
established, used and verified by appropriate testing. This should apply as 
mandatory (where possible) for all involved systems and system owners. This 
connects to section 7.7.8 and 7.7.9. 
 
 
7.9 Integrated risk management (IRM) 
 
Objective: Recognize where IS security vulnerabilities and risks exist in the DELTA 
context and implement security measures that commensurate with the identified 
risks. 
 
7.9.1 IRM 
 
To recognize where IS security vulnerabilities exist and the potential impact and 
consequences that could occur as a result of an IS security incident, it is important to 
identify, assess and manage all IS security risks. The ISA 99 standard suggests that 
risk management is based on two parts. All risks must first be identified, classified 
and assessed. The identified risks should then be managed through risk mitigation 
implementations. AstraZeneca have developed a framework for risk management 
called the Integrated risk management (IRM). Therefore the suggestion is that the 
DELTA ISA 99 security program takes advantage of the IRM tool for risk 
management. 
 
** (52) In order to follow AstraZeneca standard procedures for IRM the DSG should 
perform a yearly IRM process. The result of the IRM process will then form the basis 
for further reviewing of the IS security program and for implementing improvements. 
The risk criterions presented in appendix A should be used in the IRM process. 
Please refer to relevant IRM documentation for more information about the IRM tool. 
[35] [56]  
 
Use IBM or other external part to provide expert knowledge about new threats and 
vulnerabilities during yearly IRM work. 
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7.10 Maintaining and implementing improvements for IS 
security 
 
Objective: Implement, measure, track and improve security efforts continually to keep 
process automation systems and the production of pharmaceuticals more secure. 
 
7.10.1 Identify new threats and opportunities 
 
The procedure to identify new threats is integrated in the IRM process. In order to 
identify possible improvements for IS security; the process should also include work 
on identifying opportunities. Since the IRM process is performed once a year, DSG 
could discuss and respond to new threats on a monthly basis. If necessary, 
emergency cases should be taken care of immediately. 
 
7.10.2 Identify and implement corrective and preventive actions 
 
Based on the identified threats and opportunities in section 7.9.1 and 7.10.1, the 
DSG group must on an appropriate time interval or on yearly basis identify corrective 
and preventive actions. By integrating changes continually, there is less need for 
significant amounts of time to be spent on updating the entire DELTA IS security.  
 
When actions are approved, action plans and areas of improvement need to be 
communicated towards key stakeholders and the affected personnel. 
 
7.10.3 Evaluate personnel feedback on IS security measures  
 
When implementing IS security measures it is important to seek personnel feedback 
on performance shortcomings and production interference due to the IS security 
measures. The idea with the DSG group composition is to increase the efficiency of 
communication of action plans to stakeholders and gathering of stakeholder and 
personnel feedback. The feedback could be collected when appropriate or on a 
yearly basis. The feedback could also be selectively addressed or based on free 
responses for suggestions of improvements. For example could a structured 
questionnaire be used for collecting feedback in important areas.  
 
 
7.11 Monitoring and reviewing of the DELTA ISA 99 security 
program 
 
Objective: Monitor and review the DELTA ISA 99 security program continually. 
 
7.11.1 Review the business case for the DELTA ISA 99 security 
program 
 
As a part of the yearly based Sweden Operations budget planning work, the DSG 
chairman shall update the business case for the IS security program. The business 
case and a summary of the work conducted during the year within the DSG should 
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be presented for the management responsible for DSG. This will provide a basis for 
management review of the work and the efficiency and effectiveness of the security 
program. 
 
7.11.2 Continuously review the IS security activities within the 
DELTA network and the operations 
 
** (53) To assure that the IS security activities in the network are performing as 
expected, the DSG need a process for collecting information about the performance 
of manual and automatic (computerized) IS security activities. The manual part of the 
process could be based on audits in production and lab areas, server rooms and 
review of system maintenance and operations. Audit of the automatic IS security 
activities must be performed in cooperation with IBM and IT Services. This creates a 
dilemma since then IBM would both provide and review the IS security level. A 
suggestion is to solve this issue with the help of IT Services. 
 
The audits could be performed as monthly random inspections in critical areas and 
on a yearly random basis for less critical areas. The suggestion is that areas 
identified as the most severe in the risk analysis in section 7.9 above are inspected 
more frequently. 
 
7.11.3 Report IS security incidents in a timely manner 
 
** (54) IBM and the IT Services department should have procedures in place to 
identify failed and successful IS security breaches. The DSG should establish a 
connection to IBM and IT Services for collection of the information that is produced 
as a result of this procedure (in a timely manner). There should also be an initiative 
for educating operators and relevant personnel on reporting IS security incidents to 
the DSG in a timely manner. 
 
Information provides data for incident response and reviewing the risk level. IBM and 
the IT Services department should execute this process. The information also 
provides data for IRM work and for business case background.  
 
The system owner and information owners of the systems that is affected by the 
incidents should also be informed. 
 
7.11.4 Review the risk level with changes to the environment and 
address issues discovered 
 
When there are changes in the IS security environment or within the DELTA context, 
that demands urgent risk level assessment, the members of DSG shall consult with 
the local LISSM to evaluate if there is need for immediate actions.  
 
* (55) IBM and IT Services should have a procedure for closing the firewall 
between GAMMA and the DELTA network when there is risk for virus infection 
or a possible Day zero scenario.  
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7.12  DELTA ISA 99 security program compliance 
 
Objective: Assess the IS security program policies and procedures to affirm that they 
meet legal, regulatory and company security requirements. 
 
The DELTA ISA 99 security program complies with the ISA 99 Part 2 standard. 
 
The program is intended to comply with and complement the SOP 016054 and the 
AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process 
Automation Services documents. When changes are made to the program there 
must be a compliance audit to ensure compliance to these documents. The 
suggested firewall configuration deviates from Mandatory Standards and Good 
Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services. [31] 
 
The program complies with AstraZeneca IRM requirements. [56] 
 
The program complies with the GAMP 4 Guide, appendix O3: Guideline for 
Automated System Security. This includes system classification, Employee 
awareness, and Incident management and Information security policy. [2] 
 
 
7.13 Summary 
 
This chapter presents a suggested IS security program for DELTA context. The 
intention with the program is to address IS security within the DELTA network and in 
the production and lab environments in an overall solution manner with respect to 
both IS security and business requirements. 
 
Sections with priority (***) are 7.5, 7.6.6, 7.6.7, 7.6.2, 7.7.4, 7.7.5, 7.7.6 
 
Responsibilities for implementation of all italic sections are presented in 
Appendix E. 
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8 MES/EBR system implementation and IS security 
 
 
8.1 Overview 
 
This chapter briefly discusses the implementation of a MES/EBR system and the IS 
security risks that this implementation potentially creates. The chapter also provides 
some IS security conclusions that is of interest for the MES/EBR system 
implementation.  
 
In order to follow the scope of the study the focus in this chapter is on how the EBR 
system implementation affects the IS security within the DELTA context and the 
production at the Södertälje site. 
 
 
8.2 Implementation of a MES/EBR system  
 
Sweden Operations is looking at the possibility to implement a computerized 
Manufacturing execution system (MES). A MES is a system that companies can use 
to measure and control critical production activities. Activities include prodcution 
recource management, prodeuction definition management, production tracking, 
production performance analysis, production dispatching, prodcution data collection 
and production execution management. Some of the benefits with regards to MES 
solutions are increased traceability, productivity, and quality. The MES system 
connects the systems used in the production (level 0-2 in the ISA hierarchy) with 
Enterprise resource and planning systems (ERP systems) (level 4). Today there are 
many different ERP system used by Sweden Operations. All ERP systems are today 
operated from GAMMA. [23] [73] [80]  
 
Current plans for a computerized MES system within Sweden Opertions consists of 
an Electronic batch record (EBR) system and a system for manufacturing operations 
that also connects the EBR system to the ERP systems. Current MIS systems 
(mainly THETA) and systems in production areas and JOTA VLANs will provide 
production data to the MES system. [75] 
 
8.2.1 Electronic batch records (EBR) 
 
A crucial part of the MES system is the EBR system. The EBR system provides most 
of the MES functions except for production scheduling and performance analysis. 
Benefits of the EBR system is paperless production and includes electronic batch 
recipes, protocols and reports, equipment management, process documentation, 
electronic work instructions (program recipes), lab analysis results and most of all the 
electronic batch record. The batch record contains all data about the manufactured 
batch (including audit trails, critical sensor and equipment values, and electronic 
signatures with timestamps) and founds the basis for the validation process before 
the batch is approved to be shipped to the ISMO department. The system enforces 
that all values corresponds to the master batch recipe. This makes the validation of 
manufactured batches almost automatic since only the production and quality control 
deviations from the master batch protocol have to be approved by validation 
personal. Hence the EBR system has a great potential to reduce costs for 
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administration, validation and documentation within the production of 
pharmaceuticals. [28] 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8.1 Structure of MES system 
 
 
8.2.2 MES and EBR system functionality 
 
The production scheduling and performance analysis part of the system will mainly 
keep track of what is produced and report Key performance indicators (KPI) from the 
production. Connecting to IS security, the loss of such a system due to an IS security 
incident will not cause the production to stop immediately. If the system becomes 
unavailable for a long time, the scheduling of batches and material in production will 
have to be made manually. 
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The EBR part of the system in principal consist of databases and software that 
connects the databases with the production scheduling and performance analysis 
system, production systems and operator HMI, SCADA and DCS, lab systems and 
the THETA system. The databases store batch record contents and keep track of the 
equipment recipes and batch record templates. [28] 
 
Thus the availability of the EBR system becomes very important for the production 
since no production can be performed without that the production equipment is 
connected to the EBR system. The data transmitted to and from the EBR system is 
also of potential value to a competitor to AstraZeneca since it contains a lot of 
information about the production processes.  
 
Furthermore there is also likely to be increased demands for the use of wireless 
networks to be able to connect all production equipment and personnel to the 
EBR/MES system.  
 
Finally to comply with the GMP regulations and provide traceability, the batch reports 
and electronic batch and lab protocols or batch files have to be electronically long 
term stored. The technical solution for this task is not yet decided. 
 
8.2.3 Suggested network solutions for the implementation of an 
MES system 
 
It is today not yet decided where the MES system will be placed in the network 
architecture within Sweden Operations. Probable locations for the system are in the 
GAMMA network or inside the DELTA network (in the ZETA zone). [73 [75]  
 
Irrespective of if the system is operated from GAMMA or the ZETA segment, there is 
need for a communication bus server that translates information between, ERP, 
MES, MIS and process automation and lab systems. Such bus-server will most likely 
be operated from the EPSILON segment. This means that communication through 
the communication bus and communications between GAMMA and DELTA can 
utilize EPSILON as a DMZ. [73] 
 
The increased need for wireless connectivity and access to the MES/EBR system 
also requires the use of wireless access points. In GAMMA there are already 
wireless networks and access points available. Today there are no access points 
available in DELTA. If such access points are needed it will most likely be added as a 
separate AstraZeneca ‘BRONZE’ standard network. [32] [73] 
 
This creates three possible architectures for the DELTA context with the 
implementation of a MES system: 
 
- Placing the MES system in ZETA inside DELTA and adding a wireless network 
access point within DELTA (I). Figure 8.2. 
 
- Placing the MES system in ZETA inside DELTA and use GAMMA wireless 
networks (II). Figure 8.3. 
 
- Placing the MES system in GAMMA and use GAMMA wireless networks (III). 
Figure 8.4. 
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Fig 8.2 MES system in ZETA segment and access point inside DELTA (I) 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8.3 MES system in ZETA segment and use of wireless networks from GAMMA (II) 
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Fig 8.4 MES system in GAMMA (III) 
 
 
8.3 MES/EBR system introduced IS security threats 
 
The following IS security risks that especially relate to an MES/EBR system have 
been derived in cooperation with people involved in the MES/EBR project. In order to 
follow the scope of the study, the focus is on the EBR part of the system. [60] [75] 
 
8.3.1 Possible threats and threat agents 
 
Possible threats for IS security attacks on the MES/EBR system are the passive and 
active threats described in the theory chapter. For the EBR system this is mainly 
wiretapping, malicious code, intentional or unintentional human errors and possible 
hostile intrusion from the Internet, through a modem connection or through a wireless 
network connection. The possible threat agents are also presented in the theory 
chapter. 
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8.3.2 Wireless network vulnerabilities 
 
With increased wireless connectivity and wireless connection access points there is a 
risk for war-driving attacks (hacker intrusion through a wireless access point) on the 
network that hosts the access point. Therefore it is very important that the wireless 
network must be properly encrypted and protected according to global AstraZeneca 
IS security standards. [4] [31] [37] 
 
8.3.3 MES/EBR system availability 
 
The production of pharmaceuticals becomes dependent on that the EBR part of the 
system is working. Thus the production is also dependent on that DELTA and the 
segment where the EBR system is operated from, is operational. Depending on 
where the system is placed in the reference architecture, the integrity of this segment 
becomes very important for Sweden Operations. There must also be an 
extraordinary capacity to quickly restore the system in the scenario of an IS security 
incident. 
 
8.3.4 Availability of EBR critical systems 
 
The EBR system will be dependent on EBR critical systems (like the THETA system) 
for data from the production. This makes the system vulnerable against malfunctions 
and IS security incidents in DELTA network, ZETA and the production areas. The 
THETA system has an estimated worst-case scenario recovery time of up to two 
weeks. This implies that if the THETA system suffers a major IS security incident, 
then the THETA connected production at the Södertälje site is forced to halt for up to 
two weeks. Therefore there is need for a very quick and effective recovery of the 
THETA system if the MES and EBR system is implemented. 
 
8.3.5 Wiretapping of information 
 
With the EBR implementation the amount of confidential information that is 
transmitted within DELTA increases. Without EBR, mainly recipes (electronic work 
instructions) and sensor and actuator values are transmitted, but with EBR more 
information will be transmitted within the DELTA network. Thus the impact of possible 
wiretapping of DELTA becomes a more serious problem with the implementation of a 
MES and EBR system (compare with section 6.3 and table 6.2). Encrypting 
communication within the DELTA network could reduce this threat. Furthermore a lot 
of the information is already available on papers in the production and lab 
environments.  
 
Information that is used and transmitted is classified as confidential or internal 
depending on the estimated value for a competitor to AstraZeneca. Confidential 
information is assumed to be of value for a competitor to AstraZeneca. [71] [72] [63] 
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Information Confidential Internal 
Used or 
communicated 
within 
Master batch recipe 
material   
MES system and 
the DELTA 
network. 
Batch and quality 
control protocols   
MES system and 
the DELTA 
network. 
Production and 
Lab 
Batch recipes 
(electronic work 
instructions) 
  
MES system, 
ZETA, production 
area VLAN and 
the DELTA 
network 
Batch report material   
MES system, 
ZETA and the 
DELTA network 
 
Table 8.1 Classification and use of information with MES system 
 
 
To transform this risk to an opportunity, the implementation of EBR increase the 
information sent electronically but at the same time have a potential to reduce the 
risk of industrial espionage in production due to the reduced amounts of printed batch 
protocols that have to be used. Thus the EBR implementation provides an 
opportunity to limit industrial espionage against Sweden Operations and 
AstraZeneca. 
 
8.3.6 Validation of batches 
 
With the increased automatization of the validation of batches that is one of the main 
benefits with the EBR system comes also a risk. If there is some malfunction in the 
EBR software or the underlying operating systems, there is a risk for errors in the 
validation process. Most likely the validation will not be approved. A worst-case 
scenario could be that the system becomes programmed or changed in a way that 
approves batches that not should be approved. An illegitimate insider might 
reconfigure the system in a way that makes the system approve batches that not 
should be approved. Even that this scenario might be seen as hypothetical, the 
impact could be serious harm of patients and a serious loss of AstraZeneca 
reputation. Thus the integrity of the EBR system is very important. 
 
8.3.7 Traceability of batches 
 
Failure in the EBR system might lead to that long term stored data from 
manufactured batches is lost.   The likelihood of this scenario can be reduced 
through printing the batch files for all manufactured batches or by providing data 
redundancy to the part of the MES system that is used for long-term data storage of 
batch records.  
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8.4 IS security evaluation of suggested implementation 
solutions  
 
This section assumes that a majority of the production areas at the Södertälje site 
becomes connected to the MES and EBR system and mainly focuses on the first 
three IS security risks identified in section 8.3; Wireless network vulnerabilities, 
MES/EBR system availability and Availability of EBR critical systems. 
 
8.4.1 Model I 
 
Placing the MES system in ZETA and utilization of a wireless network with an access 
point connected inside the DELTA network. This solution will demands 
communication with ERP systems in GAMMA. This solution adds the less extra 
communication with GAMMA.  
 
Wireless network vulnerabilities 
The wireless connection creates a vulnerability to war-driving inside DELTA. 
Therefore it is very important that the added wireless access points have a high level 
of security. If the access points are assigned a separate VLAN, EPSILON could be 
used as a DMZ between the access points and the production or ZETA. If model I is 
chosen there must be a thorough risk assessment concerning the location and 
operation of such access points and wireless networks. [37] 
 
EBR system availability 
Placing the MES system in ZETA provides the MES system with the same level of IS 
security as the THETA system. According to the risk analysis in chapter 6 the main 
risks are virus from EPSILON, production VLAN, JOTA VLAN or a process 
automation system vendors or support organizations. It is concluded that the ZETA 
segment is less vulnerable to virus outbreaks than in GAMMA. 
 
Availability of EBR critical systems 
Placing both the MES and the THETA system in the ZETA segment reduces this 
problem to mainly concern communication with ERP systems if DELTA is isolated 
from GAMMA. 
 
8.4.2 Model II 
 
Placing the MES system in ZETA and utilization of a wireless network with access 
point connected to GAMMA network. This solution demands communication with 
GAMMA for the communication with the access points for a required wireless 
network and with ERP systems. 
 
Wireless network vulnerabilities 
Operating a wireless network from GAMMA will make it possible to use EPSILON as 
DMZ for the communication with the access points. Data from wireless connected 
personnel and equipment will not be in communication with the MES system if the 
DELTA is isolated from GAMMA. 
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EBR system availability 
Placing the MES system in ZETA provides the MES system with the same level of IS 
security as the THETA system. According to the risk analysis in chapter 6 the main 
risks are virus from EPSILON, production VLAN, JOTA VLAN or a process 
automation system vendor or support organization. It is concluded that the ZETA 
segment is less vulnerable to virus outbreaks than in GAMMA. 
 
Availability of EBR critical systems 
Placing both the MES and the THETA system in the ZETA segment reduces this 
problem to mainly concern communication with ERP systems and wireless 
connected personnel and systems. In the scenario where DELTA must be isolated 
from GAMMA there will be problems with the communication to wireless devices. 
 
8.4.3 Model III 
 
Placing the MES system in GAMMA and use of wireless network with access points 
in GAMMA. Since the MES system is dependent on information from the SCADA and 
DCS systems this solution will add most extra traffic between GAMMA and the 
DELTA network. This solution does not demand a special DELTA wireless network 
access point and makes communication with ERP systems easier.  
 
Wireless network vulnerabilities 
The wireless connection will not directly affect DELTA. 
 
EBR system availability 
Placing the MES system in GAMMA will provide a situation where a DMZ not is 
protecting the MES system. Therefore this solution can be concluded as being the 
most vulnerable to malicious code (virus) and hacking incidents. 
 
Availability of EBR critical systems 
In the scenario where DELTA must be isolated from GAMMA there will be major 
problems with the communication between production and the MES system. Thus 
this solution is likely to cause the MES connected production to halt if the connection 
to GAMMA is intentionally closed or disrupted due to for example an IBM caused 
network problem or virus outbreak in GAMMA. 
 
8.4.4 Connecting to IS security standards 
 
Connecting to AstraZeneca IS security standards the MES system will be needed to 
perform communication directly to the corporate network. Therefore there is no 
mandatory rule that states that the MES system has to be operated from inside the 
DELTA network. It is recommended to perform an IS security risk analysis based on 
the three models (presented above) to determine in which segment the MES system 
will be most vulnerable. If it is concluded that the MES system not have to 
communicate directly to GAMMA then it should be operated from ZETA according to 
AstraZeneca IS security standards. [32] 
 
Deployment of the MES system in the corporate network creates a situation where 
many process automation systems must communicate with GAMMA through 
EPSILON. Comparing with a deployment of the MES in the ZETA segment, ERP 
systems must instead communicate with the MES through the DELTA-GAMMA 
firewall. Thus an analysis should be conducted in order to decide if it is desired to 
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have MES-ERP or MES-process automation system communication through 
EPSILON. Consideration should also be given to the differences in time constants 
between process automation systems and ERP and MES systems. The 
communication bus must have capacity to handle large amounts of data if the 
process automation systems use EPSILON as DMZs for communication with the 
MES/EBR system. 
 
With a MES system deployment in the corporate network it must be assured that the 
network connection or communication to process automation systems (BRONZE 
networks) is indirect (network connection (b)). That is ensuring that the 
communication bus in EPSILON works as DMZ. If it is concluded that this 
communication or connection is direct (network connection (a)), then all process 
automation must meet all mandatory aspects in the AstraZeneca document 
Mandatory standards and good practice for the security of process automation 
systems, or have global AstraZeneca approval for exceptions. This scenario will 
create a challenge for Sweden Operations in terms of administration, technical 
solutions and costs. This also removes some of the main advantages with the 
DELTA network architecture. 
 
According to the NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA 
and Process Control Networks, The NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and industrial Control Systems Security and DHS Control 
Systems Cyber Security: Defence in depth strategies documents, the use of a DMZ 
between production data historian servers or process automation systems and the 
corporate network is recommended. Both the NISCC document and the NIST 
document refer to as EPSILON and ZETA as a MES layer or a Process Information 
Network. Hence it is concluded that it is recommended to operate the MES system 
from inside the DELTA network within ZETA with EPSILON as DMZ between the 
MES system and GAMMA. [11] [17] [18] 
 
According to the ISA 99 part 2 standard, it is very important to build in IS security in 
process automation systems from the beginning. Thus it is important to include IS 
security requirements in the system specifications when purchasing the system. This 
includes building the system on a platform that provide a good level of IS security 
including easy patching management of operating systems and applications, system 
hardening, good BCP and DRP possibilities and possibility to use encrypted 
communication. [13] 
 
Since the MES/EBR system will be very important for the production, it is important 
that the system is constructed with ability for quick recovery from IS security 
incidents. The system might for example include automatic recovery software. Since 
the system is likely to be in operation for a long time, it is also important to choose a 
platform that is likely to be supported by a vendor in the future, in order to ensure that 
security patches will be developed continuously.  
 
Thus the system should be built on reliable and secure technology that will be 
supported in the future and allows for easy maintenance and quick recovery from IS 
security incidents. 
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8.4.5 Conclusions and suggestions 
 
Model I ads a war-driving attack (wireless hacking) possibility to the DELTA network. 
Model II might create problems for production due to that communication with 
devices that are connected through wireless networks, will be closed if DELTA is 
isolated from GAMMA. Model III is most vulnerable to virus incidents and violate 
recommendations in industrial IS security standards. This solution is also very 
vulnerable to the scenario where DELTA is isolated from GAMMA. 
 
In a perspective of IS security, a conservative suggestion is therefore that the 
MES/EBR is operated from inside the DELTA network. If model I is implemented a 
further suggestion is to evaluate the use of EPSILON as DMZ between a wireless 
access point and ZETA or the production area networks.  
 
It is recommended to perform a risk assessment of the possibility for wiretapping of 
information in the DELTA network. Evaluation of encrypting communications within 
the DELTA network based on this risk assessment should be made if the MES/EBR 
system is implemented. 
 
 
8.5 Summary 
 
The identified IS security risks with the MES/EBR implementation are: 
 
- The scenario where the MES system malfunction or becomes infested with a virus 
 
- The scenario where EBR critical systems becomes unavailable or infested with a 
virus 
 
- Increased wireless network vulnerabilities in DELTA. 
 
- Wiretapping of information in DELTA 
 
- Problems with software for automatic validation of batches 
 
- Problems with electronic storage of records and traceability of batches 
 
The two first risks might cause the production to undesired halts. Due to these risks, 
a conservative suggestion is to operate the MES system from inside the DELTA 
network. The implementation of a MES and connection of a wireless network to the 
DELTA network demands thorough IS security risk assessment. 
 
The MES/EBR implementation provides an opportunity for reducing the risk of 
espionage against Sweden Operations through that the amount of printed batch 
protocols that are used in the production and lab environments is reduced. 
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9 Conclusions 
 
 
9.1 Overview 
 
This chapter presents the main conclusions from the study. Some ideas for future 
work, investigations and research, are also presented. 
 
 
9.2 Evaluation of DELTA and IS security compliance 
 
According to current available IS security standards the DELTA architecture is 
suitable for a large manufacturing site within Sweden Operations. It is considered as 
almost a best practice solution for a large manufacturing site with highly vulnerable 
process automation systems that demands a high level of IS security and at the 
same time connectivity to the corporate network. It is less suitable for a small 
manufacturing site. 
 
The architecture and implemented IS security measures are mainly compliant with 
global AstraZeneca IS security standards. Most exceptions from global AstraZeneca 
IS security standards are found on local process automation systems in the 
production areas. 
 
The impression is that the IS security level and the effectiveness of DELTA would 
benefit from a clear security program. There exist AstraZeneca policies, guidelines 
and SOPs for how to secure process automation systems and networks. These 
documents aim for systems and networks on different levels or are in general 
intended for a specific system or a special kind of systems.  
 
 
9.3 Most severe IS security risks in the production at the 
Södertälje site 
 
According to the risk analysis there are threat scenarios with consequences and 
impacts that might be very costly for Sweden Operations. A Day zero scenario (Major 
virus outbreak in the production due to that the anti-virus in the DELTA network not is 
updated in time) might cost Sweden Operations as much as -. A major virus outbreak 
in the THETA system might cost -. 
 
The most severe IS security risks that endangers DELTA and the production of 
pharmaceuticals at the Södertälje site are: 
 
- An unknown virus from GAMMA or the Internet that the antivirus in EPSILON can 
resist, with major impact on all the different networks and production areas within the 
DELTA network (known as a Day zero scenario). 
 
- An IBM error that have major effects on both the DELTA network and the 
production area networks. 
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- Non-validated updates or patching of infrastructure services or network equipment 
prevents friendly communications or network services in the DELTA network. 
 
- Major virus infection from system providers in a production area network with PLC 
based process automation systems. 
 
- Major virus infection from direct-dial up access in a production area network with 
PLC based process automation systems. 
 
- Major incident due to remote access through a direct-dial up connection in a 
production area network with PLC based process automation systems. 
 
- Major incident due to virus outbreak from a non-standard client in a production area 
network with PLC based process automation systems. 
 
The built in architecture and IS security safeguards address most of the identified 
threat scenarios, except for the Day zero scenario. The Day zero scenario potential is 
well known to the site Local IS security managers.  
 
 
9.4 IS security evaluation of MES/EBR system 
implementation 
 
The main IS security risks with the MES/EBR implementation are: 
 
- The scenario where the MES becomes unavailable 
 
- The scenario where EBR critical systems becomes unavailable 
 
- Increased wireless network vulnerabilities 
 
- Wiretapping of information 
 
- Problems with automatic validation of batches 
 
- Problems with electronic storage of records and traceability of batches 
 
The two first risks might cause the production to undesired halts if the MES for 
example is infested with a virus. Due to these risks, a conservative suggestion is to 
operate the MES from inside the DELTA network. The implementation of a MES and 
connection of a wireless network to the DELTA network demands thorough IS 
security risk assessment. 
 
 
9.5 Organizational conclusions about the IS security work in 
the production at the Södertälje site 
 
According to ISA 99, IS security can be viewed as a cultural issue and should be 
addressed in a holistic manner. Therefore there is need for a view on the IS security 
work at the Södertälje site in perspectives of organization and culture. Putting an 
organizational perspective on IS security in the production at the Södertälje site 
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defines four major parts: Global AstraZeneca IS security directions and standards, 
IBM, the Infrastructure (DELTA) and finally the operations. The operations include 
personnel from departments such as DSS, DPS, and personnel that works with lab 
systems. 
 
Global AstraZeneca IS security provides standards and rules that are difficult to 
adapt to the business needs and requirements that the operations have (see section 
9.6 second paragraph).  
 
IBM officially provide their services as agreed but there is doubt whether their 
services comply with the GMP regulations, that they will deliver the promised DRPs 
and BCP executions and that they sometimes fail to deliver their services as agreed. 
Examples that cost Sweden Operations time and money include patching of wrong 
systems and network malfunctions. The impression is also that IBM creates a lot of 
administrative work for Sweden Operations and not always understand the special 
requirements that pharmaceutical manufacturing demands.  
 
The operations is constantly under pressure to become more efficient and to cut 
costs. Therefore the requirements for increased IS security protection on process 
automation systems is viewed as something that mainly interfere and create 
problems. The impression when discussing IS security with personnel in production 
is that they identify virus infection as the major threat source. In most cases the virus 
is believed to origin from GAMMA and the Internet. The threat of social engineering, 
misbehaving personnel (both intentionally and unintentionally) and the risk for local 
virus infection outbreaks in a production area VLAN is unknown or somewhat naively 
neglected. 
 
Only the infrastructure is considered to deliver a satisfying level of IS security in a 
way that oblige with the other parts. 
 
Thus there is a need for harmonization between AstraZeneca Global IS security 
standards and the special conditions and business requirements that the operations 
have. The communication between Sweden Operations and IBM must also be 
improved and simplified to ensure that IBM deliver their services as agreed and with 
a satisfying level of IS security. 
 
The intention with the DELTA ISA 99 security program and especially the DELTA 
security group (DSG, section 7.3) is to overcome those problems and address the IS 
security risks in the production at the Södertälje site in an organizational manner. 
Selective actions for an increased IS security level will in the long run be more 
expensive than well-reasoned, strategic and cooperative work from all involved parts. 
With the DSG the communication might also be simplified and sharing of knowledge 
increased, and the IS security work less bureaucratic and more effective. 
 
 
9.6 Future work, investigations and research 
 
AstraZeneca 
Despite that the AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the 
Security of Process Automation Services recently has been approved as an 
AstraZeneca global IS security standard, it can be concluded that the document 
needs to be changed and updated. [31] 
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There is need for a mandatory and more specified section the network scenario (b) in 
the AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process 
Automation Services, that demands global exception, that states that process 
automation system clients needs to have closed USB, CD-ROM and floppy drives 
and hardening of operating systems (section 4.3.4 in AstraZeneca Mandatory 
Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services). This 
section should replace the physical security section (4.3.11 AstraZeneca Mandatory 
Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation Services) as 
requiring global approval. 
 
The vast amounts of exceptions that demand local approval will probably also create 
administrative problems at the different AstraZeneca sites.  
 
Isolation from the corporate network is not the solution for all IS security problems. 
Moving from network connectivity scenario (b) to network connectivity scenario (c) 
might be concluded as removing all mandatory requirements that need global or local 
approval in the document. But this is not the solution for all threats. Viruses can still 
be locally injected and systems intentionally or unintentionally abused. 
 
The AstraZeneca Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the Security of 
Process Automation Services is also very indistinct and can be interpreted very 
differently at different AstraZeneca sites. Thus AstraZeneca needs to update the 
Mandatory Standards and Good Practice for the Security of Process Automation 
Services document. 
 
When ISA 99 part 3 and 4 and the IEC 62443 have been released there is need for a 
new evaluation of the DELTA architecture and implemented IS security work and 
measures, with the help of these standards. This work could identify new threats and 
vulnerabilities as well as new technical and administrative solutions for combat of 
new and already identified threats. There is also need for keeping an eye out after 
new standards concerning architectures and DMZs in the manufacturing systems 
context. This area is currently underrepresented in the ISA 99 work. [27] 
 
The MES/EBR system implementation must be carefully looked after to ensure that 
the present IS security level in the DELTA network is maintained. Together with a 
possible need for encrypting of the communication on the DELTA network this also 
remains as a topic for future investigations. The AGA 12 standards represent a good 
reference source for SCADA systems communication and cryptography. [9] 
 
ISA 
Finally the area of IS Security concerning MES and MIS systems implementation and 
operations, remains as an area for future research. In the future this could possibly 
be added as fifth part of the ISA 99 standard. This part could also include network 
and system architecture solutions for connecting process automation system 
networks, MES, MIS and corporate networks, according to ISA 99 and ISA 95. 
 
 
 
 121
10 References 
 
 
Printed material 
 
[1] AstraZeneca PLC (2007); Annual report 2006 
 
[2] ISPE (2001); GAMP 4 – GAMP Guide for Validation of Automated Systems, 
 Good Automated Manufacturing Practice, ISPE 
 
[3] Olsson, Gustaf & Rosen, Christian (2005); Industrial Automation; applications, 
 structures and systems, Revised Edition, Media-Tryck, Lund University, Lund, 
 Sweden 
 
[4] McClure, Stuart, Scambray Joel & Kurtz George (2005); Hacking Exposed; 
 Network Security Secrets & Solutions, Fifth Edition, Mcgraw-Hill, California, 
 USA 
 
Articles 
 
[5] Anonymous, (2007); CYBER SECURITY - PLANT SAFETY: Beating the 
 hackers, Process engineering, February 2007, p. 21-22 
 
[6] Byres, Eric & Lowe, Justin (2004); The Myths and Facts behind Cyber 
 Security Risks for Industrial Control Systems, VDE Congress Berlin 2004 
 
[7] Henrie, Morgan & Carpenter, Philip (2006); Process Control Cyber-Security: 
 A Case-Study with Design Proposals, IEEE, Industrial and Commercial 
 Power  Systems Technical Conference paper 
  
[8] Singer, Bryan L & Weiss Joe (2005); Control systems cyber security, 
 Control Engineering, Volume 52, Issue 2, p. 26-31 
 
Standards, guidelines and policies 
 
[9] AGA (2006); AGA 12, part 2, draft 2006-03-31 
  
[10] CIDX (2004); Report on Cyber security Vulnerability Assessment 
 Methodologies, Version 2.0,  
 http://www.chemicalcybersecurity.com/cybersecurity_tools/guidance_docs.cf
 m , 20070223 
 
[11] Department of Homeland Security (2006); Control Systems Cyber Security: 
 Defence in Depth Strategies, External report # INL/EXT-06-11478,  
 http://csrp.inl.gov/Documents/Defense%20in%20Depth%20Strategies.pdf , 
 20070227 
 
[12] ISA (2000); ISA-95.00.01-2000 Enterprise-Control System Integration Part 1: 
 Models and Terminology, ISBN: 1-55617-727-5 
 
 122
[13] ISA (2006); ISA-d99.00.01 Security for Industrial Automation and Control 
 Systems Part 1: Concepts, Terminology and Models, Draft 2 Edit 8 
 
[14] ISA (2006); ISA-d99.00.02 Security for Industrial Automation and Control 
 Systems Part 2: Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems 
 Security Program, Draft 2 Edit 9 
 
[15] ISA (2003); ISA-dTR99.00.01 Security Technologies for Manufacturing and 
 Control Systems, Draft 14 
 
[16] ISA (2004); ISA-dTR99.00.02 Integrating Electronic Security into the 
 Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment, Draft 15 
 
[17] NISCC (2005); NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for 
 SCADA and Process Control Networks, Revision 1.4,  
 http://www.cpni.gov.uk/ProtectingYourAssets/ElectronicSecurity/scada.aspx , 
 20070220 
 
[18] NIST (2006); Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
 and Industrial Control Systems Security; Recommendations of the National 
 Institute of Standards and Technology, Special publication 800-82, Initial 
 public draft,  csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-82/Draft-SP800-82.pdf , 
 20070220 
 
[19] Primatech Inc (2003); A Scenario Based Approach For Industrial Cyber 
 Security Vulnerability Analysis, 
 http://www.primatech.com/info/paper_a_scenario_based_approach_for_indus
 trial_cyber_security_vulnerability_analysis.pdf , 20070223 
 
Course material 
 
[20] ISA (2004); Securing Industrial Networks; Cyber Protection for Automation, 
 Control and SCADA Systems, Course IC32C Participant Note set, Version 
 1.5 
 
[21] Sweden Operations/OKT (2006); Introduktion i GMP 
 
Electronic sources 
 
[22] AstraZeneca Sweden, www.astrazeneca.se, 20070306 
 
[23] http://bridgefieldgroup.com/bridgefieldgroup/glos6.htm#M, 20070424 
 
[24] Cyber Threat Source Descriptions,  
 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/csthreats.html, 20070306 
 
[25] Overview of Cyber Vulnerabilities,  
 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/csvuls.html , 20070305 
 
 
 
 123
[26] Pressmeddelande; AstraZenecas tidigare aviserade effektiviseringsprogram i 
 produktionen tar nu form, 
 http://www.astrazeneca.se/5804_18923.aspx?year=2007&l1=&l2=&l3= ,
 20070330 
 
[27] Project : IEC 62443 Ed. 1.0, http://www.iec.ch/cgi-
 bin/procgi.pl/www/iecwww.p?wwwlang=E&wwwprog=sea22.p&search=iecnu
 mber&header=IEC&pubno=62443&part=&se=&submit=Submit, 20070425 
 
AstraZeneca documentation 
 
[28] Enckell, Carl & Perhsson, Mikael (2005); A model for MES in Pharmaceutical 
Production, Master Thesis, Department of Automatic Control, Lund University 
 
[29] AstraZeneca Aggregating risks to site level; (Swe Ops, UK OPS, US OPS), 
 PowerPoint presentation 
 
[30] AstraZeneca global Computer Users Code of Conduct,   
 
[31] Global Automation Strategy Team – Security Group (2006) Mandatory 
 standards and good practice for the security of process automation systems,  
 Draft J 
 
[32] Global Automation Strategy Team – Security Group (2004) Secure Network 
 Isolation of Process Automation Computer Systems, Version 1.0 
 
[33] AstraZeneca Global IS Incident reporting in 2005 
 
[34] Alfa plant description   
  
[35] AstraZeneca IRM tips and guidance 
  
[36] Password Standards, IS SEC 027 
 
[37] Wireless LAN Security, IS SEC 029 
 
[38] AstraZeneca IS Security FAQ's 
 
[39] Mission Sweden Operations OI 
 
[40] Mission Sweden Operations 
 
[41] Presentation of THETA system, PowerPoint presentation  
 
[42] Beta plant description  
 
[43] Vision Sweden Operations OI 
 
[44] BaDS DELTA Beskrivning av datoriserat system DELTA, Version 1.0 
 
[45] BaDS DCS Beskrivning av datoriserat system DCS  
 
 124
[46] RUT 310235 Viruskontroll av extern programvara som implementeras i 
 processtyrsystem förvaltade av  
 
[47] RUT 400113 Krav och regler för extern personal med GMP-relaterade 
 uppdrag inom Analytisk Kontroll.  
 
[48] RUT 400038 Katastrof och kontinuitetsplan för produktionssystem THETA 
 
[49] RUT 400451 Utförande vid anslutning av Remote Control inom Gärtuna  
 
[50] SOP 016054 Vulnerability Assessment Standard Operating Procedure 
  
[51] SOP 110104 Behörighetshantering av datoriserade produktionssystem 
THETA 
 
[52] SOP 110179 Viruskontroll av datautrustning för produktionssystem 
 inom Tabletttillverkning  
 
[53] SOP 200014 Validering 
 
[54] SOP 200082 Validering av datoriserade system  
 
[55] SOP 300091 Behörighet - processtyrsystem  
 
Interviews 
 
[56] Roger Belvén, IS-quality Manager, OI, 20070316 
 
[57] Dan Bergvall, System Manager, CTS, 20070509 
 
[58] Mikael Björklund, Automation Engineer, CTS, 20070319 
 
[59] Tomas Borg, Group manager, QC Lab Coordination, 20070416 
 
[60] Max Börjesson, System Service Manager, OITP, 20070316 
 
[61] Johan Callin, Associate Director Automation, AstraZeneca Engineering, 
20070316  
 
[62] Henrik Carnborg, System Manager, CTS, 20070509 
 
[63] Chatarina Daggenfelt, First Line Manager, QA & QC Systems, 20070522 
 
[64] Tomas Ersson, System manager, OITP, 20070313 
 
[65] Christer Gottschalk, LISSM, OITI, 20070424 
 
[66] Torbjörn Hjalmarsson (Phone), Technical Specialist, CTS, 20070321 
 
[67] Malin Holmstrand, Business Controller, OF, 20070326  
 
[68] Robert Järn, Process Technician, TP, 20070507  
 
 125
[69] Fredrik Lundgren (Phone), Quality Manager, QA Computerized systems, 
20070319  
 
[70] Britt-Marie Linder (Phone), Group manager, TP, 20070425 
 
[71] Monica Lindmark-Hamberg, (Phone), Group manager, TP, 20070425 
 
[72] Catrin Mattson, Business Controller, OF, 20070326 
 
[73] Joakim Moby, IT Infrastructure Manager, OITI, Numerous interviews spring 
2007 
 
[74] Fredrik Paulsson (Phone), Finance manager, OF, 20070411 
 
[75] Ola Persson, IS project manager, OI Project Management, 20070411 
 
[76] Tomas Raidma (E-mail), DPS , 20070329 
 
[77] Ted Svensson, DSS, 20070325 
 
[78] Björn Vingek, IS/IT, 20070321 
 
[79] Östh, Anna, LISSM, OITI, 20070321 
 
Other sources 
 
[80] MESA international (2006); MESA Metrics that Matter Guidebook & 
Framework 
 
[81] Observations in ALFA and BETA, Spring 2007 
 
[82] Test of connection of laptop to production area and JOTA VLANs, 20070320 
(Appendix D) 
 
 126
 Appendix A 
 
 
AstraZeneca Risk criterions 
 
 
Likelihood Impact (financial or time delay) Definitions 
Measure Score Time Delay Score 
VH - Very High 5 
An event you can expect to 
happen (Once per year or 
more) 
VH 4 months VH 
H - High 4 
An event that can be 
anticipated to happen and this 
area/AZ or a closely allied 
company have experienced 
such an event (Once in 3 year)
H 6 weeks H 
M - Medium 3 
A rare event that can be 
envisaged but has not occurred 
in this area or in AZ (Once in 
10 year) 
M 2 weeks M 
L - Low 2 
An event that can be 
envisaged but hasn’t occurred 
in the company history (e.g. 
requires a combination of two 
or more events to occur).(Once 
in 30 years) 
L 1 week L 
VL - Very Low 1 
An event that can be conceived 
but is considered to be very 
difficult to realise (e.g. requires 
a combination of several 
events to occur) (Once in 100 
year or less) 
VL 1 day VL 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Equipment and processes in ALFA and BETA 
 
 
Segment/Skepp A ALFA plant 
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Tablet production area (BETA) 
 
 
Production flow in tablet production area in BETA 
 
Blue arrows indicate feeding of solvers or sanitation fluids. Black arrows indicate 
production material workflow. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Threat scenarios and vulnerabilities 
 
 
DELTA CONDUIT 
 
 
Threat scenario Consequences Likelihood
Financial 
impact (lost 
production 
capacity) 
Severity 
Total cost 
for worst 
case 
scenario 
Passive threats      
Information collection 
through wire-tapping.      
Scanning of the 
network architecture.      
Malicious code      
Unknown custom 
made virus for an 
attack against 
AstraZeneca or 
DELTA (Day zero 
attack) 
     
Unknown virus from 
GAMMA & Internet. 
(Day zero scenario) 
     
Virus from corporate 
network (GAMMA) & 
Internet 
     
Human errors      
Social engineering. 
Individual with 
knowledge about 
architecture and 
network weaknesses 
might be tricked or 
forced to reveal 
information or destroy 
critical computer 
equipment. 
     
IBM error that have 
major effects on 
both DELTA and the 
production area 
networks. 
     
Insider intentionally 
damages or abuse 
system or network. 
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Non-validated 
update or patching 
prevents friendly 
communications or 
network services. 
     
Interference of 
systems and 
communication 
     
Denial of service 
attack from the 
Internet. 
     
Undesired remote 
access from the 
Internet to a network 
inside DELTA 
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EPSILON ZONE 
 
 
Threat scenario Consequences Likelihood Financial 
impact (lost 
production 
capacity) 
Severity Total cost 
for worst 
case 
scenario 
Passive threats      
Not applicable.      
Malicious code      
Virus from corporate 
network (GAMMA).  
    
Virus from ZETA.      
Virus from production 
area VLAN zone.  
    
Virus from JOTA 
VLAN zone.  
    
Virus from system 
provider.  
    
Human errors      
Social engineering. 
Individual with 
knowledge about 
architecture and 
network weaknesses 
might be tricked or 
forced to reveal 
information or destroy 
critical computer 
equipment or inject 
virus.  
    
Insider intentionally 
damages or abuse 
system.  
    
Interference of 
systems and 
communication 
     
Remote access from 
Internet to systems in 
EPSILON.  
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ZETA ZONE 
 
 
Threat scenario Consequences Likelihood Financial 
impact 
(lost 
production 
capacity) 
Severity Total cost 
for worst 
case 
scenario 
Passive threats      
Not applicable.      
Malicious code      
Virus from corporate 
network (GAMMA).  
    
Virus from 
EPSILON.  
    
Virus from 
production area 
VLAN zone.  
    
Virus from JOTA 
VLAN  
    
Virus from system 
provider.  
    
Human errors      
Social engineering.      
Insider intentionally 
damages or abuse 
system.  
    
Interference of 
systems and 
communication 
     
Remote access from 
Internet to systems 
in ZETA.  
    
 
 133
PLC based production area VLAN ZONE (BETA) 
  
 
Threat scenario Consequences Likelihood Financial 
impact (lost 
production 
capacity) 
Severity Total cost 
for worst 
case 
scenario 
Passive threats      
Wiretapping of 
information through 
direct dial-up. 
     
Scanning of network 
through direct dial-
up. 
     
Malicious code      
Virus from corporate 
network (GAMMA).  
    
Virus from EPSILON.      
Virus from ZETA.      
Virus from other 
production area 
VLAN zone.  
    
Virus from JOTA 
VLAN zone.  
    
Virus from system 
vendor or laptop.  
    
Virus from AZ laptop.      
Virus from operator 
on standard client.  
    
Virus from operator 
on non-standard 
client.  
    
E-mail carried virus.      
Virus through direct 
dial-up.  
    
Human errors      
Manipulation of 
operating system.  
    
Manipulation of 
Process control 
related system.  
    
Social engineering.      
Interference of 
systems and 
communication 
     
Direct Dial-up 
access.  
    
Remote access to 
systems from the 
Internet.  
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DCS production area VLAN ZONE (ALFA) 
 
 
Threat scenario Consequences Likelihood Financial 
impact (lost 
production 
capacity) 
Severity Total cost 
for worst 
case 
scenario 
Passive threats      
Wiretapping of 
information through 
direct dial-up. 
     
Scanning of network 
through direct dial-
up. 
     
Malicious code      
Virus from corporate 
network (GAMMA).  
    
Virus from EPSILON.      
Virus from ZETA.      
Virus from other 
production area 
VLAN zone.  
    
Virus from JOTA 
VLAN  
    
Virus from system 
vendor or laptop.  
    
Virus from AZ laptop.      
Virus from operator 
on standard client.  
    
Virus from operator 
on non-standard 
client.  
    
E-mail carried virus.      
Virus through direct 
dial-up.  
    
Human errors      
Manipulation of 
operating system.  
    
Manipulation of 
Process control 
related system.  
    
Social engineering.      
Interference of 
systems and 
communication 
     
Direct Dial-up 
access.  
    
Remote access to 
systems from the 
Internet.  
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JOTA VLAN ZONE 
 
 
Threat scenario Consequences Likelihood Financial 
impact (lost 
production 
capacity) 
Severity Total cost 
for worst 
case 
scenario 
Passive threats      
Not applicable.      
Malicious code      
Virus from corporate 
network (GAMMA). 
     
Virus from 
EPSILON. 
     
Virus from ZETA.      
Virus from 
production area 
VLAN zone. 
     
Virus from system 
vendor or laptop. 
     
Virus from AZ 
laptop. 
     
Virus from operator 
on lab client 
     
Human errors      
Manipulation of 
operating system. 
     
Manipulation of lab 
instrument related 
system. 
     
Social engineering.      
Interference of 
systems and 
communication 
     
Remote access to 
systems from the 
Internet. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Test of connection of laptop to production area and JOTA 
VLAN 
 
 
Test AZ laptop ’External’ laptop 
Automatic assignment of IP 
address (DHCP)? 
No No, no automatic DHCP 
assignment 
Possibility to assign IP address 
(DHCP)? 
No Yes, DHCP 
Possibility to generate ‘ping’? - Yes, the gateway, main 
router and EPSILON. 
ZETA no. 
Possible to ping the firewall? 
 
 
- No 
Possible to run Remote 
Desktop on EPSILON-servers? 
(Access with normal PRID?) 
- Yes, no access with 
normal PRID account. 
Possible to run Remote 
Desktop on ZETA-servers? 
- No 
 
Possible to run Telnet and http 
protocols on EPSILON? 
 
- Telnet activated 
(password protected), http 
activated (password 
protected) 
 
Connect shares on EPSILON-
servers (c$)? 
 
- No 
Possible to ping clients in other 
‘BRONZE’ VLAN 
 
 
- No 
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Appendix E 
 
 
DELTA IS security program implementation responsibilities 
 
Translation 
 
Swedish title English title 
Systemägare System owner 
Systemförvaltare System manager 
Systemapplikationsägare System application owner 
Systemapplikationsförvaltare System application manager 
System/Tjänsteleverantör System/Service provider 
Chef IT SWEOPS IS Director IT SWEOPS IS 
Lokal enhetschef eller fabrikschef Head of local production area or lab 
department 
Lokal CTS or Lab system manager Head of local system managers 
group 
Standardklient eller -server /  Icke 
standardklient eller -server 
Standard client or server / Non-
standard client or server 
 
 
Defence-in-depth strategy 
 
 System, service 
or network 
owner 
(suggested 
future system 
owner) 
Demand or 
management 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
 
Key Stakeholder 
Governance 
responsible 
department / 
Personnel 
Supplier of 
service 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
Mandatory Priority 
1 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
2 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
3 (DELTA owner) DELTA manager  IT Services IBM  * 
4 DELTA owner / 
System owner of 
non-standard 
client 
DSG + LISSM IT Services / 
System governing 
organization 
IBM / Service 
supplier 
M * 
5 DELTA owner DSG + LISSM AZ Engineering IBM  ** 
6 DELTA owner / 
System owner of 
non standard-
clients 
DELTA manager / 
System owner 
IT Services / 
System manager 
IBM / System 
provider 
M *** 
7 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
IT Coordination and 
Security Manager 
IT Infrastructure 
Manager (DELTA 
-  ** 
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manager) 
8 LISSM DSG + LISSM DSG DSG  ** 
9 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
DSG + LISSM DSG HR + LISSM  ** 
10 DELTA owner + 
System 
application 
owner / System 
owner 
DSG + LISSM IT Services + 
system 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM+ service 
provider / System 
supplier 
 ** 
11 DELTA owner + 
System 
application 
owner / System 
owner 
LISSM IT Services + 
System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M *** 
 139
IS security policy for DELTA network, services and applications  
 
 System, service 
or network 
owner 
(suggested 
future system 
owner) 
Demand or 
management 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
 
Key Stakeholder 
Governance 
responsible 
department / 
Personnel 
Supplier of 
service 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
Mandatory Priority 
12 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
13 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM  * 
14 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
15 DELTA owner DELTA manager + 
DSG 
IT Services IBM  ** 
16 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
17 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M ** 
18 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M ** 
19 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS + 
DELTA owner 
LISSM DSG DSG  ** 
20 DELTA owner + 
THETA owner + 
Eta systems 
owners 
DELTA manager + 
THETA manager + 
Eta systems 
manger 
IT Services + 
Omikron + 
provider of Lab 
systems 
IBM + Omikron + 
Provider of Lab 
systems 
M * 
21 DELTA owner / 
System 
application 
owner 
DELTA manager / 
System application 
manager 
IT Services / 
Service 
application 
provider 
IBM / Service 
application 
provider 
M ** 
22 (System owner) DSG Project manager System provider  ** 
23 DELTA owner / 
THETA owner / 
Eta systems 
owner 
DSG IT services / IT 
Services + OITP / 
IT Services + Eta 
systems manager
IBM / IBM + 
Omikron / IBM + 
Eta systems 
provider 
 *** 
24 DELTA owner DSG DSG IBM / IBM + 
Omikron + OITP 
 * 
25 DELTA owner DSG IT Services IBM  ** 
26 DELTA owner / 
THETA owner / 
Eta systems 
owner 
DSG IT services / IT 
Services + OITP / 
IT Services + Eta 
systems manager
IBM / IBM + 
Omikron / IBM + 
Eta systems 
provider 
 *** 
27 DELTA Owner DSG DSG IBM + Omikron + 
IT services + 
System 
application 
managers in 
 ** 
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ZETA 
28 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM  * 
29 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
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IS security policy for Production area and Lab VLAN environments 
 
 System, service 
or network 
owner 
(suggested 
future system 
owner) 
Demand or 
management 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
 
Key Stakeholder 
Governance 
responsible 
department / 
Personnel 
Supplier of 
service 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
Mandatory Priority 
30 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
LISSM Head of local 
production area 
or lab department
HR + LISSM  ** 
31 
 
Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
LISSM Head of local 
production area 
or lab department
HR + LISSM  ** 
32 DELTA owner + 
System 
application 
owner / System 
owner of non-
standard client 
LISSM IT Services + 
System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M * 
33 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
LISSM Head of local 
production area 
or lab department
QQU  ** 
34 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
LISSM LISSM DSG  *** 
35 DELTA owner DSG IT Services IBM  ** 
36 DELTA owner DSG AZ Engineering / 
CTS project 
managers / Lab 
system project 
managers 
AZ Engineering / 
CTS project 
managers / Lab 
system project 
managers 
 ** 
37 DELTA owner + 
System 
application 
owner / System 
owner of non-
standard client 
DELTA manager / 
System owner of 
non-standard client 
IT Services + 
System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM+ System 
application 
provider / System  
service provider 
M  
38 System owner System owner System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM+ System 
application 
provider / System  
service provider 
M *** 
39 System owner System owner System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
  
40 DELTA owner / 
System owner of 
non-standard 
client 
DELTA manager / 
System owner of 
non-standard client 
IT Services + 
System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M *** 
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41 DELTA owner / 
System owner of 
non-standard 
client 
DELTA manager / 
System owner of 
non-standard client 
IT Services + 
System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M *** 
42 DELTA owner + 
System 
application 
owner / System 
owner 
DELTA manager / 
System owner 
IT Services + 
System 
application 
manager / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M ** 
43 DELTA owner / 
System owner 
DELTA manager / 
System owner 
IT Services / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M ** 
44 DELTA owner / 
System owner of 
non-standard 
client 
DELTA manager / 
System owner of 
non-standard client 
IT Services / 
System manager 
IBM / System  
service provider 
M  
45 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
Head of local 
system managers 
group 
Head of local 
production area 
or lab department
Local system 
managers 
 ** 
46 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
Head of local 
system managers 
group 
Head of local 
production area 
or lab department
Local system 
managers 
 ** 
47 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
DSG System 
managers + CTS 
+ IT Services + 
IBM + 
OITP/Omikron 
System 
managers + CTS 
+ IT Services + 
IBM + 
OITP/Omikron 
 ** 
48 System owner DSG + LISSM IT Services / 
System manager 
+ CTS 
IBM / System 
manager + CTS 
  
49 DELTA owner DSG Local CTS + 
System supplier 
Local CTS + 
System supplier 
M  
50 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS + 
Associate 
Director, 
Automation AZ 
Engineering 
 
DSG AZ Engineering / 
CTS project 
managers / Lab 
system project 
managers  
AZ Engineering / 
CTS project 
managers / Lab 
system project 
managers 
 ** 
51 Director IT 
SWEOPS IS 
DSG IT Infrastructure 
and Coordination 
manager + DSG 
LISSM  ** 
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Integrated risk management (IRM) 
 
 System, service 
or network 
owner 
(suggested 
future system 
owner) 
Demand or 
management 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
 
Key Stakeholder 
Governance 
responsible 
department / 
Personnel 
Supplier of 
service 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
Mandatory Priority 
52 DSG DSG DSG DSG  ** 
 
 
Monitoring and reviewing of the DELTA IS security program 
 
 System, service 
or network 
owner 
(suggested 
future system 
owner) 
Demand or 
management 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
 
Key Stakeholder 
Governance 
responsible 
department / 
Personnel 
Supplier of 
service 
responsible 
department / 
personnel 
Mandatory Priority 
53 DELTA owner DSG + DELTA 
manager 
IT Services IBM  ** 
54 DELTA owner DSG + DELTA 
manager 
IT Services IBM  ** 
55 DELTA owner DELTA manager IT Services IBM M * 
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Appendix F 
 
Abbreviations 
 
API Active pharmaceutical ingredient 
BaDS Beskrivning av datoriserat system 
BCP Business continuity plan 
CIDX Chemical industry data exchange 
CTS Common Technical Support 
DCS Distributed control system 
DHCP Dynamic host configuration protocol 
DHS Department of homeland security 
DMZ Demilitarized zone 
DRP Disaster recovery plan 
EBR Electronic batch records 
FDA Food and drug administration 
DSG DELTA security group 
FTP File transfer protocol 
GAMP Good automated manufacturing practice 
GAST Global automation strategy team 
GMP Good manufacturing practice 
HTTP Hyper text transfer protocol 
IP Internet protocol 
IRM Integrated risk management 
IS Information systems 
ISMO international sales and marketing organization 
IT Information technology 
KPI Key performance indicators 
LISSM Local infrastructure IS security manager 
MES Manufacturing execution system 
MIS Manufacturing information systems 
NISCC National infrastructure security co-ordination centre (UK) 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology (USA) 
OI Information Services 
OF Finance 
OIT Information Technology 
OITI IT Infrastructure and Security 
OITP Production Information Systems 
PLC Programmable logic controller 
QA Quality Assurance 
QC Quality Control 
R&D Research and Development 
RTU Remote terminal units 
RUT Routine 
SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition 
SOP Standard operating procedure 
TP Process Technology 
TR Technical report 
USB Universal serial bus 
WAN Wide area network 
 
 
